In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.10

The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony," in deciding petitioner’s administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to proceedings before an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and adjudication of cases before it.⁴

For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:

 (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; 

(b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; 

(c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; 

(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and

 (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.⁵

In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID because she left the country on February 6, 1993,⁶ or even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679, a case which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City, the very same resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted.

Petitioner contends that the CA, as well as the CSC and the Secretary of Justice, should not have applied Section 47, Rule 130 because there was failure to lay the basis or predicate for the rule. The argument is specious and deserves scant consideration. The records of this case reveal that even in the early stages of the proceedings before the Board of Discipline of the BID, Weng Sai Qin’s departure from the country and consequent inability to testify in the proceedings had already been disclosed to the parties.⁷

Further, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law.⁸ Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them.⁹ In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.¹⁰

The Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations in the CSC¹¹ which were applicable to petitioner’s case provided that administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings.¹² The Uniform Rules further provided that evidence having materiality and relevance to the administrative case shall be accepted.¹³ Not only was petitioner’s objection to the application of Section 47, Rule 130 a technicality that could be disregarded; the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was also material and relevant to the administrative case. Hence, the CSC was correct in applying Section 47, Rule 130 when it took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the aforementioned criminal case.

Petitioner’s assertion that there was no hearing (that he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard) is likewise without merit. Apparently, petitioner’s concept of the opportunity to be heard is the opportunity to ventilate one’s side in a formal hearing where he can have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant. However, it is well-settled that, in administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings.¹⁴

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.¹⁵ A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.¹⁶ The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.¹⁷ In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, afidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.¹⁸

In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed his answer¹⁹ and two motions to dismiss,²⁰ as well as other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all stages of the administrative proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the CSC by way of appeal.

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.²¹ And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.²² Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.²³

Petitioner himself admits that he filed a motion for reconsideration²⁴ of the decision of the BID which was confirmed by the Secretary of Justice. He also admits that he filed a motion for reconsideration²⁵ with the CSC. Hence, by his own admission, petitioner’s protestations that he had been deprived of due process must necessarily fail.

Petitioner claims that when the Sandiganbayan approved his probation in the criminal case, it restored him to all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction, including the right to remain in government service. Petitioner cites the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, et al.²⁶ where the grant of probation suspended the imposition not only of the principal penalties but of the accessory penalties as well.

Petitioner’s contention is misplaced.

First, the Baclayon case is not in point. In that case, no administrative complaint was instituted against the public officer, a public school teacher, during the pendency of the criminal case against her and even after her conviction. There being no administrative case instituted against the public officer and no administrative liability having been imposed, there was no administrative sanction that could have been suspended by the grant of probation.

Second, dismissal is not an accessory penalty either of prision correccional ²⁷ or arresto mayor,²⁸ the range of penalty imposed upon petitioner in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679. Hence, even assuming arguendo that petitioner’s contention was correct, the grant of probation could not have resulted in the suspension of an accessory penalty like dismissal that does not even exist.

Third, "to suspend" means "to stop temporarily; to discontinue" ²⁹ or "to cause to be intermitted or interrupted."³⁰The records of this case show that petitioner was granted probation in an order dated December 12, 1992³¹ of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. He was dismissed from the service in the decision dated July 25, 1996³² of the BID Commissioner. Since the grant of probation was granted long before the administrative case was decided, the probation could not have possibly suspended the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service in the administrative case since there was no administrative penalty that could have been interrupted by the probation at the time it was granted. Indeed, petitioner’s discharge on probation could not have restored or reinstated him to his employment in government service since he had not been yet been dismissed therefrom at the time of his discharge.

Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal penalty imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not have been suspended by the grant of probation. As petitioner himself contends, the criminal action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability.³³ Hence, probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case,³⁴ not its administrative dimension.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 140079             March 31, 2005

AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents.