In the case of Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.[25] it is held that:
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged — it is public and secular, not religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral.[26] (Citations and emphasis in the original omitted)
The totality of evidence in this case does not justify the dismissal of Dagdag from her employment considering that there was no legal impediment to marry between Dagdag and the father of her child at the time of the conception. To reiterate the ruling of this Court in Leus and Capin-Cadiz, pregnancy of a school teacher out of wedlock is not a just cause for termination of an employment absent any showing that the pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
xxx
This Court, in a number of cases, has deemed the acts of unmarried male respondents engaging in pre-marital sexual relations (and even siring children) with an unmarried woman insufficient to warrant removing from the male respondent his means to earn a living. I submit that the guarantee of equal protection of the law compels us to apply the same treatment to unmarried female employees who decide to enter into pre-marital, consensual sexual relations with a man, likewise unmarried, and bear a child as a result of these relations.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
The guarantee of equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[34] Its purpose is to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, and forbids the drawing of distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[35] In other words, similar subjects should not be treated differently as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.[36]
Our jurisprudence is replete with cases dismissing disbarment cases filed against unmarried male lawyers for commission of allegedly immoral conduct with unmarried female partners:
In Soberano v. Villanueva,[37] this Court held that "[i]ntimacy between a man and a woman who are not married x x x is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act [nor] so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar."[38]
In Reyes v. Wong,[39] we held that while "[undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack of a valid marriage. But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must be 'grossly immoral' — 'it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."[40]
In Radaza v. Tejano,[41] while the Court found that respondent's conduct does not "[conform] with the highest standard of morality and propriety or decorum that every lawyer is expected to maintain," it nevertheless held that the same "does not warrant drastic disciplinary action."[42]
In Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr.,[43] the Court found that respondent's acts of bearing an illegitimate child and reneging on his promise to marry petitioner did not "constitute gross immorality warranting [his] permanent exclusion x x x from the legal profession."[44]
In all the foregoing cases, the Court refused to disbar the unmarried male respondent for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations with an unmarried woman, "even if as a result of such relationship, a child was born out of wedlock."[45] Indeed, while the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws without distinction,[46] classification can only be permitted when the same is "based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary."[47] Here, I find no reasonable foundation or rational basis (and none appears to have been shown on the record) for a distinction between unmarried male and female workers as to warrant differential treatment for their commission of what are essentially the same act/s.
Thus, upholding respondent's termination from employment on account of her engaging in premarital sexual relations with her unmarried partner, and having a baby as a consequence, constitutes discrimination insofar as the same grounds have been held insufficient to warrant removal from a male respondent (under like circumstances) of his means of livelihood.
xxx
An unmarried woman has a liberty interest under the due process clause to engage in consensual sexual relations with an unmarried man and bear a child with him as a result of said relations. I submit this Opinion to show that (I) considering jurisprudential precedents and Filipino tradition, it is high time this Court recognize this liberty interest as a fundamental right entitled to State protection. Thus, pregnancy of an employee out of wedlock cannot constitute just cause for termination from employment absent any showing that the pregnancy was contracted under grossly immoral circumstances; and (II) a contrary ruling would violate the constitutional guarantee of equalprotection of the law and result in an unwarranted difference in treatment of men and women under like circumstances.
I
Our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Liberty, in turn, has been generally defined by this Court as the freedom to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.[1]Traditionally, the exercise of liberty interests is protected from arbitrary government interference. Where the government is able to show a rational relation between its action and a legitimate governmental interest, judicial attitude toward the challenged state action is deferential and government intrusions into liberty interests are generally upheld.[2] This deference, however, stops when the governmental act infringes on a fundamental right. In such cases, the Court requires "a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice."[3]
A
An unmarried woman has a liberty interest to engage in consensual sexual relations with an unmarried man and bear a child with him as a result of said relations. I submit that it is high time that the Court recognize this liberty interest as "fundamental," as to require a higher burden of proof to justify its intrusion.[4]
In this jurisdiction, fundamental rights have been deemed to include only those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.[5] Admittedly, there is nothing in our Bill of Rights which explicitly guarantees a right in favor of an unmarried woman to engage in consensual sexual relations with an unmarried man, and thereafter bear a child with him. Precedential decisions of this Court, however, support the recognition of the fundamental nature of this liberty interest.
