The IBP's existence traces
its roots to Sec. 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which stated that:
Section 13. The
Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws
on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
In view of this provision,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 6397[27] which
gave this Court the facility to initiate the integration process of the
Philippine Bar; the provisions of which read:
Section 1. Within two years
from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as
it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Section 2. The sum of five
hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be
included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
Section 3. This Act shall
take effect upon its approval.
Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution was ratified wherein Sec. 5(5) of Art. X enumerated the powers of
this Court, thus:
Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, and the integration of the bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Finally, the legal quandary
pertaining to the integration of the Philippine Bar culminated in the
promulgation of In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines[28] where
the Court upheld the integration of the Philippine Bar on the ground that it
was sanctioned by Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the 1935 Constitution.
Following this judicial pronouncement, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 181[29] was enacted formally creating the IBP and vesting it with corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the law states:
Following this judicial pronouncement, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 181[29] was enacted formally creating the IBP and vesting it with corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the law states:
Section 2. The
Integrated Bar shall have perpetual succession and shall have all legal powers
appertaining to a juridical person, particularly the power to sue and
be sued; to contract and be contracted with; to hold real and personal property
as may be necessary for corporate purposes; to mortgage, lease, sell, transfer,
convey and otherwise dispose of the same; to solicit and receive public and
private donations and contributions; to accept and receive real and personal
property by gift, devise or bequest; to levy and collect membership dues and
special assessments from its members; to adopt a seal and to alter the same at
pleasure; to have offices and conduct its affairs in the Greater Manila Area
and elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not
inconsistent with the laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court,
particularly Rule 139-A thereof; and generally to do all such acts and things
as may be necessary or proper to carry into effect and promote the purposes for
which it was organized.
Significantly, Section 6[30] of
P.D. No. 181 still recognized this Court's constitutional power to promulgate
rules concerning the IBP, and such power of the Court was also
institutionalized and carried into the present Constitution in which Sec. 5(5),
Art. VIII now reads:
Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
Now, given the IBP's
statutory and jurisprudential background, the Court proceeds to answer the
question: What branch of government created the IBP? More importantly: Is the
IBP strictly a public office or a private institution?
To answer both questions,
the Court highlights its observations regarding the important segments of the
legal history which led to the grant of the IBP's juridical personality, viz:
Firstly, both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions gave the Court and the Legislature the
concurrent power to regulate the practice of law. In other words, the
overlapping and coequal powers of both branches of government to regulate the
practice of law became the initial bases for the IBP's establishment.
Secondly, Sec.
1 of R.A. No. 6397 used the phraseology "to effect the integration"
which means that Congress, though it also had the power to enact laws affecting
the practice of law under the 1935 Constitution, had acknowledged the
Court's rightful (and primary) prerogative to adopt measures to raise the
standard of the legal profession.[31] At
that time, only this Court had the power to "promulgate" rules
concerning the practice of law while Congress may only "repeal, alter or
supplement" these promulgated rules. That may be the apparent reason why
Congress only appropriated (and allowed for subsequent appropriations of) the
necessary funds to assist this Court in attaining the objective
of initiating the integration of the Philippine Bar.
Thirdly, the
Court had ordained the integration of the Philippine Bar to: a) assist in the
administration of justice; b) foster and maintain on the part of its members
high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and
conduct; c) safeguard the professional interests of its members; d) cultivate
among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood; e) provide a forum
for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and
publish information relating thereto; f) encourage and foster legal education;
g) promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective
law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; h) enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility effectively; i) render more effective
assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law; j) protect lawyers and litigants
against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; k) discharge,
fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; l) shield the
judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; m) have an
effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers; n) prevent
the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position; o) establish welfare funds for
families of disabled and deceased lawyers; p) provide placement services, and
establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the
country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; q) distribute
educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of
our provinces; r) devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education
for practicing attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country; s) enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate
minimum fees schedules; t) create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research; u) conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions
and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and v) generate and maintain pervasive and
meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of
the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.[32]
Fourthly, P.D.
No. 181 endowed the IBP with the attributes of perpetual succession and, more
importantly, "all legal powers appertaining to a juridical person."
It means that the IBP had corporate attributes which gave it the ability to
pursue desired activities on its own, subject only to the Court's
administrative supervision.
Lastly, the
present Constitution's acknowledgment of the "integrated bar" as one
of the subjects of this Court's power to promulgate rules relative to the
practice of law cements the IBP's existence as a juridical person.
The aforementioned
observations indubitably establish that the collaborative enactments of the
Court, the Congress (and the President exercising legislative powers in the
case of P.D. No. 181), and the present Constitution all contributed to the
emergence of the IBP's juridical personality. Due to this peculiar
manner of creation, it now becomes reasonable for the Court to
conclude that the IBP is a sui generis public[33] institution deliberately
organized, by both the legislative and judicial branches of government and
recognized by the present and past Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal
profession. At this juncture, the Court needs to determine whether the IBP's
officers, especially the IBP Commissioners, are considered as public officers
under the purview of the law.
