The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

In People v. Dela Piedra,^[25] the Court declared that an erroneous performance of statutory duty - such as an apparent selective enforcement of the statute - could not be considered a violation of the equal protection clause, unless the element of intentional or purposeful discrimination is shown. In that case, the Court ruled that there is no violation of the equal protection of the laws in prosecuting only one of the many equally guilty persons. This lone circumstance would not be sufficient to uphold the claim of denial of the equal protection clause. Absent a clear showing of intentional discrimination, the prosecuting officers shall be presumed tc have regularly performed their official duties. Thus:

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination." Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.^[26] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted; italics in the original)

Like the prosecution which has been given the discretion to prosecute whoever it believes to have committed a crime, depending on its sound assessment of the evidence, the COA has the authority to disallow disbursements of public funds if, in its judgment, they were utilized in violation of its intended purpose. Consequently, it is up to the person who claims to have been the victim of selective enforcement to prove that the same was made for a discriminatory purpose.

In this case, aside from her allegation that DPWH IV-A was among those singled out by the COA concerning the disallowance of the CNA Incentive, Cuaresma failed to present even a single evidence to show that the disallowance of the subject CNA Incentive was made pursuant to a discriminatory purpose. Clearly, no violation of equalprotection clause for selective enforcement could be attributed to the COA as Cuaresma failed to prove that there was intentional discrimination.

Neither could the alleged allowance by the COA of the CNA Incentive for calendar year 2007 be sufficient reason to conclude that the commission is guilty of grave abuse of discretion. Suffice it to state that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.^[27] The supposed error by the COA in allowing DPWH IV-A's CNA Incentive for calendar year 2007, allegedly similarly sourced from the savings from the EAO, is insufficient justification to uphold the validity of the CNA Incentive in question. A contrary ruling would compel the COA to contravene its constitutional duty as the guardian of public funds.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 237987, March 19, 2019 ]

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, REGION IV-A AND GENEVIEVE E. CUARESMA, AS ONE OF THE CERTIFYING OFFICERS AT THE TIME OF THE GRANT OF THE ASSAILED CNA INCENTIVE,^* PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.