EN BANC
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A. GONZALES, Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Philippine Senate, and EDGARDO J. ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive of the Philippine Senate, all of whom also sue as taxpayers, in their own behalf and in representation of Senators HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL- ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and FREDDIE N. WEBB, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, impleaded herein as an unwilling
co-petitioner, respondents.
G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as taxpayers, and FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as taxpayers, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105.
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888.
Roco, Buñag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales and Edgardo Angara.
Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (Lamp).
Once
again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of
authority between the Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the
powers of the purse and the sword. Providing the focus for the contest
between the President and the Congress over control of the national
budget are the four cases at bench. Judicial intervention is being
sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on the claim that Congress and
the President have impermissibly exceeded their respective authorities,
and by several Senators on the claim that the President has committed
grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise
of his veto power.
I
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill
of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of
Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted
to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented
the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill
into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663,
entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the
same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed
certain conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution
Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers,
prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and
void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special
provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for
Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt
Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess
of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision
of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led
by Senate President Edgardo J. Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco, sought
the issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers,
petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2)
the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and
Wigberto Tañada (a co-petitioner in G.R. No. 113174), together with the
Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation, sought
the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, the National Treasurer, and the COA.
Petitioners Tañada and Romulo sued as members of the
Philippine Senate and taxpayers, while petitioner Freedom from Debt
Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the constitutionality of
the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for
debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought
the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same
respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest
the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision added
to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2)
the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary
restraining orders to enjoin respondents Secretary of Budget and
Management, National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned
provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the Court declined to grant said
provisional reliefs on the time- honored principle of according the
presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of regularity to
official acts.
In view of the importance and novelty of most of the
issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to
submit their respective memoranda as Amicus curiae, which they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.,
191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire
membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify
the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of
the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on
February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:
Authorizing
and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the
Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the
President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of
the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other
Purposes.
In the
United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been
recognized (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d
384, 391 [1976]; Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632 [1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16
Senators, including the Senate President and the Chairman of the
Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself.
Likewise, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of
petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary issue before this
Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the
conditions for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House
of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in
an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without
or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the
Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive
into the domain of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).
To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so
is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307
[1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution
of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412
F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a
resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
This
is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual
Senators as such having a substantial interest in the question at issue.
It could likewise be said that there was the requisite injury to their
rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi
issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to
be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the
Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could
likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a
Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office (Memorandum, p. 14).
It is true
that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art.
VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the
presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations but not
when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case,
it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the
exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative
jurisdiction begin.
III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a
Countrywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority
projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries." Said Article provides:
COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND
development projects P 2,977,000,000
———————
New Appropriations, by Purpose
Current Operating Expenditures
Current Operating Expenditures
A. PURPOSE
Personal Maintenance Capital TotalServices and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenses
1. For Countrywide
Developments Projects P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
TOTAL NEW
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein
appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances
and computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by
officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each;
Vice-President, P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said credit
facilities shall be constituted as a revolving fund to be administered
by a government financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for lending
operations. Prior years releases to local government units and national
government agencies for this purpose shall be turned over to the
government financial institution which shall be the sole administrator
of credit facilities released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by
way of Advice of Allotments and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to
the assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the
beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and
activities by the officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of
Budget and Management shall submit within thirty (30) days after the
end of each quarter a report to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from this Fund.
The report shall include the listing of the projects, locations,
implementing agencies and the endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p.
1245).
Petitioners
claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and
identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide
Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive
power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a
law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do
not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the
only function given to the Congress by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78- 86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by
James Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject
only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the
budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is
lodged in the Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power
to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation
law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it
shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers
and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined
the purposes for the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is
only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the
President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must
perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of
Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the
Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are
in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the
President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members
of Congress of particular projects or activities under Article XLI of
the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a workable
government and its interpretation must take into account the
complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the
political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an
uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members
of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or
who hold cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored
colleagues. The members of Congress also had to reckon with an
unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to cancel
from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or
Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make
equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues
are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project.
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the
Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for
current operating expenditures, while the appropriation for the House of
Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 of which P1,165,297,000.00 is
appropriated for current operating expenditures (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4,
9, 12).