A general right to personal privacy is recognized in the United States, with its Supreme Court declaring that liberties extend to "certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy x x x"[6] The right to privacy was first expressly recognized in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,[7] where the US Supreme Court upheld a privacy right to use contraceptives in favor of married couples. (Later on, a similar right in favor of unmarried individuals would be recognized in the case of Eisenstadt v. Baird.[8])
In this jurisdiction, the constitutional right to personal privacy was first explicitly acknowledged in 1968[9] when the Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,[10] adopted the ruling in Griswold, declaring thus:
x x x The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. x x x
x x x x
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. x x x[11] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
On the other hand, in Leus v. St. Scholastica 's College Westgrove,[12] this Court has held that the fact that an unmarried female employee gives birth out of wedlock does not give cause for administrative sanction for disgraceful and immoral conduct under the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) if the father of her child is himself unmarried.[13] The Court said:
x x x It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.[14] (Emphasis omitted.)
This ruling was subsequently affirmed in Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.,[15] which involved a suit questioning Brent Hospital's act of putting an unwed, pregnant employee on suspension until she marries her child's father in accordance with law. In ruling in favor of the female employee, the Court in Cadiz recognized a woman's inherent, intangible and inalienable right to choose her status, that is, to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with her free and full consent.[16] In my Concurring Opinion in Cadiz, I first ventured that this freedom to choose also includes the freedom to decide whether she will bear and rear her child without the benefit of marriage.[17]
More recently, the fundamental right to marry was again recognized in Republic v. Manalo,[18] where this Court upheld a liberty interest on the part of a Filipino spouse to be re-capacitated to marry, in cases where a valid foreign divorce has been obtained.
I submit that the foregoing jurisprudential holdings recognizing fundamental rights to marriage and privacy can and should extend to include a right on the part of an unmarried woman to engage in consensual sexual relations with an unmarried man and bear a child with him as a result. As I explained in my Concurring Opinion in Cadiz:
x x x [T]he rights to personal liberty and privacy are embodied in the Due Process Clause and expounded by jurisprudence. These rights pertain to the freedom to make personal choices that define a human being's life and personhood. The decision to marry and to whom are two of the most important choices that a woman can make in her life. In the words of the US Supreme Court in Obergefell "[n]o union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were." The State has no business interfering with this choice. Neither can it sanction any undue burden of the right to make these choices. Brent, in conditioning Christine Joy's reinstatement on her marriage, has effectively burdened her freedom. She was forced to choose to lose her job or marry in order to keep it. By invoking the MRPS and the Labor Code, Brent is, in effect, saying that this kind of compelled choice is sanctioned by the State. Contrary to this position, the State cannot countenance placing a woman employee in a situation where she will have to give up one right (the right to marry as a component of personal liberty and privacy) for another (the right to employment). This is not the kind of State that we are in. Nor is it the kind of values that our Constitution stands for.
x x x x
Christine Joy has the right to decide how she will rear her child. If this choice involves being a single mother for now or for good, no law or government issuance may be used to interfere with this decision. Christine Joy, and all other women similarly situated, should find refuge in the protection extended by the Constitution.
The Constitution highlights the value of the family as the foundation of the nation. Complementary to this, the Family Code of the Philippines provides that marriage is the foundation of the family. Indeed, our laws and tradition recognize that children are usually reared and families built within the confines of marriage. The Constitution and the laws, however, merely express an ideal. While marriage is the ideal starting point of a family, there is no constitutional or statutory provision limiting the definition of a family or preventing any attempt to deviate from our traditional template of what a family should be.
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