MIDTERM EXAMINATION 2010 Political Law
Multiple Choice. Write the letter of your choice in your
notebook.
- Which of the following is NOT a legislative function of Congress?
(a) taxation
(b) appropriation
(c) expropriation
(d) impeachment
- Which of the following is an implied power of Congress?
(a) power to punish
contempt
(b) declare
the existence of a state of war
(c) discipline
its members
(d) canvass
presidential elections
- Which of the following is an INHERENT power of Congress?
(a) concur
to treaties
(b) concur
to amnesty with the President
(c) determining its
internal rules
(d) propose
constitutional amendments
- The power to make laws includes the power to –
(a) the
adoption of a bill
(b) the
framing of a statute
(c)
the repeal of a law
(d) enact
a bill
5.On a clash or conflict between
an executive agreement and statute, the latter prevails because-
(a) the
President cannot repeal a law through an executive agreement
(b) the main function of Congress is to enact a
law
(c) the statute is more
authoritative than an executive agreement
(d) because the Supreme Court says
so
6.What is done during the second
reading of the bill?
(a) referral to Senate
(b) it is
read in its entirety
© printed in its final form
(d) voting of the bill
7.Which of the following is considered a bill of local application?
(a) bill granting honorary citizenship
(b) bill authorizing the release of funds
© bill fixing rates on imports
(d)bill creating a municipality
8.Which of the following statements is correct?
(a) Congress cannot increase the appellate jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court
(b) Congress may increase the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court
© Congress cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court
(d)Congress may provided the
Supreme Court concurs.
9.To prevent a log-rolling legislation-
(a) every bill may have many subtitles
(b) every bill must embrace only
one subject matter
© every bill must be sponsored only by one member
(d)every bill must be debated and scrutinized.
10.The president may veto a bill, but this can be overridden
by –
(a) 2/3 vote of all the members of Congress voting
separately
(b) 2/3 voted of all the member of Congress voting jointly
© 2/3 vote of all members of each
House
(d)majority vote only of all members of each House.
11.The general rule is that the
President must approve entirely or disapprove in toto a bill. Which of the
following is true?
(a) there is no exception to the
rule
(b) he cannot veto an item
© he can
veto partially a tariff bill
(e) he
can veto the whole of an appropriation bill.
12.Which is False concerning the power of legislative
investigation?
(a) it is implied from the power of legislation
(b) it is expressly granted in the constitution
© it need not even be expressly granted
(d)it is not mandatory
13.Which is not true concerning the Arnault case?
(a) a person cited in legislative
contempt cannot be detained for an indefinite period of time
(b) the Court may grant bail
© imprisonment could last only when Congress is in session
(d)the President may grant pardon.
14.Which of the following is not a constitutional limitation
regarding an appropriation bill?
(a) that it must be devoted to a
public purpose
(b) that is should originate from the House of
Representatives
© the sum authorized to be released must be determinate or
at least determinable
(d)it must be for reasons of necessity
15.Which of the following does not describe the power of
taxation?
(a) it is inherent
(b) it must be uniform
©
it must be equal
(d)it must be equitable
16.The granting of tax exemtion requires-
(a) concurrence 2/3 of all members of Congress
(b) concurrence of majority of all members of Senate
© concurrence of majority of all
member of Congress
(d)Concurrence of 2/3 of congress voting separately.
17.The power of the people to propose bill and laws is known
as-
(a) referendum
(b)initiative
© plebiscite
(d) special election
18.Which of the following is NOT descriptive of executive power?
(a) it is not defined under the 1987 constitution
(b) it is the power to enforce the law
© it is the power to administer the law
(d)it is limited only to the
enumerated powers
19.The returns of every election for President shall be
submitted to-
(a)Senate
(b) House of Representatives
© the President of the Senate
(e) Speaker
of the House.
20.In which of the following shall the Vice-president become
the president?
(a) when the President fails to qualify
(b) when the President shall not have been chosen
© when the president resigns
(d) when the president is disabled.
PROBLEMS;
1. (a) Does the
declaration of a state of rebellion amount to a declaration of martial law? (b)
Does it also constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers of the
President? Explain your answer.
Answer:. The argument that
the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law
and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of
logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts in the “theater of war” or that military authorities have taken over the
functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil
or political rights. There is no indication that the President has
exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no
illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised
martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the
imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency
powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) ….
