Instruction: Answer the questions briefly and concisely.
Always support your answer with reasons or legal basis, otherwise it earns no
points.
PART I. BASIC QUESTIONS (5 points each)
1.The Judiciary is an independent and co-equal body
with the two other main departments of government. What are the safeguards
under the constitution to maintain its independence? Give at least five of
these safeguards.
ANSWER: 1.The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It
cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the manner of its meetings be
changed by mere legislation. 2. The members of the judiciary are not subject to
confirmation by the CA 3.The members of the Supreme Court may not be removed
except by impeachment 4.The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its original
appellate jurisdiction as prescribed in Art. X, sec. 5 of the Constitution.
5.The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may not be increased by law without its
advice and concurrence 6.The SC has administrative supervision over all lower
courts and their personnel 7.The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges of
the lower courts 8.The members of the Supreme Court and all lower courts have
security of tenure which canot be undermned by law reorganizing the
judiciary.9.They shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions 10.Their
salaries may not be reduced during the continuance in office 11.The judiciary
enjoys fiscal autonomy 12.The Supreme Court alone may initiate rules of court.
2.It is provided in Art. VIII, Sec. 14 that “No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”. State the exceptions to
this constitutional provision.
ANSWER:1.This rule is applicable only to a decision,which
is described as a judgment rendered after the presentation of proof or on the
basis of the stipulation of facts. Mere orders are not covered since they
dispose of only incidents of the case, such as postponements of th trial,
except a dismissal on the merits. 2.A minute resolution disposing a petition
for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus is not covered by this provision; or
orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters 3.it does not aply to administrative
cases decided by the Supreme Court 4. not also applicable to the decisions of
the COMELEC and of the military tribunals which are not courts of justice.
3.State the limitations on the rule making power of the
Supreme Court.
ANSWER:1.The rules must be uniform for all courts of the
same grade 2.The rules must not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.
4.State the constitutional commissions. What are some
of the guarantees prescribed in the Constitution to ensure their independence?
State at least five.
ANSWER: coa, comelec and csc. 1.These bodies are created
by the Constitution and may not be abolished by statute. 2.Each is described by
the Const. as independent 3.each is conferred certainpowers and functions which
cannot be withdrawn or reduced by statute 3.the chair and members may not be
removed from office except by impeachment 4.givenfarily long terms 5. terms are
staggered in such a way as to lessen the opportunity of for appointment
of the majority of the body by the same president 6. may not be appointed or
reappointed in an acting capacity 7salaries are high and cannot be decreased
during the continuance in office 9,enjoy fiscal autonomy 10.promulgateits own
rules 11.subject to certain inhibitions and disqualifications calculated to
strengthen their integrity 12. allowed to appoint their own officials and
employees in accordance with CSC rules.
5.State the composition and qualifications
of the COMELEC.
ANSWER: CHAIRMAN AND 6 COMMISSIONERS; natural born; at
least 35 years old, holders of college degree; must not have been candidates
for any elective position in theimmediately precedng elections; majority
thereof, including chair, must be members of the bar, engaged in the practice
oflaw for at least tenyears.
6.State the function and composition of
the Commission on Appointments.
ANSWER:The CA is the body charged for the confirmation of
appointments made by the president. It is composed of the Senate Pres. as
chair, 12 senators and 12 congressmen as members.
7.What are public funds? Where are they deposited? How
are they released? What is the duty of the COA with respect to these public
funds?
Answer: Public funds are derived mainly from taxes, fines
and loans contracted by the government. All collections are to be turned over
to the national treasury and accounted for in accordance with law and
regulations. That COA sees to it that this duty is duly perfomed by the
officers receiving these collections. Once these funds are deposited with the
treasury they cannot be released except in pursuance of an appropiration made
by law. This law may come from the Constitution itself or from the Congress.In
the absence of such apropriation it is the duty of the COA to refuse to approve
the disbursement of funds.
8.What is impeachment? Who are the impeachable officers
under the 1987 Constitution? What are the grounds?
