PRINCIPLES: BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY, LEMON TEST,

In Estrada vs. Escritor,^[54] this Court encapsulated its policy towards these kinds of disputes as "benevolent neutrality":

By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government action and examines the effect of these actions on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of accommodation where an exemption is sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.

Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the religion clauses justify it. While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small-not only for a majority, however large-but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.^[55] (Emphasis ours)

Verily, where the Court has been asked to determine whether there has been an undue enchroachment of this Constitutionally forged "wall", this Court has adopted a stance of "benevolent neutrality". Rightfully so, for this incorporates the Constitutional principle of separation of the Church and the State while recognizing the people's right to express their belief or non­ belief of a Supreme Being. This Court, applying the view of benevolent neutrality, declared that there was no violation of the non-establishment of religion clause in the recent case of Re: Letter Of Tony Q. Valenciano.^[56]

Even in the U. S., whose jurisprudence are of persuasive weight in this jurisdiction, it can be gleaned that the religious nature of certain governmental acts does not automatically result in striking them as unconstitutional for violation of the non-establishment clause, particularly if the act involves constitutionally protected form of exercise of religious freedom.

The "Lemon test", which has been extensively applied by the U. S. Supreme Court in issues involving the determination of non-establishment of religion clause originated from the case of Lemon vs. Kurtzman.^[57] In that case, the Court used a three-pronged test to adjudge whether the assailed governmental act violated the First Amendment, as follows:

1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and,
3. The statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."

In that case, the Court ruled that the state laws of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania providing financial aid and resources to teachers of parochial private schools, who will teach non-secular subjects to public schools is unconstitutional. This was because the effect of the law was to require the individual states to have continuous monitoring and surveillance of teacher­ beneficiaries, in order to ensure that they would not espouse Catholic teachings in their classes. Such scenario, according to the Supreme Court, constitutes as an excessive entanglement of government in matters of religion. In that case, however, the U. S. High Court admitted that drawing the line between allowable and prohibited State acts delving on religion is not a matter of drawing conclusions from well-defined formula, to wit:

Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,343 U.S. 312 (1952); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U.S. 422 (1963) (HARLAN, J., dissenting). Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible contacts. Indeed, under the statutory exemption before us in Walz, the State had a continuing burden to ascertain that the exempt property was, in fact, being used for religious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.

This is not to suggest, however, that we are to engage in a legalistic minuet in which precise rules and forms must govern. A true minuet is a matter of pure form and style, the observance of which is itself the substantive end. Here we examine the form of the relationship for the light that it casts on the substance. (Emphasis ours)

Meanwhile, in upholding the use of a creche or Nativity scene in its annual Christmas display by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the U. S. Supreme Court, in Lynch vs. Donnelly,^[58] explained that the separation of the Church and the State should not be viewed to mean absolute detachment of each other. The Court stated that:

This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the church or the state] into the precincts of the other."

xxxx

In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible.

The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses as erecting a "wall" between church and state, see, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 330 U.S. 18 (1947). The concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. The metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching it But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.

No significant segment of our society, and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government. "It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation. . . ." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 413 U.S. 760 (1973). Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 343 U.S. 314, 343 U.S. 315 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 333 U.S., 211 (1948). Anything less would require the "callous indifference" we have said was never intended by the Establishment Clause." xxx (Emphasis Ours)

The U. S. Supreme Court then went on to state how its history and tradition has allowed a healthy interaction between the State and religion, so long as the State does not commit acts that are solely motivated by religious considerations.

Another important lesson in Lynch was the Court's consideration of the context within which the government has issued a legislation or pursued an act. In that case, the Court found that the inclusion of the creche in the annual Christmas display was merely a recognition of the historical origins of the Christmas holiday.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018 ]

RENATO V. PERALTA, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION (PHILPOST), REPRESENTED BY MA. JOSEFINA MDELACRUZ IN HER CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PHILPOST, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN CESAR N. SARINO, RESPONDENTS.

The benevolent neutrality approach is further explored in Estrada v. Escritor27 as follows:

Benevolent neutrality is manifest not only in the Constitution but has also been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence, albeit not expressly called "benevolent neutrality" or "accommodation." In Aglipay, the Court not only stressed the "elevating influence of religion in human society" but acknowledged the Constitutional provisions on exemption from tax of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instruction as well as the provisions of the Administrative Code making Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week, Christmas Day and Sundays legal holidays. In Garces, the Court not only recognized the Constitutional provisions indiscriminately granting concessions to religious sects and denominations, but also acknowledged that government participation in long-standing traditions which have acquired a social character - "the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair" - does not offend the Establishment Clause. In Victoriano, the Court upheld the exemption from closed shop provisions of members of religious sects who prohibited their members from joining unions upon the justification that the exemption was not a violation of the Establishment Clause but was only meant to relieve the burden on free exercise of religion. In Ebralinag, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were exempt from saluting the flag as required by law, on the basis not of a stature granting exemption but of the Free Exercise Clause without offending the Establishment Clause.

While the US. and Philippine religion clauses are similar inform and origin, Philippine constitutional law has departed from the US. jurisprudence of employing a separationist or strict neutrality approach. The Philippine religion clauses have taken a life of their own, breathing the air of benevolent neutrality and accommodation. Thus, the wall of separation in Philippine jurisdiction" is not as high and impregnable as the wall created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson. While the religion clauses are a unique American experiment which understandably came about as a result of America's English background and colonization, the life that these clauses have taken in this jurisdiction is the Philippines' own experiment, reflective of the Filipinos' own national soul, history and tradition. After all, "the life of the law .... has been experience." (Citations omitted.)