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite
a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised
powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and
18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.(SANLAKAS
V. REYES)
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary Reyes
[GR 159085, 3 February 2004]; also Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers/Member [GR 159103], Suplico, et al., vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. [GR 159185]; Pimentel et al. vs. Romulo et al. [GR 159196]
En Banc, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 2 join, 2 file own separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on leave
[GR 159085, 3 February 2004]; also Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers/Member [GR 159103], Suplico, et al., vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. [GR 159185]; Pimentel et al. vs. Romulo et al. [GR 159196]
En Banc, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 2 join, 2 file own separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on leave
Facts: Armed with
high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City
in the wee hours of 27 July 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the
soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the
Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). In
the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day
Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and
calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the evening of 27
July 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on 1
August 2003, through Proclamation 435. In the interim, several petitions were
filed before the Supreme Court challenging the validity of Proclamation 427 and
General Order 4.
Issue [1]: Whether the
President’s declaration of state of rebellion is necessary in the exercise of
the calling out power.
Held [1]: NO. For the
purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require
the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law.
In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and
that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as observed in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora,
“[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power.
The only criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may
call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.’” Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does
not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note
that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief
powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. Section 1, Article VII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: “The executive power shall be
vested in the President….” As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article
provides: “He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” The
provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when
taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath
of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the
occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the
very existence of government or the integrity of the State. In The Philippine
Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes,
proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual power and that
this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this
distinction to the “unitary and highly centralized” nature of the Philippine
government. She noted that, “There is no counterpart of the several states of
the American union which have reserved powers under the United States
constitution.” Thus, the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time,
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, statutory authority
for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power),
Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a
declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only
gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak
emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire
nation. But the Court’s mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of
the declaration. The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any “confusion” generated by the issuance of Proclamation 427
and General Order 4, the Court clarifies that the mere declaration of a state
of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion
could not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the presidential issuances
themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion “with due regard to
constitutional rights.”
Issue [2]: Whether
apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests, during the declaration of a state of rebellion, are
founded.
Held [2]: NO. A person may
be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not
the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for
a valid warrantless arrest are present. It is not disputed that the President
has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether
the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by
way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without
factual basis. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion
amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of
the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that
military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There
is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In
short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or
has exercised martial law powers. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the
declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise
depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President
has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive
or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and
in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
2. (A) Is the position of Provincial
Administrator primarily confidential? (2) Does the rule on nepotism apply to
designation?(3) May a private citizen who does not claim any better right to a
position file a verified complaint with the Civil Service Commission to
denounce a violation by an appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and
rules?
Answer: The position of Provincial
Administrator . the position of Provincial Administrator is embraced within the
Career Service under Section 5 of P.D. No. 807 as evidenced by the
qualifications prescribed for it in the Manual of Position Descriptions, 16
to wit:
Education
: Bachelor's degree preferably in Law/Public or Business Administration.
Experience
: Six years of progressively responsible experience in planning, directing and
administration of provincial government operations. Experience in private agencies
considered are those that have been more or less familiar level of
administrative proficiency.
Eligibility
: RA 1080 (BAR)/Personnel Management Officer/Career Service
(Professional)/First Grade/Supervisor).
It may be
added that the definition of its functions and its distinguishing
characteristics as laid down in the Manual, thus:
xxx xxx
xxx
2. DEFINITION:
Under the
direction of the Provincial Governor, responsible for the overall coordination
of the activities of the various national and local agencies in the province;
and general planning, direction and control of the personnel functions and the
administrative services of the Governor's Office.
3. DISTINGUISHING
CHARACTERISTICS:
This is
the class for top professional level management, administrative and
organizational work in the operation of provincial government with highly
complex, involved relationships with considerable delegation of authority and
responsibility and a high degree of public contact.
render
indisputable the above conclusion that the subject position is in the career
service which, per Section 5 of P.D. No. 807, is characterized by (a) entrance
based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, (b)
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, and (c) security of
tenure. More specifically, it is an open career position, for
appointment to it requires prior qualification in an appropriate examination. 17
It falls within the second major level of positions in the career service, per
Section 7 of P.D. No. 807, which reads:
Sec. 7. Classes
of Positions in the Career Service. — (a) Classes of positions in the
career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into
three major levels as follows:
xxx xxx
xxx
(2) The
second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions
which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory
or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to
Division Chief level; . . .