Presently, the IBP as an
organization has as its members all lawyers coming from both the public and
private sectors who are authorized to practice law in the Philippines. However,
Section 4[34] of the IBP's By-Laws allows only private
practitioners to occupy any position in its organization. This
means that only individuals engaged in the private practice are authorized to
be officers or employees and to perform acts for and in behalf of the IBP.
Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private
practitioners performing public functionsdelegated to them by this Court in
the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. This
was aptly described in Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada[35] where
the Court declared that:
The [IBP CBD] derives
its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints against
lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to
regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence,
in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative
complaints against lawyers, the [IBP-CBD] should be guided by the doctrines and
principles laid down by this Court.
Even if the afore-cited
case did not expound in what way the IBP-Commission is to be
"guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court," it
can be reasonably inferred that the IBP-CBD's delegated function
of entertaining complaints against lawyers is public in nature; but the
responsible officer performing such function is a private individual—not a
public officer. Consequently, it also follows that IBP Commissioners
are not "public officers" in context of
Sec. 3(b)[36] of R.A. No. 6713, Art. 203 the Revised Penal Code,[37] Sec.
4(e)[38] R.A. No. 9485,[39] or
even Sec. 2(b)[40] of R.A. No. 3019.[41] Especially
in the context of R.A. No. 6713, they are not "public officials" as
they are not elective or appointive officials of the
"government" as defined by Sec. 3(a)[42] of
the same law. Moreover, it is also obvious that IBP Commissioners cannot be
held liable for violation of Sec. 15(1),[43] Art.
VIII of the Constitution because they are neither members of the Judiciary in
the context of the Constitution or statutory provisions organizing lower
collegiate and trial courts nor quasi-judicial officers in the context of
applicable laws creating quasi-judicial agencies. Finally, IBP Commissioners
cannot be held administratively liable for malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance in the framework of administrative law because they cannot
strictly be considered as being "employed" with the government or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality including government-owned or
controlled corporations.[44]
Nonetheless, IBP
Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively liable for
violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar
and to the practice of law. Even if they are not "public officers" in
the context of their employment relationship with the government, they are
still "officers of the court" and "servants of the law" who
are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves
exemplars worthy of emulation by others.[45] Most
importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution placed them under the
Court's administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners may be held
administratively liable only in relation to their functions as IBP
officers—not as government officials.
THE
COURT’S ADVICE TO LAWYERS
The Court has, in some instances, even conceded that "a
lawyer may think highly of his [or her] intellectual endowment."[53] Such observation is
but a moderate and fair commentary to remind members of the legal profession to
espouse humility in all their dealings not only with their clients and with
their fellow lawyers but also against their adversaries.
The respondent's comment, that the complainant "must have
thought so highly of herself that...she finds it necessary to declare that
[Sillo's words] are not words a graduate of the only Pontifical University in
Asia and a law school ran by monks would use," is merely a fair and
realistic observation. Clearly, an academic slur implicating incompetence on a
person's intellectual capabilities due to his or her scholastic background
simply amounts to an intemperate language on the complainant's part. It finds
no place in decent legal argumentation and debate. Besides, lawyers should not
be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticisms (especially those
which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is inherently a hostile
endeavor between adverse or contending parties. Hence, it was proper on the
part of Commissioner Limpingco to recommend for the dismissal of the
complainant's charges of impropriety for the respondent merely made a fair
comment.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Obviously, the filing of baseless and unfounded administrative
complaints against fellow lawyers is antithetical to conducting oneself with
courtesy, fairness and candor. It reduces the Bar's disciplinary process into
an avenue for childish bickering and trivial catfights. Realistically, filing
harassment administrative complaints definitely causes undue anxiety and
considerable psychological stress on wrongly charged respondents. Thus, it
should be understood that the aforementioned Canon proscribes the filing of
frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of the legal
profession to prevent exploitative lawyers from abusing the disciplinary
process. Besides, an important portion of the Lawyer's Oath which should be the
guiding beacon of every member of the legal profession states: "I will not
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
or give aid nor consent to the same."
FINAL NOTE
Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal profession and even their non-lawyer adversaries with utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the primary purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings against delinquent lawyers is to uphold the law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from being corrupted by unscrupulous practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is the reason why lawyers should always set a good example in not using the law and the rules as weapons or tools of malicious vindication during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility of the legal profession and tarnishes its integrity.
On the part of the judges, the following reminders are in order:
Rule 1.01 – A judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.
Rule 1.02 – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.01 – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
Rule 3.02 – In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
Rule 3.04 – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Rule 1.02 – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.01 – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
Rule 3.02 – In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
Rule 3.04 – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
THE NON-POLITICAL BAR
Section 4. Non-political bar. - The Integrated
Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic
feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No
lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be
eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or
any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the
Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or
accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
As observed by this
Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967
decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That
is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others'
lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right."
SOURCE:
THIRD DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018 ]
ACHERNAR B. TABUZO, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, RESPONDENT.
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