ANSWER: Impeachment is a method of national inquest into
the conduct of public men; an extraordinary means of removal exercised by the
legislature over selected number of officials, the prupose being to ensure the
highest care in the indictment and conviction, theimposition of special
penalties in case of a finding of guilt, taking into account the degree or
nature of the offense committed and the high status of the wrongdoer. The
impeachable officers are: Pres, Vice-Pres, members of the Supreme Court,
members of the const. Commissions, ombudsman and the members of the
Sandiganbayan. Grounds are: culpable violation of the constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
9.Make a comparison of the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman with respect to its function and composition.
ANSWER: The SANDIGANBAYAN is an antigraft court, which has
jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees
including those in the government owned or controlled corporatins in relation
to their office as may be determined by law. IT consists of a presiding justice
and eight associate justices (and sits in divisions of three).
The
OMBUDSMAN IS NOT A COURT, but a prosecutory officer, a protector of the people,
who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner aginst public
officials or employees of the govt., or nay subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality, including GOCC,; functins are outlined in Sec. 13 of Art. XI.
10.Distinguish amendment from revision.
Can the people thru initiative propose a revision of the constitution? If so,
what is the required percent of the total registered voters and percent
requirement per legislative district?
ANSWER: Amendment is a piecemeal change of the
constitution, referring only to a portion or certain provision. Revision is the
change of the whole constitution itself. Amendment refers to an isolated or
piecemeal change only as distiguished from revision, which is a revamp or
rewriting of the whole instrument. The people cannot directly propose a revision
but only an amendment.
PART II. PROBLEM SOLVING
1. Atty. Jose CRUZ is the Chairman of the COMELEC.He
met an accident and died. Atty. Maria Diaz, one of the commissioners of the
COMELEC was designated by the President of the Philippines as COMELEC Chair to
occupy the vacancy. Is the act of the President valid?
ANSWER: Invalid.The president cannot designate,but can
only appoint.The purpose there is not to destroy the independence of the
COMELEC .(See. G.R. No. 93867 December 18, 1990SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.
vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC) “The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the
independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the
security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of
the President of the Philippines.” “What is the power of the President of the
Philippines to make the challenged designation in view of the status of the
Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific
provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no
case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
2. Manuel S. Pineda was
employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development Corp.
(PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co., from September
17, 1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when his employment
was terminated. The events leading to his dismissal from his job are not
disputed.
In
November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction
Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal
Project, Ormoc City, Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of
Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed
the corresponding certificate of candidacy for the position. Objection to
Pineda's being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was shortly
thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. The mayor
communicated with the PNOC-EDC thru
Engr. Ernesto Patanao, Resident Manager, Tongonan Geothermal Project to express the view that Pineda could not
actively participate in politics unless he officially resigned from PNOC-EDC. 1
Nothing seems to have resulted from this protest.
The local
elections in Leyte, scheduled for January 1988, were reset to and held on
February 1, 1988. Pineda was among the official candidates voted for, and
eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of councilor. Some vacillation
appears to have been evinced by Pineda at about this time. On February 8, 1988,
he wrote to the COMELEC Chairman, expressing his desire to withdraw from the
political contest on account of what he considered to be election
irregularities; and on March 19, 1988,
he wrote to the Secretary of Justice seeking legal opinion on the question,
among others, of whether or not he was "considered automatically resigned
upon . . . filing of . . . (his) certificate of candidacy," and whether or
not, in case he was elected, he could "remain appointed to any corporate
offspring of a government-owned or controlled corporation." Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office
in June, 1988 as councilor-elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. And despite so qualifying as councilor, and
assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's
Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at
Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City.
QUESTIONS:
1. Does the Civil Service Commission cover Pineda’s appointment? Explain.
2.Is he considered
resigned from his employment with the PNOC when he filed his certificatet of
candidacy? Explain.