Nepotism applies to designation. Any private
citizen can file a protest. Not being primarily confidential, appointment
thereto must, inter alia, be subject to the rule on nepotism.
prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot
be done directly cannot be done indirectly"
Any
citizen of the Philippines may bring that matter to the attention of the Civil
Service Commission for appropriate action conformably with its role as the
central personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules
governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil
servants, 29 with the power and function to administer and enforce the
Constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system. 30
Moreover, Section 37 of the decree expressly allows a private citizen to
directly file with the Civil Service Commission a complaint against a
government official or employee, in which case it may hear and decide the case
or may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct an investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted
to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken. This provision gives teeth to the Constitutional
exhortation that a public office is a public trust and public officers and
employees must at all times be, inter alia, accountable to the people. 31
An ordinary citizen who brings to the attention of the appropriate office any
act or conduct of a government official or employee which betrays the public
interest deserves nothing less than the praises, support and encouragement of
society. The vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.
JOSE P. LAUREL V, in his official
capacity as Provincial Governor of Batangas, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and LORENZO SANGALANG, respondents. THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 71562 October 28, 1991
3. Alexander Albofera, a municipal treasurer was
convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court on July 20, 1981. On appeal,
the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending
appeal before the Supreme Court, the President of the Philippines on January 2, 1987.upon
recommendation of the National Amnesty Commission granted him absolute pardon.
(a) Is the grant of pardon, under the said circumstances valid? (b) Is he
entitled to be reinstated to his government position? (c) Is the payment of
fine and civil liability extinguished ?
ANSWER: As a general rule, for pardon to be
granted there must first be a conviction by final judgment. However, this
applies only for pardons granted pursuant to the 1987 constitution. BEFORE
that, pardon may be granted (under the 1973 constitution) even if there is no
final judgment by conviction. In the problem, the pardon was granted on January
2, 1987, hence it is valid.
A person pardoned cannot be reinstated to
his government position, unless the pardon expressly grants it. The person
needs to reapply.
The payment of fine, being criminal in
nature, is deemed suspended. But the payment of civil liability is not.
Absolute pardon having been
granted to accused-appellants prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
on February 2,
1987, when
there was as yet no requirement that pardon may be extended only after
conviction by final judgment, the pardon granted by the President on January
29, 1987, was, therefore, valid, binding and effective. Accused-appellants'
criminal liability is thereby extinguished but their civil liability remains.
A pardon
shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ALEXANDER ALBOFERA, AND ROMEO LAWI-AN accused-appellants. G.R. No. L-69377
April 8, 1988
"Pardon
is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before
or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction[U1] . Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does
'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,'
and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself,
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense."[U2] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA
JESSIE" and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant. SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000]
4. Does the President of the Philippines have the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases? Is such grant considered a
political question beyond judicial review? What is the limitation of said
power if there be any? Explain and cite your case.
Answer:YES. Moreover, applying the
doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," We
cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish,
so We must no distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which
cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for
the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19
of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily
involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing
reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative
cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases,
with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.X X X We wish to stress
however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.
X X X Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true
that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's
discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is
also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such
discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by
the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review.
And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of
the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the
President. In this connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco,
et al., 103 Phil. 1051, is very enlightening, and We quote:
Elsewhere in this treatise the
well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within
the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or
executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Consfitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is
not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only
with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the
judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the
political departments of government because in very many cases their action is
necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these
limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize
that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these
determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be
traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States,
Vol. 3, p. 1326).
xxx xxx xxx
What is generally meant, when it
is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter
which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or
that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the goverrunent, with discretionary power to act. See State
vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis.
497, 51 L.R.A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Fan. 155; 32 Pac.
470, 948, 19 L. RA. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. CA 516, 30 L.R.A-
90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 111, 41, 37 N.E. 683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its
discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control
over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but
because they are matters which the people have by the Constitute delegated to
the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free
from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the
limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable,
not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the
Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But
every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and
subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting
through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department
is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary the department which
is charged with the special duty of determinining the limitations which the law
places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown
except in Great Britain and America,
is necessary, to "the end that the government may be one of laws and not
men" � words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any
written constitutional document.
Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been
conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the
other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they
have acted within the bounds of the Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec. 1,
Constitution). "Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the govermental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view" (Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives &
Ong, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and Balanquit vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives & Ong, G.R Nos. 92202-03, July 30, 1991).
