[ G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019 ]
DOMINGO CREBELLO, PETITIONER, V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND TIMOTEO T. CAPOQUIAN, JR., RESPONDENTS.
The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation took effect on April 12, 2016, when the Supreme Court denied with finality the OMB's motion for reconsideration in Morales v. Court of Appeals.[1] However, the application by the OMB of the doctrine of condonation prior to its abandonment without the respondent elective public official invoking the same as a defense was whimsical, and amounted to grave abuse of discretion. Condonation, being a matter of defense, must be specifically invoked by the respondent elective public official.xxxThe petitioner submits that the doctrine of condonation had been abandoned on November 10, 2015 through the ruling in Morales v. Court of Appeals;[14] hence, the decision of the OMB dated March 31, 2016 absolving respondent Capoquian, Jr. because of condonation was unjustified inasmuch as the doctrine of condonation had then been abandoned.
In contrast, the OMB insists that the ruling in Morales v. Court of Appeals on the abandonment of the doctrine of condonation became final only on April 12, 2016 because that was the date on which the Supreme Court had acted upon and denied with finality its motion for clarification/motion for partial reconsideration in Morales v. Court of Appeals; and that it issued its Office Circular No. 17 declaring that it would no longer apply the defense of condonation starting on April 12, 2016 except for open and pending administrative cases.
We sustain the insistence of the OMB. The ruling promulgated in Morales v. Court of Appeals on the abandonment of the doctrine ofcondonation had, indeed, become final only on April 12, 2016, and thus the abandonment should be reckoned from April 12, 2016. Under the circumstances, the decision of the OMB dated March 31, 2016 absolving respondent Capoquian, Jr. by reason of the application of the doctrine of condonation might have been justified.
However, the petitioner has assailed the application of the doctrine of condonation precisely because respondent Capoquian, Jr. had not invoked the doctrine of condonation as a defense. This omission on his part appears to be confirmed by the records, which indicated that he did not submit or file his counter-affidavit and verified position paper despite being required to do so. Worse, the omission to submit or file, according to the petitioner, amounted to his waiver of his right to controvert the charge of nepotism brought against him.
In this regard, we have to agree with the petitioner.
In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the Ombudsman took the strong position that condonation was a matter of defense that should be raised and passed upon during the administrative disciplinary proceedings, to wit:
The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.[15]
x x x x
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.[16]
The aforestated position taken by the OMB in Morales v. Court of Appeals should be upheld. Condonation is an affirmative fact that must be raised by the respondent in the administrative proceedings to enable the OMB to fully consider and pass upon the matter. That did not happen in the case of respondent Capoquian, Jr., whose failure to file or submit his counter-affidavit and verified position paper despite notice rendered indubitable that he had not at all raised before the OMB the doctrine of condonation or any other matter as a defense. Clearly, the OMB acted whimsically in absolving respondent Capoquian, Jr. by virtue of condonation.
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