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 153,347
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870
————
Total Salaries and Wages 160,217
=======
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870
————
Total Salaries and Wages 160,217
=======
Other Compensation
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
Medicare Premiums 888
Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Others 57,173
————
Total Other Compensation 103,815
————
01 Total Personal Services 264,032
=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Traveling Expenses 32,84103 Communication Services 7,666
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 1,220
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 318
06 Transportation Services 128
07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
08 Rents 24,584
14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
29 Other Services 89,778
————
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 200,415
————
Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447
=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4)
The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives are as follows:
Salaries, Permanent 261,557
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643
————
Total Salaries and Wages 405,200
=======
Other Compensation
Step Increments 4,312
Honoraria and Commutable
Allowances 4,764
Compensation Insurance
Premiums 1,159
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
Medicare Premiums 2,281
Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance 21,150
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53
Others 106,140
————
Total Other Compensation 202,863
————
01 Total Personal Services 608,063
=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Traveling Expenses 139,61103 Communication Services 22,514
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 5,116
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 1,863
06 Transportation Services 178
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474
20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency Expenses 9,400
23 Advertising and Publication 242
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
29 Other Services 284,209
————
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 557,234
————
Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297
=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)
The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines provides:
4.
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of
Congress may realign his allocation for operational expenses to any
other expenses category provide the total of said allocation is not
exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
The
appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further
divided into expenditures for salaries, personal services, other
compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and other operating
expenses. In turn, each member of Congress is allotted for his own
operating expenditure a proportionate share of the appropriation for the
House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for one items of
expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation
in said item to another item of expense.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a
member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to
any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:
No
law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations:
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The proviso
of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to augment
items in an appropriation act for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law
authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating
expenses of members of Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the
General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
Expenditure
Components. Except by act of the Congress of the Philippines, no change
or modification shall be made in the expenditure items authorized in
this Act and other appropriation laws unless in cases
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
Petitioners
argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones
authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the
Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only determine the
necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their
operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they
are the ones who know whether there are savings available in some items
and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating
expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval,
these two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are
actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to
be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes
of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or
realignment is to be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00
for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated
only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and
Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the
highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because
under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the
highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which
provides:
(5)
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and
ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the
best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of
job satisfaction and fulfillment.
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
While
it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution,
Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to
education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it
does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the
budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of
the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled.
The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A.
No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department
budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional
mandate according highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is
certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt,
the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of
our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education,
the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) of the GAA of 1994 which provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized
herein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of foreign
and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in excess
of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of
the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of
the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas and the Department of Finance shall submit a quarterly report
of actual foreign and domestic debt service payments to the House
Committee on Appropriations and Senate Finance Committee within one (1)
month after each quarter (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
The
President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article.
According to the President's Veto Message:
IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with
the desire of Congress to reduce the debt burden by decreasing the
appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion of the Special
Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe that this debt reduction
scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. This must be
addressed by revising our debt policy by way of innovative and
comprehensive debt reduction programs conceptualized within the ambit of
the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether
foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated
under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the constitutionality of such
automatic provisions on debt servicing has been upheld by the Supreme
Court in the case of "Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, et al.," G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22,
1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special
provision for the reason that the GAA is not the appropriate legislative
measure to amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No.
1177 and E.O. No. 292:
Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein
shall be used for payment of principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of
the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall
this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board
of Liquidators (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners
claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the
appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of
P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo,
G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General counterposed that
the Special Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for
debt service and could therefore be the subject of an item veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In that case, the issue was stated by the Court, thus:
The
fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be any misunderstanding about it, thus:
The
focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the
item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has
the President the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those invoked in the present case, are stated as follows:
In
essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1)
the President's line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is
limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section
16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a
provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not
carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for
that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5]
of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on
the exercise of that power.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners
that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire
bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true
sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in
its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and
does not relate to the entire bill.
The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto power.
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards,
La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot include in a
general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted
in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed
by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision
applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to
funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an
"inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of
1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt
to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O.
No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of
the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will presume the
constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P.
1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President,
is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice
Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is
found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in
Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution. There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a
veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to
show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to
veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art.
VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power
given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI,
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The
Item Veto Power of the Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act
of the Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress on August 29, 1916. The
concept was adopted from some State Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting
provisions, including conditions, restrictions and limitations, to items
in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the
following sentence to Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935
Constitution:
. .
. When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more items of
the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same
time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates . . . .
In short,
under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto
separately not only items in an appropriations bill but also
"provisions".
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the
aforementioned sentence added to Section 11(2) of Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, it included the following provision:
No
provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations
bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates (Art. VI, Sec.