In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is
not purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the
Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
We must not overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power
of executive clemency is subject to constitutional l'um'tations. We will merely
check whether the particular measure in question has been in accordance with
law. In so doing, We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or motives
which actuate the President as such is clearly beyond our power of judicial
review.
RODOLFO D.
LLAMAS, petitioner,
vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, respondents. EN BANCG.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991
5. Enumerate some of the powers of the president as
elucidated in the Marcos v. Manglapus case.
6.
(a) What do you mean by the "Calling-out Power"
of the President under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?
Answer: Section 18, Article VII provides:The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
This is the “calling out power”. It is the most benign
military power of the president. He can use that power to “prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion”. The ground is “whenever it becomes
necessary” only.
(b)On February 24,
2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.1017 declaring a
state of national emergency. Is this Proclamation constitutional? Explain.
Part of the proclamation
has this provision: “Now, Therefore, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of
the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article
7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President...
whenever it becomes necessary ... may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress .... rebellion ..., " and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”
The portion on “calling
out” is a valid exercise of her power as the commander-in-chief. But to enforce
“ decrees” is invalid, as she does not exercise legislative powers.
©During the
effectivity of this Proclamation, Gener, Lito, and Bong were arrested by the
police for acts of terrorism. Is the arrest legal? Explain.
At that time when she
proclaimed a national state of emergency, there was no law then on terrorism.
The crime was still undefined, hence the arrest was illegal.
1.
Does Robert have a
standing to challenge Proclamation No.1018? Explain. 2.5%
2.
In the same suit,
the Solicitor General contends that under the Constitution, the President as
Commander-in-Chief, determines whether the exigency has arisen requiring the
exercise of his power to declare Martial Law and that his determination is
conclusive upon the courts. How should the Supreme Court rule?
3.
The Solicitor
General argues that, in any event, the determination of whether the rebellion
poses dangers to public safety involves a question of fact and the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. What should be the ruling of the Court? 2.5%
4.
Finally, the
Solicitor General maintains that the President reported to Congress such
proclamation of Martial Law, but Congress did not revoke the proclamation. What
is the effect of the inaction of Congress on the suit brought by Robert to the
Supreme Court?
Answer:
(a) Yes, Robert has standing. The Supreme
Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.(b) The
Supreme Court has the power to review the factual basis. (c) The Solicitor
General is wrong. The Supreme Court as a matter of exception now, can review
the sufficiency of the FACTUAL basis. (d) Even the inaction of Congress does
not negate the fact that the proclamation of martial law is only temporary in
nature.
8. During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the
President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a
writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General,
to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders
are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present
action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials
of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded.
Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the
aforementioned executive orders because the latter have taken away from the
former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions intervened in the
case.
Question: Is the act of the president in
creating 33 municipalities valid? Explain.
The act of the president is
unconstitutional. The creation of municipalities is an exercise of legislative
power; hence the president cannot do so. There are only two situations where
the president exercises delegated legislative power in the constitution: fixing
of tariff rates and during a national emergency. In the case at bar, said
legislative exercise is not authorized.
9. .
Sometime before 1979, petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance
of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate
prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days
to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an
indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810, 91041 and F-138107). These
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and
17694-CR). The maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000. On 18 April
1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of
the Philippines on condition
that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law." Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board")
resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional
pardon granted to the petitioner. The
record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in
Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction was then pending appeal before the
Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a letter report
dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation
("NBI"), addressed to the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter,
the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had been brought
against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of
crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave
coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious
mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were
identified in the NBI report as having been dismissed. The NBI report did not
purport to be a status report on each of the charges there listed and
Identified. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the
President of the Philippines
informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the
conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. On 8 September 1986, the
President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.On 10 October
1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The
petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired
portion of his sentence.Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of
Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty
(20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of
the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926. Petitioner also contends
that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.Rule on
petitioner’s contentions
Answer: Once pardon is granted,
the relationship is transferred purely between the president and the convict.
The condition of his pardon did not require a final conviction, hence his
arrest is valid. There is no deprivation of due process. ONCE the conditional
pardon is violated, the president has always the right to revoke the same at
will.
“A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the
sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect
that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he
does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison
to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the
pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has
thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his
delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the
terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the
arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail
to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or
suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial
scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee,
having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment
of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.”
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was
the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the
corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the
acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him,
warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by the
President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling
that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a
requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a
breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for
the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by
the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely
lodged in his office. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong
Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents. G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents. G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
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