Answer: The Civil Service Commission does not cove Pineda’s appointment
it being that the PNOC as an agency doesnot possess an original charter.However
he is covered by the provisions of the COMELEC, which provides that an employee
who files his certificate of candidacy is considered resigned from his
employment.( see G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993PNOC ENERGY DEV'T. CORP., ET AL.
vs. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.).
When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code
of 1985, in connection with its deliberations on and subsequent enactment of
related and repealing legislation i.e.,
Republic Acts Numbered 7166: "An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations
Therefor, and for Other Purposes" (effective November 26, 1991), 6646:
"An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for
Other Purposes" (effective January 5, 1988) and 6636: "An Act
Resetting the Local Elections, etc., (effective November 6, 1987), it was no
doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987
Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of two (2)
categories those with original charters,
and those organized under the general law
and (b) employees of these corporations were of two (2) kinds those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations because employed in corporations having original charters, and
those not subject to Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed
in said corporations organized under the general law, or the Corporation Code.
Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish
between these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations
or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes,
particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." 29
Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a
government-owned or controlled corporation does not lose its character as such
because not possessed of an original charter but organized under the general
law. If a corporation's capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is
operated and managed by officers charged with the mission of fulfilling the
public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a government-owned or
controlled corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code and not
under a special statute; and employees thereof, even if not covered by the
Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless "employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations," and come within the letter
of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them "ipso facto
resigned from . . . office upon the filing of . . . (their) certificate of
candidacy."
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and
therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do
not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words,
Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to
those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.”
3.The rules provide that in case of a judgment of the
RTC imposing death as a penalty, the case shall be forwarded directly to the
Supreme Court for automatice review. Can the Supreme Court change the rules and
provide that in said cases, the matter should first be reviewed by the Court of
Appeals? Explain your answer.
ANSWER: The Supreme Court can change the rules prusuant to
its rule-making powers.( See PP. V. Mateo,)It has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,pleading nad
practice and procedure in all courts x x xwhich shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
[Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (50]
4. The petitioner, Alfredo Guieb and the private respondent, Manuel
Asuncion, were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in the barangay election of 9 May 1994.
After the canvass of votes in the said barangay, the former was proclaimed as
the winning candidate. The latter then seasonably filed an election protest
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
On 27 May 1994, the MTC, per
Judge Lilia C. Español, rendered a decision confirming the proclamation of the
petitioner and dismissing the protest of the private respondent.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. The case was assigned to Branch 42 thereof.
In its decision of 31 August
1994, the RTC, per respondent Judge Luis M. Fontanilla, reversed the decision
of the MTC, annulled the proclamation of the petitioner, and declared the
private respondent as the winning candidate with a plurality of four votes over
the petitioner.
After the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied on 25 November 1994, the private
respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
In its order of 8 December 1994, 5 the RTC
declared that the motion should be properly filed with the court of origin and
that the decision of 31 August 1994 had already become final; it then ordered
the remand of the records of the case to the MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan,
for proper disposition.
On 12 December 1994, the
petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review on certiorari. On 29 December 1994, he sent by registered
mail his petition, which this Court received only on 25 January 1995. It turned
out, however, that his motion for extension of time to file a petition had
already been denied on 4 January 1995 for his failure to submit an affidavit of
service of that motion. On 8 February 1995, he filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial.
Meanwhile, on 20 December
1994, the private respondent filed with the MTC a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution. 6
In its order of 19 January
1995, the MTC deferred action on the said motion and required the petitioner's
counsel to inform the court of the status of his petition with this Court. For
failure of the petitioner's counsel to comply with the said order, the court
issued an order on 7 February 1995
granting the issuance of a writ of execution. On 13 February 1995,
however, the court received the said counsel's Compliance dated 9 February 1995
9 wherein he informed the court of the petitioner's motion to reconsider this
Court's resolution denying the motion for extension of time to file his
petition.
In the resolution of 8
February 1995, this Court required the respondent to comment on the petition.
On 16 February 1995, the petitioner filed with
the MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay and/or Suspend Execution. This motion was,
however, denied on the ground that the
writ, having been hand-carried by the private respondent to the office of the
sheriff, must have already been implemented and, therefore, the motion to stay
or suspend the same has become moot and academic.
On 20 March 1995, the sheriff returned the writ of
execution with the information that in the presence of a barangay kagawad and
barangay residents, he enforced the writ and proclaimed the private respondent
as Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
QUESTION 1.On the basis of
the above facts, who should be the rightful punong barangay of Nilombot? Support
your answer.
ANSWER: Alfredo Guieb is the rightful winner.The appeal to the RTC made
by his opponent is erroneous, hence judgment infavor f Guieb has become final
and executory.The appeal should have been made to the COMELEC and not to the
RTC.( See. G.R. No. 118118 August
14, 1995ALFREDO GUIEB vs. LUIS M. FONTANILLA, ET AL.) The private respondent
should have appealed the decision of the MTC to the COMELEC; the MTC should not
have given due course to the appeal; and the RTC should have dismissed outright
the appeal for want of jurisdiction.In accepting the appeal and deciding the
case on its merits, the respondent judge manifested either ignorance or
palpable disregard of the aforesaid constitutional provision and decision
5.Juan is the school administrator of the ZN Trade
School.To evade the violation of nepotism, he asked his section head, Jose to
recommend the appointment of his son Julius, as janitor of his office. Jose
acceded, and the Civil Service Commission upon the recommendation of Jose, Industrial
Arts Section head, approved the appointment.
a. Is
the appointment of Julius valid?
b. What if Juan appoints his
wife as Teacher II of the same school is the appointment valid?
ANSWER: The appointment of Julius
is invalid as it is nepotic. However, the appointment of his wife as a teacher
is valid, as an exception to the rules on nepotism.( G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994ROGELIO R.
DEBULGADO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) he prohibitory norm against nepotism in
the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as E.O. No. 292). Section 59 reads as
follows:Sec. 59. Nepotism (1) All
appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office,
or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section the word
"relative" and members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.(2) The following are exempted from the
operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential
capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full
report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.
The restriction mentioned in
subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a member of any family
who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau,
contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event
the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.(3) In order to give immediate effect to
these provisions, cases of previous appointment which are in contravention
hereof shall be corrected by transfer and pending such transfer, no promotion
or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who
were appointed in violation of these provisions. (Emphasis supplied).Section 6
of Rule XVIII, of the "Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws," issued on 27
December 1991, implementing, among other things, the abovequoted Section 59,
provides as follows:Sec. 6. No
appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal government
or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
Unless otherwise specifically
provided by law, as used in this Section, the word "relative" and the
members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree
either of consanguinity or of affinity.The following are exempted from the
operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential
capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of
such appointment shall be made to the Commission.The restriction mentioned in
the first paragraph of this Section shall not be applicable to the case of a
member of any family who after his or her appointment to any position in an
office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau,
in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may
be allowed.Cases of previous appointment which are in contravention hereof
shall be corrected by transfer, and pending such transfer no promotion or
salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who were
appointed in violation of these provisions. (Emphasis supplied)
6.The Municipality of Katipunan purchased some farm
implements for the use of its farmers. The COA upon investigation found out
that the plows purchased by it are overpriced. It also found out that there was
an overstaffing and hiring of employees in its agriculture department.
It then disapproved the
vouchers for the payment of overpriced farm implements and the release of
salaries of overhired employees. Is it within COA’s power to make said
disapprovals/disallowance?
ANSWER: It is within COA’s power
to disapprove overpriced farm implements, but not to disapprove salaries of
overhired employees. Distinctin should be made. In overpriced farm implements,
COA can disapprove that pursuant to its powers to dsiapprove/disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconsciounable expenditures
[Art. 1X Sec. 2 (2)] In overhiring of employees however, it cannot do so,
without necessarily interfering with the appointment prerogatives of the mayor.