25[2]).
In Gonzales,
we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of Section 16(2) of
the 1935 Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not be
interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power of the President to
veto a "provision".
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision
which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows
that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is
considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately
from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate
provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no
place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general
legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former
Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress
cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of
powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an
unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
Just
as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional
powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive
the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief
executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation
bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The
Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . .
. cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a
general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose
between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing
"items" of expenditures essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto.
Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they
appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation.
Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of
government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . .
We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation
power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto
matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to
encroach on the Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to
avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such
a manner as to encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof
"logrolling measures", special interest provisions which could not
succeed if separately enacted, or "riders", substantive pieces of
legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo
that the veto of the Special Provision on the ceiling for debt payment
is valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt
payment without complying with the conditions for automatic
appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D.
No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the
Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will
not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of prohibition will not issue
on the fear that official actions will be done in contravention of the
laws.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisions
that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These
provisions are germane to and have a direct connection with the item on
debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to
specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So.,
2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be
vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any
misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special
Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso
therein requiring that "any payment in excess of the amount herein,
appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . .
."
G.R. NO. 113766
G.R. NO. 11388
1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
In the appropriation for State Universities and
Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed special provisions which
authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance
of revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed are the following:
(H. 7) West Visayas State University
Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the
University subject to Section 13 of the special provisions applicable to
all State Universities and Colleges shall be equally shared by the
University and the University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
xxx xxx xxx
(J. 3) Leyte State College
Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and
Human Resources Development Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte State
College derived from the operation of its LSC House and HRDC shall be
constituted into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in an authorized
government depository bank for the operational expenses of these
projects/services. The net income of the Revolving Fund at the end of
the year shall be remitted to the National Treasury and shall accrue to
the General Fund. The implementing guidelines shall be issued by the
Department of Budget and Management (GAA of 1994, p. 415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the following:
12.
Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities and Colleges
are authorized to use their income from their extension services.
Subject to the approval of the Board of Regents and the approval of a
special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty development, instructional materials and work study program (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty development, instructional materials and work study program (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The
income of State Universities and Colleges derived from tuition fees and
other sources as may be imposed by governing boards other than those
accruing to revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872 and 1026 and
those authorized to be recorded as trust receipts pursuant to Section
40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be deposited with the
National Treasury and recorded as a Special Account in the General Fund
pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D. No. 1437 for the use of the
institution, subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292L PROVIDED, That disbursements from the Special Account shall not exceed the amount actually earned and deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER,
That a cash advance on such income may be allowed State half of income
actually realized during the preceding year and this cash advance shall
be charged against income actually earned during the budget year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY,
That in no case shall such funds be used to create positions, nor for
payment of salaries, wages or allowances, except as may be specifically
approved by the Department of Budge and Management for income-producing
activities, or to purchase equipment or books, without the prior
approval of the President of the Philippines pursuant to Letter of
Implementation No. 29.
All collections of the State Universities and
Colleges for fees, charges and receipts intended for private recipient
units, including private foundations affiliated with these institutions
shall be duly acknowledged with official receipts and deposited as a
trust receipt before said income shall be subject to Section 35, Chapter
5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reason for the veto thus:
Pursuant
to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines,
Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987 and Section 22,
Article VII of the Constitution, all income earned by all Government
offices and agencies shall accrue to the General Fund of the Government
in line with the One Fund Policy enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article
VI and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution. Likewise, the
creation and establishment of revolving funds shall be authorized by
substantive law pursuant to Section 66 of the Government Auditing Code
of the Philippines and Section 45, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution and existing law, I have noted the proliferation of special
provisions authorizing the use of agency income as well as the
creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds.
I would like to underscore the facts that such income
were already considered as integral part of the revenue and financing
sources of the National Expenditure Program which I previously submitted
to Congress. Hence, the grant of new special provisions authorizing the
use of agency income and the establishment of revolving funds over and
above the agency appropriations authorized in this Act shall effectively
reduce the financing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same time,
increase the level of expenditures of some agencies beyond the
well-coordinated, rationalized levels for such agencies. This
corresponding increases the overall deficit of the National Government
(Veto Message, p. 3).
Petitioners
claim that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
disallowed by his veto the "use of income" and the creation of
"revolving fund" by the Western Visayas State University and Leyte State
Colleges when he allowed other government offices, like the National
Stud Farm, to use their income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in
other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to
use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by
virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to
the "one-fund policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the
National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange
Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management's
Procurement Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the President vetoed the second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ration of works to be
contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges. The said
paragraph reads as follows:
2.
Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted for the
maintenance and repair of roads which are provided in this Act for the
Department of Public Works and Highways shall be released to the
respective Engineering District, subject to such rules and regulations
as may be prescribed by the Department of Budget and Management.
Maintenance funds for roads and bridges shall be exempt from budgetary
reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated for the
maintenance of national roads and bridges, a maximum of thirty percent
(30%) shall be contracted out in accordance with guidelines to be issued
by the Department of Public Works and Highways. The balance shall be used for maintenance by force account.
Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund
appropriated herein to be applied across the board to the allocation of
each region shall be set aside for the maintenance of roads which may be
converted to or taken over as national roads during the current year
and the same shall be released to the central office of the said
department for eventual
sub-allotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance of the said five percent (5%) shall be restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis for the maintenance of existing national roads.
sub-allotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance of the said five percent (5%) shall be restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis for the maintenance of existing national roads.
No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead
expenses shall be made, except as authorized by law or upon direction of
the President
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the veto:
While
I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to impose
certain restrictions contained in some special provisions, I am equally
aware that many programs, projects and activities of agencies would
require some degree of flexibility to ensure their successful
implementation and therefore risk their completion. Furthermore, not
only could these restrictions and limitations derail and impede program
implementation but they may also result in a breach of contractual
obligations.
D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure
Agencies show that for practical intent and purposes, maintenance by
contract could be undertaken to an optimum of seventy percent (70%) and
the remaining thirty percent (30%) by force account. Moreover, the
policy of maximizing implementation through contract maintenance is a
covenant of the Road and Road Transport Program Loan from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990) and Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund (OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is a covenant
under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the Highway Management Project
(IBRD Loan
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the
policy of the government to encourage and maximize private sector
participation in the regular repair and maintenance of infrastructure
facilities, I am directly vetoing the underlined second paragraph of
Special Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(Veto Message, p. 11).
The second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in
policy of Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laid down
the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road
maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a
comprehensive study, believed that contracting out road maintenance
projects at an option of 70% would be more efficient, economical and
practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not
alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand,
it specified how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative
and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress
of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill,
which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so
long as they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec.
25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the
veto of this special provision. He merely argued that the provision is a
complete turnabout from an entrenched practice of the government to
maximize contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to veto a provision separate from the item to which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is therefore unconstitutional.
3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the special provision on the
purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs
Law (R.A. No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads:
12.
Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed Forces of
the Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall strictly comply with
the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of
Health (GAA of 1994, p. 748).
According
to the President, while it is desirable to subject the purchase of
medicines to a standard formulary, "it is believed more prudent to
provide for a transition period for its adoption and smooth
implementation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p.
12).
The Special Provision which requires that all
purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of
Health is an "appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by
Congress to the fact that there is an existing law, the Generics Act of
1988, that requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic names
through a rational system of procurement and distribution." The
President believes that it is more prudent to provide for a transition
period for the smooth implementation of the law in the case of purchases
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11
(Education Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however, cannot
justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of medicines by the
AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the
said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486
[1964]).
4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization of the
AFP, the President vetoed the underlined proviso of Special Provision
No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which requires the prior approval of
Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as
well as the entire Special Provisions
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":
2.
Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority shall be
given for the acquisition of AFP assets necessary for protecting marine,
mineral, forest and other resources within Philippine territorial
borders and its economic zone, detection, prevention or deterrence of
air or surface intrusions and to support diplomatic moves aimed at
preserving national dignity, sovereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED,
That the said modernization fund shall not be released until a Table of
Organization and Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to and approved
by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund
shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers (GAA
of 1994, p. 747).
As reason
for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall effectively alter the
original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the
"Use of Fund" and Special Provision No. 3 are conditions or limitations
related to the item on the AFP modernization plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the
"Use of Fund" for the AFP modernization program that the President must
submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval,
is an exercise of the "congressional or legislative veto." By way of
definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can
block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a
form of legislative control in the implementation of particular
executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is requiring
disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval
of the executive action. This device represents a significant attempt by
Congress to move from oversight of the executive to shared
administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash,
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion
to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as
provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand
can be disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae:
"What Congress cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by
attaching conditions to the exercise of that power (of the President as
Commander-in-Chief) through provisions in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the
use of the Modernization Funds for payment of the trainer planes and
armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP,
is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws
that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so,
contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Fund, the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of
Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
The vetoed provision reads:
2.
Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense, to use savings in the
appropriations provided herein to augment the pension fund being managed
by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System as provided under
Sections 2(a) and 3 of P.D. No. 361 (GAA of 1994,
p. 746).
p. 746).
According
to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should
be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the
purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the
officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution
(Veto Message, pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP
Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condition or limitation which is so
intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be
separated therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of
Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution.
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no
money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's,
including the payment of separation benefits but it added the following
Special Provision:
1.
CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The appropriation authorized
herein shall be used for the compensation of CAFGU's including the
payment of their separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year
subsistence allowance for the 11,000 members who will be deactivated in
1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies and procedures for
the payment of separation benefit (GAA of 1994, p. 740).
The
President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this
Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A.. No. 6758. He
gave the following reasons for imposing the condition:
I
am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in proposing the
amendment of Special Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU. However, it is
premature at this point in time of our peace process to earmark and
declare through special provision the actual number of CAFGU members to
be deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that the number to be
deactivated would largely depend on the result or degree of success of
the on-going peace initiatives which are not yet precisely determinable
today. I have desisted, therefore, to directly veto said provisions
because this would mean the loss of the entire special provision to the
prejudice of its beneficient provisions. I therefore declare that the
actual implementation of this special provision shall be subject to
prior Presidential approval pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 1597
and
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
Petitioners
claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of the CAFGU's
when it appropriated the money for payment of the separation pay of the
members of thereof. The President, however, directed that the
deactivation should be done in accordance to his timetable, taking into
consideration the peace and order situation in the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the
President was tantamount to an administrative embargo of the
congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve
the CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot impair or withhold expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor other legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot impair or withhold expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor other legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
The Solicitor General contends that it is the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
who should determine when the services of the CAFGU's are no longer
needed (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888,
pp. 92-95.).
pp. 92-95.).
This is the first case before this Court where the
power of the President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment refers to
a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound
argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose
in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the
President to implement the project and to spend the money appropriated
therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the
Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an
appropriation item, the President in effect exercises a veto power that
is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the
Constitution does not say anything about impounding. The source of the
Executive authority must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three
principal sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the
authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by
Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role
as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which
ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of
the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if
doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when
through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial
savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the
President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown Law Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes; Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686 [1973).
We do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to
deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much
less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if
such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle
for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in
another law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an appropriations
act cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress added the following provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's
Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriations for the Supreme Court
and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court to augment any item of the Court's appropriations for (a)
printing of decisions and publication of "Philippine Reports"; (b)
Commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the
Supreme Court and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices
entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.;
(c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other operating expenses of the
courts' libraries, including purchase of books and periodicals; (d)
purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; (e)
necessary expenses for the employment of temporary employees,
contractual and casual employees, for judicial administration; (f)
maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorney-de-officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorney-de-officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on
Audit is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, to use savings for the payment of fringe
benefits as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of the Commission (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman
xxx xxx xxx
6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to
appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations to augment
items of appropriation in the Office of the Ombudsman from savings in
other items of appropriation actually released, for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, training and information
materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of OMB Central and
Area/Sectoral facilities; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals
and equipment;
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits as may be authorized specifically by law for officials and personnel of OMB pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution; and (e) for other official purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1174; Emphasis supplied).
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits as may be authorized specifically by law for officials and personnel of OMB pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution; and (e) for other official purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1174; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to augment any item of
appropriation in the office of the CHR from savings in other items of
appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing and/or publication
of decisions, resolutions, training materials and educational
publications; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of Commission's
central and regional facilities; (c) purchase of books, journals,
periodicals and equipment, (d) payment of commutable representation and
transportation allowances of officials and employees who by reason of
their positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits, as may be
authorized by law for officials and personnel of CHR, subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1178;
Emphasis supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the conditions included in the GAA of 1994. He noted that:
The
said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which
states that "no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically
authorized by law." I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the
said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to
the well-established principle on compensation standardization (Veto
Message, p. 10).
Petitioners
claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman,
the COA and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by
petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional
mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given
pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in
accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as
superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President
imposed the condition that the implementation of the budget of the COA
be subject to "the guidelines to be issued by the President."
