[ G.R. NO. 156408, JANUARY 31, 2005 ]
ANDRES S. SUERO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO; THE
CITY PROSECUTION OFFICE OF DAVAO CITY; AND HON. EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, DAVAO CITY,
RESPONDENTS
FACTS:
The petitioner
was earlier accused of the crime of Falsification of Public Document, defined
and penalized under Article 171 of the Revise[d] Penal Code. That on or about
February 12, 1992 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Davao, Andres S. Suero being then the Administrative Officer and Property
Inspector of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region XI,
Davao City, with salary grades below grade 27, while in the performance of
their official duties, and taking advantage of their official positions, in
conspiracy with one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified an undated Inspection Report affixing their signatures thereto,
making it appear that various furniture purchase[d] from, and delivered by
Business International Wood Products under Delivery Receipt Nos. 9758, 9759,
9760 and 9761, in the total amount of P1,033,450.00, have all been delivered
and duly inspected, thereby justifying the release of the payment to Business
International Wood Products in the aforesaid amount, when in truth and in fact,
no such complete delivery was made and inspected, to the damage and prejudice
of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the formal admission of
similarity of primordial legal issue as well as identical parties, public
documents involved and questioned transactions, would amount to double jeopardy upon the filing of the instant case
after the dismissal of the earlier complaint?
HELD:
We hold that the
instant case does not constitute double jeopardy , for which the
following requisites must concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
It is undisputed
that the two charges stem from the same transaction. However, it has been
consistently held that the same act may give rise to two or more separate and
distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attaches,
as long as there is a variance between the elements of the offenses charged.
The constitutional right against double jeopardy protects
from a second prosecution for the same
offense, not for a different
one.
Indeed, the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shares two common elements with the felony under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code -- that the offender is a public officer and that the act is related to the officer’s public position. However, the latter offense is not necessarily inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do not form part of those enumerated in the former. For there to be double jeopardy, the elements of one offense should -- like the ribs of an umbrella -- ideally encompass those of the other. The elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the realm of those of falsification of a public document and vice versa. At most, the two offenses may be considered as two conjoined umbrellas with one or two common ribs. Clearly, one offense does not include the other.
Indeed, the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shares two common elements with the felony under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code -- that the offender is a public officer and that the act is related to the officer’s public position. However, the latter offense is not necessarily inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do not form part of those enumerated in the former. For there to be double jeopardy, the elements of one offense should -- like the ribs of an umbrella -- ideally encompass those of the other. The elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the realm of those of falsification of a public document and vice versa. At most, the two offenses may be considered as two conjoined umbrellas with one or two common ribs. Clearly, one offense does not include the other.
[ G.R. NO. 172777, OCTOBER 19, 2011 ]
BENJAMIN
B. BANGAYAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married
Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two children. Later, Sally Go learned that Benjamin,
Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on January
5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco." Benjamin,
Jr. fathered two children with Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that
on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan recommend the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to Sally Go.
In its December 3, 2003 Order, the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence. Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan recommend the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to Sally Go.
In its December 3, 2003 Order, the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence. Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire
into the factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without
violating the constitutional right of herein petitioner against double jeopardy.
HELD:
No person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no Double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial court's order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no Double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial court's order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy
[ G.R. NO. L-44205, FEBRUARY 16, 1993 ]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, BRANCH XXI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, AND CONSOLACION NAVAL, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
That
on or about the 17th day of August, 1971, in the municipality of Pasig,
province of Rizal, Philippines, the above-named accused, being then private
individual did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, committed
as follows: the said accused on August 17, 1971, executed a document entitled
"Application For Registration" for parcels of land located at Taytay,
Rizal, to the effect that She is the exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel
of land situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with
Psu-248206 and that she "does not know of any mortgage or encumbrance of
any kind whatsoever affecting said land or that any person has estate or
interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession remainder, reversion or
expectancy", as a result of which the Court in its Decision of March 22,
1972 declared the herein accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of
land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature, when in truth and in
fact the herein accused has already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V.
Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as can be gleaned from a document
entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion"
dated August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V. Ilano has already paid partial
amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused.
On
October 28, 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the
information for falsification, premised, among other things, on the
apprehension that she is in danger of being condemned for an identical offense.
The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against her
for falsification and on December 22, 1975, the court a quo denied her motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before judgment a
motion to quash on the ground of jeopardy.
HELD:
It would now appear that
prior conviction or acquittal in the first case, as long as the accused had
entered his plea therein is no longer required in order that the accused may
move to quash a second prosecution for the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy."
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused."
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