Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[115] In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.[116]
The instant petition is case of transcendental importance
While traditionally, the principle of transcendental importance applies as an exception to the rule requiring locus standi before the Courts can exercise its judicial power of review, the same principle nevertheless, finds application in this case as it is without doubt that the State maintains an interest on the issue of the legality of the Chief Justice's appointment.
Further, it is apparent that the instant petition is one of first impression and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto. The Court's action on the present petition has far-reaching implications, and it is paramount that the Court make definitive pronouncements on the issues herein presented for the guidance of the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. Thus, the questions herein presented merit serious consideration from the Court and should not be trifled on.
Policy and ethical considerations likewise behoove this Court to rule on the issues put forth by the parties. This Court has always been a vigilant advocate in ensuring that its members and employees continuously possess the highest ideals of integrity, honesty, and uprightness. More than professional competence, this Court is cognizant of the reality that the strength of Our institution depends on the confidence reposed on Us by the public. As can be gleaned from Our recent decisions, this Court has not hesitated from disciplining its members whether they be judges, Justices or regular court employees. This case should not therefore be treated merely with kid gloves because it involves the highest official of the judicial branch of the government. On the contrary, this is an opportune time for this Court to exact accountability by examining whether there has been strict compliance with the legal and procedural requirements in the appointment of its Members.
Respondent, however, pounds on the fact that as a member of the Supreme Court, she is an impeachable officer. As such, respondent argues that a quo warranto proceeding, which may result in her ouster, cannot be lodged against her, especially when there is an impending impeachment case against her.
This argument is misplaced.
The origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different
While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.
To lend proper context, We briefly recount the origin and nature of impeachment proceedings and a quo warranto petition:
Impeachment
Historians trace the origin of impeachment as far as the 5th century in ancient Greece in a process called eisangelia.[117] The grounds for impeachment include treason, conspiracy against the democracy, betrayal of strategic posts or expeditionary forces and corruption and deception.[118]
Its, modem form, however, appears to be inspired by the British parliamentary system of impeachment. Though both public and private officials can be the subject of the process, the British system of impeachment is largely similar to the current procedure in that it is undertaken in both Houses of the Parliament. The House of Commons determines when an impeachment should be instituted. If the grounds, normally for treason and other high crimes and misdemeanor, are deemed sufficient, the House of Commons prosecutes the individual before the House of Lords.[119]
While impeachment was availed for "high crimes and misdemeanors", it would appear that the phrase was applied to a variety of acts which can arguably amount to a breach of the public's confidence, such as advising the King to grant liberties and privileges to certain persons to the hindrance of the due execution of the laws, procuring offices for persons who were unfit, and unworthy of them and squandering away the public treasure, browbeating witnesses and commenting on their credibility, cursing and drinking to excess, thereby bringing the highest scandal on the public justice of the kingdom, and failure to conduct himself on the most distinguished principles of good faith, equity, moderation, and mildness.[120]
While heavily influenced by the British concept of impeachment, the United States of America made significant modifications from its British counterpart. Fundamentally, the framers of the United States visualized the process as a means to hold accountable its public officials, as can be gleaned from their basic law:
The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.[121]Other noted differences from the British process of impeachment include limiting and specifying the grounds to "treason, Bribery, or other High Criines and Misdemeanors", and punishing the offender with removal and disqualification to hold public office instead of death, forfeiture of property and corruption of blood.[122]
In the Philippines, the earliest record of impeachment in our laws is from the 1935 Constitution.[123] Compared to the US Constitution, it would appear that the drafters of the 1935 Constitution further modified the process by making impeachment applicable only to the highest officials of the country; providing "culpable violation of the Constitution" as an additional ground, and requiring two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives to impeach and three-fourths vote of the Senate to convict.
As currently worded, our 1987 Constitution, in addition to those stated in the 1935 basic law, provided another additional ground to impeach highranking public officials: "betrayal of public trust". Commissioner Rustico De los Reyes of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained this ground as a "catch-all phrase to include all acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute."[124]
From the foregoing, it is apparent that although the concept of impeachment has undergone various modifications to suit different jurisdictions and government forms, the consensus seems to be that it is essentially a political process meant to vindicate the violation of the public's trust. Buckner Melton, in his book The First Impeachment: The Constitutions Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount, succintly opined:
Practically all who have written on the subject agree that impeachment involves a protection of a public interest, incorporating a public law element, much like a criminal proceeding....[I]mpeachment is a process instigated by the government, or some branch thereof, against a person who has somehow harmed the government or the community. The process, moreover, is adversarial in nature and resembles, to that extent, a judicial trial.[125]Quo warranto
The oft-cited origin of quo warranto was the reign of King Edward of England who questioned the local barons and lords who held lands or title under questionable authority. After his return from his crusade in Palestine, he discovered that England had fallen because of ineffective central administration by his predecessor, King Henry III.[126] The inevitable result was that the barons, whose relations with the King were governed on paper by Magna Carta, assumed to themselves whatever power the King's officers had neglected. Thus, King Edward deemed it wise to inquire as to what right the barons exercised any power that deviated in the slightest from a normal type of feudalism that the King had in mind. The theory is that certain rights are regalia and can be exercised only upon showing of actual grants from the King or his predecessor. Verily, King Edward's purpose was to catalogue the rights, properties and possessions of the kingdom in his efforts to restore the same.
In the Philippines, the remedies against usurpers of public office appeared in the 1900s, through Act No. 190.[127] Section 197 of the Act provides for a provision comparable to Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 197. Usurpation of an Office or Franchise - A civil action may be brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands:Based from the foregoing, it appears that impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules.
- Against person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil office or a franchise within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the Government of the Philippine Islands;
- Against a public civil officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provisions of law, works forfeiture of his office;
- Against an association of persons who act as corporation within the Philippine Islands, without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously
Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
The term "quo warranto" is Latin for "by what authority."[128] Therefore, as the name suggests, quo warranto is a writ of inquiry.[129] It determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office he or she occupies.[130]
In review, Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:Thus, quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment.
(a) person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. In the past, the Court held that title to public office cannot be assailed even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order.[131] That quo warranto is the proper legal vehicle to directly attack title to public office likewise precludes the filing of petition for prohibition for purposes of inquiring into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. Thus, in Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,[132] the Court held:
"[T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office."[133]As earlier discussed, an action for quo warranto may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[134]
That usurpation of public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public interest in our jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that where the action is for the usurpation of public office, position or franchise, it shall be commenced by verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor.[135]
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General, in the exercise of sound discretion, may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quowarranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of case certified to him, the Solicitor General may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may choose not to file the case at all. The Solicitor General is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.[136]
The instance when an individual is allowed to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name is when such person is claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[137] Feliciano v. Villasin[138] reiterates the basic principle enunciated in Acosta v. Flor[139] that for quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show no less than a clear right to the contested office.
In case of usurpation of a public office, when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, position or franchise, the judgment shall include the following:
(a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office;The remedies available in a quo warranto judgment do not include correction or reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office or franchise. Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed retroactively upon prior exercise of official or corporate duties.[141]
(b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and
(c) such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.[140]
Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing quo warranto proceeding.[142]
Respondent's Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam specifically tackled the objection to the petition on the ground of forum shopping: Essentially, respondent points out that the inclusion of the matter on tax fraud, which will further be discussed below, is already covered by Article I of the Articles of Impeachment. Hence, respondent argues, among others, that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.[143] Forum shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue.[144] At present, our jurisdiction has recognized several ways to commit forum shopping, to wit: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).[145]
We have already settled that the test for determining existence of forum shopping is as follows:
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.[146] (Emphasis ours)Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.[147]
On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is - between the first and the second actions - identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[148]
Ultimately, what is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.[149]
Guided by the foregoing, there can be no forum shopping in this case despite the pendency of the impeachment proceedings before the House of Representatives, contrary to respondent's position.
The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in different manner, the crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the Rules on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, x x x, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, x x x."[150] In short, respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding.[151] It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.
In the said Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam, respondent advanced the argument that the "impeachment proceeding" is different from the "impeachment case", the former refers to the filing of the complaint before the Committee on Justice while the latter refers to the proceedings before the Senate. Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, respondent posits that the "impeachment proceeding" against her is already pending upon the filing of the verified complaint before the House Committee on Justice albeit the "impeachment case" has not yet started as the Articles of Impeachment has not yet been filed with the Senate. Hence, in view of such proceeding before the Committee on Justice, the filing of the instant petition constitutes forum shopping.
The difference between the "impeachment proceeding" and the "impeachment case" correctly cited by the respondent, bolsters the conclusion that there can be no forum shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment proceeding" before the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the respondent.
The House Committee on Justice's determination of probable cause on whether the impeachment against the respondent should go on trial before the Senate is akin to the prosecutor's determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation in a criminal case. In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; he does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. The process is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.[152] As such, during the preliminary investigation before the prosecutor, there is no pending case to speak of yet. In fact, jurisprudence states that the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial.[153]
Thus, at the time of the filing of this petition, there is no pending impeachment case that would bar the quo warrranto petition on the ground of forum shopping.
