Sunday, October 14, 2012

ellis



GSIS VS CSC
G.R. No. 96938, October 15, 1991

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees for having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.

The dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer. The Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal of GSIS and ordered the reinstatement of only three employees, it appearing the respondents Namuco and Manuel have since passed away. It accordingly directed the GSIS to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Namuco and Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their demise.

ISSUE:
Can the motion for execution of the CSC resolution filed by the heirs of Namuco and Manuel be granted?

RULING:
            The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional commission invested by the constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. In a resolution promulgated, it provided that decisions in administrative disciplinary cases shall be immediately executory, unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. If the decision of the Commission is brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, the same shall still be executory unless a restraining order or preliminary injunction is issued by the High Court.
The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and not merely upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that the issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.


KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC.
G.R. No. L-32485, October 22, 1970

FACTS:
Petitioner claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the law prays for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of RA 6132. It impugns the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of association and freedom of expression and it is an ex post facto law.

ISSUE:
            Is RA 6132 an ex post facto law?

RULING:
            The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision con­stitutes an ex post facto law is untenable.
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provi­sion of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is im­posed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Sec. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval.

PEOPLE VS NITAFAN
G.R. Nos. 107964-66, February 01, 1999

FACTS:
Several informations for violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 960 were filed against private respondent in different courts. The Solicitor General filed separate motions for consolidation of the informations, which were granted. Before the Manila RTC, the informations were reassigned to Branch 52 presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan.
The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case no 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB circular is an ex post facto law. In a separate order, he also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases ruling that it violated the private respondent’s right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Can a judge motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismiss a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy?

RULING:
On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action.

            With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. The first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Private respondent was not convicted or acquitted nor did the cases against her dismissed or otherwise terminated, which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy to attached.
The petition is GRANTED.



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