Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris

The primary issue in this case is whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.

The answer is yes.

The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

Thus did we hold in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713:

“While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it hasnot been formally impleaded.” (Emphasis supplied.)

A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC­-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.

We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued:

“The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into by the PC Chief in relation to the exercise of a functionsovereign in nature. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but thelegal nature of the act. This was clearly enunciated in the case of United States of America vs. Ruiz where the Hon. SupremeCourt held:

“‘The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not applywhere the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.’ (136 SCRA 487, 492.)

“In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalizethe industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, agovernmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A. 5487, as amended, which is toregulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies. (Underscoring Ours.)” (pp. 258-259, Rollo.)

Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.

The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. “It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government” (Siren vs. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic vs. Purisima (78 SCRA 470, 473) rationalized:

“Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused [by] private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.” (citing Providence Washington Insurance Co. vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 598.)