The provisions subject to said condition reads:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on
Audit derived from sources authorized by the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not exceeding Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a revolving fund which shall be
used for maintenance, operating and other incidental expenses to enhance
audit services and audit-related activities. The fund shall be
deposited in an authorized government depository ban, and withdrawals
therefrom shall be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law and implementing rules and regulations: PROVIDED, That any
interests earned on such deposit shall be remitted at the end of each
quarter to the national Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That
the Commission on Audit shall submit to the Department of Budget and
Management a quarterly report of income and expenditures of said
revolving fund (GAA of 1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The
President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the implementation,
applicability and operation of use of income and revolving funds. The
Veto Message stated:
. .
. I have observed that there are old and long existing special
provisions authorizing the use of income and the creation of revolving
funds. As a rule, such authorizations should be discouraged. However, I
take it that these authorizations have legal/statutory basis aside from
being already a vested right to the agencies concerned which should not
be jeopardized through the Veto Message. There is, however, imperative
need to rationalize their implementation, applicability and operation.
Thus, in order to substantiate the purpose and intention of said
provisions, I hereby declare that the operationalization of the
following provisions during budget implementation shall be subject to
the guidelines to be issued by the President pursuant to Section
35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D.
No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of
this Act (Veto Message, p. 6; Emphasis Supplied.)
(c) In the
appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the condition that in
the implementation of DPWH projects, the administrative and engineering
overhead of 5% and 3% "shall be subject to the necessary administrative
guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing laws."
The condition was imposed because the provision "needs further study"
according to the President.
The following provision was made subject to said condition:
9.
Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five percent
(5%) of the amount for infrastructure project released by the Department
of Budget and Management shall be deducted by DPWH for administrative
overhead, detailed engineering and construction supervision, testing and
quality control, and the like, thus insuring that at least ninety-five
percent (95%) of the released fund is available for direct
implementation of the project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for
school buildings, health centers, day-care centers and barangay halls,
the deductible amount shall not exceed three percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this provision
shall subject the government official or employee concerned to
administrative, civil and/or criminal sanction under Sections 43 and 80,
Book VI of E.O.
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the
appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA), the President
imposed the condition that allocations for specific projects shall be
released and disbursed "in accordance with the housing program of the
government, subject to prior Executive approval."
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
3.
Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for the
specified projects shall be set aside for corollary works and used
exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and construction of
buildings, roads, pathwalks, drainage, waterworks systems, facilities
and amenities in the area: PROVIDED, That any road to be
constructed or rehabilitated shall conform with the specifications and
standards set by the Department of Public Works and Highways for such
kind of road: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That savings that may be available in the future shall be used for road repair, rehabilitation and construction:
(1) Maharlika Village Road — Not less than P5,000,000
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig) — Not less than P3,000,000
(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig) — Not less than P2,000,000
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount
appropriated for the implementation of various projects in resettlement
areas, Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,500,000) shall be
allocated to the Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan resettlement area, Eighteen
Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona Relocation Center Area (Gen.
Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan
Sites and Services, all of which will be for the cementing of roads in
accordance with DPWH standards.
5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of
Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) shall be set aside for the asphalting
of seven (7) kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
The
President imposed the conditions: (a) that the "operationalization" of
the special provision on revolving funds of the COA "shall be subject to
guidelines to be issued by the President pursuant to Section 35,
Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act" (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on the mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said Department "be subject to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for the NHA can be released only "in accordance with the housing program of the government subject to prior Executive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 10-11;
14-16).
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act" (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on the mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said Department "be subject to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for the NHA can be released only "in accordance with the housing program of the government subject to prior Executive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 10-11;
14-16).
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere
reminders that the implementation of the items on which the said
conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance with existing
laws, regulations or policies. They did not add anything to what was
already in place at the time of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President
said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.
Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they
are proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines
on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise
by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil
67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President
has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]).
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil
actions but those remedies can be used only when respondents have acted
"without or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse of
discretion," (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt payment when he merely followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say that Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment than the amount appropriated for education, when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt payment when he merely followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say that Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment than the amount appropriated for education, when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?
Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides:
Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall
from a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court's
interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its
enactment since the court's interpretation merely establishes the
contemporary legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry
into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex
Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona and Gonzales are
considered hard cases that make bad laws and should be reversed, such
reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:
The
President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not effect
the item or items to which he does not object.
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
The
majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case within the
scope of Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution]. I do not see
how this can be done without doing violence to the constitutional
design. The distinction between an item-veto and a provision veto has
been traditionally recognized in constitutional litigation and
budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for
the U.S. Supreme Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
. . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously
means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provisions of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill . . .
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the
President to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation act,
it does not
confer — in fact, it excludes — the power to veto any particular provision or provisions in said act.
confer — in fact, it excludes — the power to veto any particular provision or provisions in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al.,
156 SCRA 549, this court referred to its duty to construe the
Constitution, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative would want it construed, but in accordance with what it says
and provides. When the Constitution states that the President has the
power to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation act,
this must be taken as a component of that delicate balance of power
between the executive and legislative, so that, for this Court to
construe Sec. 27(2) of the Constitution as also empowering the President
to veto any particular provision or provisions in the appropriations
act, is to load the scale in favor of the executive, at the expense of
that delicate balance of power.
I therefore
disagree with the majority's pronouncements which would validate the
veto by the President of specific provisions in the appropriations act
based on the contention that such are "inappropriate provisions." Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that a provision in the
appropriations act is "inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint,
it is still a provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur on
the points so well expounded by a most respected colleague, Mr. Justice
Camilo D. Quiason. I should like to highlight a bit, however, that part
of the ponencia dealing on the Countrywide Development Fund or, so commonly referred to as, the infamous "pork barrel".
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an
appropriation act the activities and the projects that are desirable
and may thus be funded. Once, however, such identification and the
corresponding appropriation therefore is done, the legislative act is
completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the Executive is behooved, with
exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it that the
legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another
theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law, the
Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither may
delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the powers of a
co-equal, independent and coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not
as the individuals that comprise it, in any action or decision that can
bind it, or be said to have been done by it, under its constitutional
authority. Even assuming that overseeing the laws it enacts continues to
be a legislative process, one that I find difficult to accept, it is
Congress itself, not any of its members, that must exercise that
function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of
Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would have the
best feel on the needs of their own respective cosntituents. I see no
legal obstacle, however, in their making, just like anyone else, the
proper recommendations to albeit not necessarily conclusive on,
the President for the purpose. Neother would it be objectionable for
Congrss, by law, to appropriate funds for specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authoriy, however, to the individual members of
Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionality
impermissible.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:
The
President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not effect
the item or items to which he does not object.
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
The
majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case within the
scope of Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution]. I do not see
how this can be done without doing violence to the constitutional
design. The distinction between an item-veto and a provision veto has
been traditionally recognized in constitutional litigation and
budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for
the U.S. Supreme Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
. . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously
means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provisions of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill . . .
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the
President to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation act,
it does not
confer — in fact, it excludes — the power to veto any particular provision or provisions in said act.
confer — in fact, it excludes — the power to veto any particular provision or provisions in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al.,
156 SCRA 549, this court referred to its duty to construe the
Constitution, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative would want it construed, but in accordance with what it says
and provides. When the Constitution states that the President has the
power to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation act,
this must be taken as a component of that delicate balance of power
between the executive and legislative, so that, for this Court to
construe Sec. 27(2) of the Constitution as also empowering the President
to veto any particular provision or provisions in the appropriations
act, is to load the scale in favor of the executive, at the expense of
that delicate balance of power.
I therefore
disagree with the majority's pronouncements which would validate the
veto by the President of specific provisions in the appropriations act
based on the contention that such are "inappropriate provisions." Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that a provision in the
appropriations act is "inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint,
it is still a provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur on
the points so well expounded by a most respected colleague, Mr. Justice
Camilo D. Quiason. I should like to highlight a bit, however, that part
of the ponencia dealing on the Countrywide Development Fund or, so commonly referred to as, the infamous "pork barrel".
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an
appropriation act the activities and the projects that are desirable
and may thus be funded. Once, however, such identification and the
corresponding appropriation therefore is done, the legislative act is
completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the Executive is behooved, with
exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it that the
legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another
theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law, the
Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither may
delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the powers of a
co-equal, independent and coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not
as the individuals that comprise it, in any action or decision that can
bind it, or be said to have been done by it, under its constitutional
authority. Even assuming that overseeing the laws it enacts continues to
be a legislative process, one that I find difficult to accept, it is
Congress itself, not any of its members, that must exercise that
function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of
Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would have the
best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. I see no
legal obstacle, however, in their making, just like anyone else, the
proper recommendations to, albeit not necessarily conclusive on,
the President for the purpose. Neither would it be objectionable for
Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it
may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible.
No comments:
Post a Comment