TABUSO V. GOMOS: IBP is sui generis

The IBP's existence traces its roots to Sec. 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which stated that:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. 

In view of this provision, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6397^[27] which gave this Court the facility to initiate the integration process of the Philippine Bar; the provisions of which read:

Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified wherein Sec. 5(5) of Art. X enumerated the powers of this Court, thus:

Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Finally, the legal quandary pertaining to the integration of the Philippine Bar culminated in the promulgation of In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines^[28] where the Court upheld the integration of the Philippine Bar on the ground that it was sanctioned by Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the 1935 Constitution.

Following this judicial pronouncement, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 181^[29] was enacted formally creating the IBP and vesting it with corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the law states:

Section 2. The Integrated Bar shall have perpetual succession and shall have all legal powers appertaining to a juridical person, particularly the power to sue and be sued; to contract and be contracted with; to hold real and personal property as may be necessary for corporate purposes; to mortgage, lease, sell, transfer, convey and otherwise dispose of the same; to solicit and receive public and private donations and contributions; to accept and receive real and personal property by gift, devise or bequest; to levy and collect membership dues and special assessments from its members; to adopt a seal and to alter the same at pleasure; to have offices and conduct its affairs in the Greater Manila Area and elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 139-A thereof; and generally to do all such acts and things as may be necessary or proper to carry into effect and promote the purposes for which it was organized.

Significantly, Section 6^[30] of P.D. No. 181 still recognized this Court's constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning the IBP, and such power of the Court was also institutionalized and carried into the present Constitution in which Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII now reads:

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)

Now, given the IBP's statutory and jurisprudential background, the Court proceeds to answer the question: What branch of government created the IBP? More importantly: Is the IBP strictly a public office or a private institution?

To answer both questions, the Court highlights its observations regarding the important segments of the legal history which led to the grant of the IBP's juridical personality, viz:

Firstly, both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions gave the Court and the Legislature the concurrent power to regulate the practice of law. In other words, the overlapping and coequal powers of both branches of government to regulate the practice of law became the initial bases for the IBP's establishment.

Secondly, Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6397 used the phraseology "to effect the integration" which means that Congress, though it also had the power to enact laws affecting the practice of law under the 1935 Constitution, had acknowledged the Court's rightful (and primary) prerogative to adopt measures to raise the standard of the legal profession.^[31] At that time, only this Court had the power to "promulgate" rules concerning the practice of law while Congress may only "repeal, alter or supplement" these promulgated rules. That may be the apparent reason why Congress only appropriated (and allowed for subsequent appropriations of) the necessary funds to assist this Court in attaining the objective of initiating the integration of the Philippine Bar.

Thirdly, the Court had ordained the integration of the Philippine Bar to: a) assist in the administration of justice; b) foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct; c) safeguard the professional interests of its members; d) cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood; e) provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto; f) encourage and foster legal education; g) promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; h) enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively; i) render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law; j) protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; k) discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; l) shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; m) have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers; n) prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position; o) establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers; p) provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; q) distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces; r) devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practicing attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country; s) enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules; t) create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research; u) conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and v) generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.^[32]

Fourthly, P.D. No. 181 endowed the IBP with the attributes of perpetual succession and, more importantly, "all legal powers appertaining to a juridical person." It means that the IBP had corporate attributes which gave it the ability to pursue desired activities on its own, subject only to the Court's administrative supervision.

Lastly, the present Constitution's acknowledgment of the "integrated bar" as one of the subjects of this Court's power to promulgate rules relative to the practice of law cements the IBP's existence as a juridical person.

The aforementioned observations indubitably establish that the collaborative enactments of the Court, the Congress (and the President exercising legislative powers in the case of P.D. No. 181), and the present Constitution all contributed to the emergence of the IBP's juridical personality. Due to this peculiar manner of creation, it now becomes reasonable for the Court to conclude that the IBP is a sui generis public^[33] institution deliberately organized, by both the legislative and judicial branches of government and recognized by the present and past Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal profession. At this juncture, the Court needs to determine whether the IBP's officers, especially the IBP Commissioners, are considered as public officers under the purview of the law.

