At the onset, it bears stressing that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts for purposes of preserving order in judicial proceedings and enforcing the court's judgments, orders and mandates.[72] In this regard, the Court has defined contempt as follows:
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.[73]
Contempt may be either civil or criminal in nature, depending on the contumacious act. When the act is directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially, or when it obstructs the administration of justice and tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect—the contempt is criminal. But if the act constitutes a failure to comply with an order of a court or judge for the benefit of the opposing party, or an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made—the contempt is civil in nature. In other words, contempt is criminal when its purpose is to punish, but it is civil if the purpose is to compensate.[74]
Despite the inherent nature of the power to cite in contempt, courts are constantly reminded that this should be exercised in the preservative, not on the vindictive, principle. As a drastic and extraordinary measure, the power to punish for contempt must be exercised only when necessary in the interest of justice.[75]
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