Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113: The crime has just been committed/personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it

Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.

In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.

In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 

1) the crime should have been just committed; and

 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely:

 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested?

 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and

 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? 

We rule in the affirmative.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182601               November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.