Presently, the IBP as an organization has as its members all lawyers coming from both the public and private sectors who are authorized to practice law in the Philippines. However, Section 4^[34] of the IBP's By-Laws allows only private practitioners to occupy any position in its organization. This means that only individuals engaged in the private practice are authorized to be officers or employees and to perform acts for and in behalf of the IBP. Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private practitioners performing public functionsdelegated to them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. This was aptly described in Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada^[35] where the Court declared that:

The [IBP CBD] derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints against lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints against lawyers, the [IBP-CBD] should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court. 

Even if the afore-cited case did not expound in what way the IBP-Commission is to be "guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court," it can be reasonably inferred that the IBP-CBD's delegated function of entertaining complaints against lawyers is public in nature; but the responsible officer performing such function is a private individual—not a public officer. Consequently, it also follows that IBP Commissioners are not "public officers" in context of Sec. 3(b)^[36] of R.A. No. 6713, Art. 203 the Revised Penal Code,^[37] Sec. 4(e)^[38] R.A. No. 9485,^[39] or even Sec. 2(b)^[40] of R.A. No. 3019.^[41] Especially in the context of R.A. No. 6713, they are not "public officials" as they are not elective or appointive officials of the  "government" as defined by Sec. 3(a)^[42] of the same law. Moreover, it is also obvious that IBP Commissioners cannot be held liable for violation of Sec. 15(1),^[43] Art. VIII of the Constitution because they are neither members of the Judiciary in the context of the Constitution or statutory provisions organizing lower collegiate and trial courts nor quasi-judicial officers in the context of applicable laws creating quasi-judicial agencies. Finally, IBP Commissioners cannot be held administratively liable for malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance in the framework of administrative law because they cannot strictly be considered as being "employed" with the government or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality including government-owned or controlled corporations.^[44]

Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively liable for violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar and to the practice of law. Even if they are not "public officers" in the context of their employment relationship with the government, they are still "officers of the court" and "servants of the law" who are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others.^[45] Most importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution placed them under the Court's administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners may be held administratively liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers—not as government officials.

THE COURT’S ADVICE TO LAWYERS

The Court has, in some instances, even conceded that "a lawyer may think highly of his [or her] intellectual endowment."^[53] Such observation is but a moderate and fair commentary to remind members of the legal profession to espouse humility in all their dealings not only with their clients and with their fellow lawyers but also against their adversaries.

The respondent's comment, that the complainant "must have thought so highly of herself that...she finds it necessary to declare that [Sillo's words] are not words a graduate of the only Pontifical University in Asia and a law school ran by monks would use," is merely a fair and realistic observation. Clearly, an academic slur implicating incompetence on a person's intellectual capabilities due to his or her scholastic background simply amounts to an intemperate language on the complainant's part. It finds no place in decent legal argumentation and debate. Besides, lawyers should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticisms (especially those which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is inherently a hostile endeavor between adverse or contending parties. Hence, it was proper on the part of Commissioner Limpingco to recommend for the dismissal of the complainant's charges of impropriety for the respondent merely made a fair comment.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Obviously, the filing of baseless and unfounded administrative complaints against fellow lawyers is antithetical to conducting oneself with courtesy, fairness and candor. It reduces the Bar's disciplinary process into an avenue for childish bickering and trivial catfights. Realistically, filing harassment administrative complaints definitely causes undue anxiety and considerable psychological stress on wrongly charged respondents. Thus, it should be understood that the aforementioned Canon proscribes the filing of frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of the legal profession to prevent exploitative lawyers from abusing the disciplinary process. Besides, an important portion of the Lawyer's Oath which should be the guiding beacon of every member of the legal profession states: "I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same."

FINAL NOTE

Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal profession and even their non-lawyer adversaries with utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the primary purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings against delinquent lawyers is to uphold the law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from being corrupted by unscrupulous practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is the reason why lawyers should always set a good example in not using the law and the rules as weapons or tools of malicious vindication during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility of the legal profession and tarnishes its integrity.

On the part of the judges, the following reminders are in order:

 Rule 1.01 – A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Rule 1.02 – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

 Rule 3.01 – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

 Rule 3.02 – In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
 Rule 3.04 – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

THE NON-POLITICAL BAR

Section 4. Non-political bar. - The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, ⁴⁸ a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right."

SOURCE: THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018 ]

ACHERNAR B. TABUZO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, RESPONDENT.