Its disallowance of salaries to said employees is interference to the
appointing powers of the mayor, who is a part of the independent executive
department of the government. The COA HAS NO DISCRETION OR AUTHORITY to
disapprove payment on the ground that the aforementioned contract isunwise or
tht the amount there on is unreasonable (Riel v. Wright 49 Phil. 195; Guevara
v. Jimenez, 6 scra 813).To question the necessityof an appropriation is clearly
beyond the jurisdiction of the COA.
7.Senator Pimentel the chairman of the Blue Ribbon
Committee in Senate discovered that the Chief of Staff of the Military
committed an anomally when he bought a piece of land in General Santos City
allegedly for military use. The price was allegedly overpriced to 200%. The
seller is a certain Atty. Juan Cruz.
a. Senator
Pimentel issued a subpoena to the Chief of Staff and to Atty. Cruz to appear
before the Blue Ribbon Committee to answer some questions concerning said
anomally. Can the two refuse to appear before said committee?
b. Meanwhile,
the Ombudsman filed a case before the Sandiganbayan concerning the two persons
concerned. Atty. Cruz now refused to appear before the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Is he correct?
ANSWER: a. THE two cannot refuse to appear pursuant to the
power of the Senate to investigate in aid of legislation. B. In this case Atty.
Cruz can refuse to appear as the investigation of the Committee may interfere
with the independence of the Sandiganbayan.
(G.R. No. 89914 November
20, 1991 JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL.
vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE) The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes
the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article
VI thereof provides:The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
8. On February
2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director
IV" of the EID. On February 15,
2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino
S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in
a "Temporary" capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on
February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath
of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of
office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the
Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation. However, the Commission on
Appointments did not act on said appointments.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and
for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their
oaths of office for a second time. The
Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments
could act on their appointments. Thus,
on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. The Office of
the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission
on Appointments. They took their oaths of office anew.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued
a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001[11] addressed to petitioner as Director IV of
the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco
Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law
Department. COMELEC EID
Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in
a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc.
Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the
Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7
dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer
and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning
January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, which states in part:
"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by
virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the foregoing
prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new
employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when
necessary in the effective performance of its mandated functions during the
prohibited period, provided that the changes in the assignment of its field
personnel within the thirty-day period before election day shall be effected after
due notice and hearing."
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001.
Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section
261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative
and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment
and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman
and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments
of its Chairman and members. Petitioner
also assails as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department.
Simultaneously, petitioner challenges the designation of Cinco as
Officer-in-Charge of the EID.
Petitioner, moreover, questions the legality of the disbursements made
by COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-in-Charge Gideon C. De Guzman to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and other emoluments.
In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President
Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, respectively, for a
term of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008. They all took their oaths of
office anew.
QUESTIONS:
1. Whether or not
the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
2. Assuming that
the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad
interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions
violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution;
3. Whether or not
Benipayo’s removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority,
having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body.
RESOLVE
THE ABOVE ISSUES.
Answer: 1.An ad interim appointment is defined as an appointment
extended by the president when congrees is not in session. It is a regular
appointment and not a temporary one, because a person appointed on an ad
interim status cannot be removed from office by the president. 2.A
reappointment is not illegal, as it is still within the prerogatives of the
appointing power of the president.3.The chairman of the Comelec has the power
of appointment, reassignment and transfer of a COMELEC employee.
9. Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987
Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces
of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato,
Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and
Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces
voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the
constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in
favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces
and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however,
that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429,
"providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439
(1) Misamis Occidental, at
present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub
City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region
IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at
present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at
present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at
present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi
City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the
filing of their petition, members of Congress representing various legislative
districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and
Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino
protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that
There is no law which authorizes the
President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions some of which did not even take part in the
plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities
of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and
restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law
(Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that
"the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis
Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to
Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of
the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization.
This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus
Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative
regions in Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery of field services of
government agencies taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
With due respect to Her
Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes the
authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to
reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge
existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to
reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under
Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of
administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order 429,
does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is
not valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and
Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House
of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative
districts in provinces and cities.
As their protest went unheeded, while
Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX were scheduled on
January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No.
