Police power is defined broadly as the State's authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. This all-comprehensive definition provides ample room for the State to meet the exigencies of the times depending on the conditions and circumstances. As the Court eruditely explained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp.[164](Basco):
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra).
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of change.[165]
From the legislative history of the Philippine education system as detailed above, one can easily discern that the enactment of education laws, including the K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten Education Act, their respective implementing rules and regulations and the issuances of the government agencies, are an exercise of the State's police power. The State has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education and the general welfare of the people. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,[166] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education."[167]
Here, petitioners essentially assail the State's exercise of police power to regulate education through the adoption of the K to 12 Basic Education Program, because the K to 12 Law and its related issuances purportedly violate the Constitutional provisions as enumerated in the outline of issues above.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.[168] For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[169] The grounds for nullity must be clear beyond reasonable doubt.[170] Hence, for the Court to nullify the assailed laws, petitioners must clearly establish that the constitutional provisions they cite bestow upon them demandable and enforceable rights and that such rights clash against the State's exercise of its police power under the K to 12 Law.
To be sure, the Court's role is to balance the State's exercise of its police power as against the rights of petitioners. The Court's pronouncement in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion[171] (Lantion) instructs:
x x x The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government's promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.[172]
In fact, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,[173] where the question was the validity of a statute criminalizing the failure of parents to allow their children to attend compulsory high school education, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that although the State's interest in universal education is highly ranked in terms of State functions, this does not free this exercise of State function from the balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, specifically the Free Exercise Clause, thus:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. See, e.g., Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534, 69 L Ed 1070, 1077, 45 S Ct 571, 39 ALR 468 (1925). Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. There the Court held that Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring, including their education in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society. See also Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639 20 L Ed 2d 195, 203, 88 S Ct 1274 (1968); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 67 L Ed 1042, 43 S Ct 625, 29 ALR 1446 (1923); cf. Rowan v Post Office Dept., 397 US 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484 (1970). Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional obligations." 268 US at 535, 69 L Ed AT 1078.[174]
As quoted above, this balancing of interest approach has been applied in this jurisdiction in Lantion in determining whether there was a violation of the private respondent's right to due process when he was not furnished a copy of the request for his extradition. This right was balanced against the country's commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to extradite to the United States of America persons who were charged with the violation of some of its laws. [175]
The Court held in Lantion that at the stage of the extradition, it was only at an evaluation stage; thus there was yet no requirement that he be given notice of the proceedings. At that stage, the balance was tilted in favor of the interest of the State in helping suppress crime by facilitating the extradition of persons covered by treaties entered into by the government.[176]
It is with these standards and framework that the Court examines whether the enactments of the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 Law and their implementing rules and regulations, were valid exercises of the State's police power to regulate education.
In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions of the Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore give rise to causes of action in court.[177] Accordingly, it is necessary to determine first whether the constitutional provisions invoked by petitioners are self-executing; and if they are, is there a conflict between these rights and the State's police power to regulate education? If a conflict does exist, do the rights of petitioners yield to the police power of the State?
xx x x
In an attempt to bolster their case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners also raised the following policy issues:
Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate, government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination.[281] Stated otherwise, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[282] Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner — all these are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.[283] In the case of Tañada v. Cuenco,[284] the Court, quoting American authorities, held:
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts."[285] (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. DENR Region 12 Employees,[286] the Court held that:
x x x. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments.
The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Unless there is a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court's exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it may seem to be, still must succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. After a careful review of the records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretion has not been shown to exist.[287] (Emphasis supplied)
Further, the courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the determination of actual cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.[288] The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretion.[289] For having failed to show any of the above in the passage of the assailed law and the department issuances, the petitioners' remedy thus lies not with the Court, but with the executive and legislative branches of the government.[290]
No comments:
Post a Comment