96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the
capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners in both cases contend that Art.
XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates
legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate
provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power
granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
In addition, petitioner in
G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the
power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the President is only to "merge regions
IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in
Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
QUESTIONS: 1. Given the set
of facts, is it within the power of the President to merge administrative
regions, transfer regional seats? Explain.
2.Discuss the validity/invalidity of the
issues raised by petitioner Jaldon.
ANSWER: It is within the
prerogatives of the administrative powers of the president to merge
administrative regions and transfer regional seats. The prohibition refers to
political subdivisions not admistrative one(G.R. No. 96754June 22, 1995JAMES L.
CHIONGBIAN, ET AL. vs. OSCAR M. ORBOS, ET AL.) Thus the creation and subsequent
reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to
authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power
"to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions"
following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to
the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the
President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into
regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments, which the law
requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas,
"while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of the Constitution]." The regions
themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes." 7 The power conferred on the
President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries 8 which has
been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General 9 or as "administrative in
nature."
There is, therefore, no
abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President
the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has
provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the
exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to
him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.
First, the question of standard.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged
legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge
existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to
reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development
and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." 12
Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in
accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the
President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing
regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the
provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was
to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative
regions.
Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible
to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734. The
constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13
has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The
title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to
that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the
power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of
administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in
favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, §13 provides that those
which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the existing
administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673
claims:
The questioned Executive Order
No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision
by moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities)
out of their legally designated regions. Aggravating this unacceptable or
untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which
did not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized
action of the President, as effected by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is
shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of Region
X and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said
Region X to Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all
formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate in the said
plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI
to Region XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao
del Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and
Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities voted
"NO", and thereby rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15
The contention has no merit.
While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not
vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification
that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing
regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to
remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region,
they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other
regions as the exigency of administration may require.
The regrouping is done only on
paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the
administrative supervision of local government units by the President and
insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no
"transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as
they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at
present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous
provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger
of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of
people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot
be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist
that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by
the President.
To be fundamental reason Art.
XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the
President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of
administration. It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the
reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that,
as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O.
No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical
features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language
groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted
by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and
(7) number of provinces and cities.
What has been said above applies
to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always
been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative
regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no
basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers.
To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that
the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to
determine the regional center.
It may be that the transfer of
the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may
entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings
and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is
addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality and it is
settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of
legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider only if
fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that presented by
petitioners.
10. Upon his assumption to the
position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a
letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking
the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees.Petitioner
de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of
the said employees were "midnight" appointments of the former mayor,
Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
While the
matter was pending before the CSC, three of the above-named employees, namely:
Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim
for payment of their salaries, alleging that although their appointments were
declared permanent by Conrado Gulim, Director II of the CSC Field Office based
in Quezon, petitioner de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and
benefits pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01, which was issued on June 30, 1995,
wherein the appointments of the said fourteen (14) employees were recalled.
Based on the
documents submitted by Marino, Ayala and Oriazel, the Legal and Quasi-Judicial
Division of the CSC issued an Order[2] finding that since the claimants-employees
had assumed their respective positions and performed their duties pursuant to
their appointments, they are therefore entitled to receive the salaries and
benefits appurtenant to their positions. Citing Rule V, Section 10 of the
Omnibus Rules[3] which provides, in part, that "if the appointee has
assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary
at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the
Commission," the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled that the said
employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral
act of the newly-assumed mayor.
On April 30, 1996, the CSC
denied petitioner's request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen
employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments
on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field
Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner's failure to present evidence that
would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
QUESTION: IS THE ACT OF
THE CSC VALID? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.CITE APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
ANSWER: The act of the CSC is
valid. THE PROHIBITION concerning midnight appointments applies only to
presidential appointments not to appointments made by the LGU’s.
( Source: DE RAMA vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 131136, 2001
February 28, En Banc)
END OF THE
EXAMINATION
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