In fine, forum shopping and litis pendentia are not present and a final decision in one will not strictly constitute as res judicata to the other. A judgment in quo warranto case determines the respondent's constitutional or legal authority to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim;[154] meanwhile a judgment in an impeachment proceeding pertain to a respondent's "fitness for public office."[155]
Considering the legal basis and nature of an action for quo waranto, this Court cannot shirk from resolving the instant controversy in view of the fact that respondent is an impeachable officer and/or in view of the possibility of an impeachment trial against respondent.
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office
Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by impeachment on the Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,[156] Cuenco v. Fernan,[157] In Re Gonzales,[158] Jarque v. Desierto[159] and Marcoleta v. Borra.[160] It should be stressed, however, that none of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable officer's appointment. Lecaroz involved a criminal charge against a mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers principally for acts done during their tenure in public office. Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his office or whether his appointment was void was not an issue raised before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never be filed against an impeachable officer. In issuing such pronouncement, the Court is presumed to have been aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. Following respondent's theory that an impeachable officer can be removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice-President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain respondent's position is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of the people as reflected in their votes must be determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power by prohibiting quowarranto proceedings against impeachable officers.
Further, the PET Rules provide that petition for quo warranto, contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.[161] Despite disloyalty to the Republic being a crime against public order[162]defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus may likewise be treated as "other high crimes,"[163] constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto as a remedy to remove the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless made expressly available.
In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. MacapagalArroyo,[164] the Court took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed against respondent therein who, at the time of the filing of the petition, had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the President. Petitioner therein prayed for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity. In fact, in the said cases, there was not even claim that respondent therein was disqualified from holding office and accordingly challenged respondent's status as de jure 14th President of the Republic. By entertaining the quo warrantopetition, the Court in fact determined whether then President Estrada has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of resignation.
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision reads:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)It is settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.[165]
The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect.[166] We have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise.[167] An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
On this score, Burke Shartel in his work Federal Judges: Appointment, Supervision, and Removal: Some Possibilities under the Constitution,[168] makes an interesting and valid observation on a parallel provision on impeachment under the U.S. Constitution from which ours was heavily patterned:
x x x it is not reasonable to spell out of the express provision for impeachment, an intention or purpose of the framers to create an exclusive remedy. The common canon for interpreting legislation, - expresio unius excusio est alterius - has no proper application to an express provision for one of several common-law remedies. The express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express provision. The main purpose of the framers of the Constitution in providing for impeachment was to supply a legislative check on the other departments of our government, and particularly on the chief executive. Without an express provision, impeachment would have been impliedly prohibited by the doctrine of separation of powers. If this legislative check was desired, a reservation in express words was essential. Another reason for the express provisions on this subject was that the framers of the Constitution did not wish to make the executive and judicial officers of our government completely dependent on Congress. They wanted to confer only a limited power of removal, and the desired limitations on the power to impeach had to be explicitly stated. These two reasons explain the presence in the Constitution of the express provisions for impeachment; it is not necessary to resort to any supposed intent to establish an exclusive method of removal in order to account for them. On the contrary, logic and sound policy demand that the Congressional power be construed to be concurrent, not an exclusive, power of removal.We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of a public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds.
Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. Shartel, above cited, eloquently incites as follows:
x x x. There is no indication in the debates of the Convention that the framers of the Constitution intended at this point to make a complete statement of causes of removal from office. The emphasis was on the causes for which Congress might remove executive and judicial officers, not on causes of removal as such. x x x How then can the causes of removal by impeachment be construed as a recital of the causes for which judges may be removed? It is especially hard to see why the express provision for impeachment - a limited legislative method of removing all civil officers for serious misconduct - should be construed to forbid removal of judges by judicial action on account of disability or any reasonable cause not a proper ground for action by the Houses of Congress.Neither can the Court accept respondent's argument that the term "may" in Section 2, Article XI qualifies only the penalty imposable at the conclusion of the impeachment trial, such that conviction may result in lesser penalties like censure or reprimand. Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution specifies the penalty of "removal from office" and "disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines" in impeachment cases.[169] There is nothing in the said provision that deliberately vests authority on the impeachment court to impose penalties lower than those expressly mentioned. Also, respondent has not shown that such was authority was intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. The ultimate penalty of removal is imposed owing to the serious nature of the impeachable offenses. This Court had occasion to rule:
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves.[170] (Emphasis supplied)
The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it Such would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust.[171] Thus, the people have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public' office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of remedy to correct a "public wrong" arising from defective or void appointments. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.[172]
As respondent herself previously opined in one case: "Reason is the foundation of all legal interpretation, including that of constitutional interpretation. And the most powerful tool of reason is reflecting on the essence of things."[173]
The essence of quo warranto is to protect the body politic from the usurpation of public office and to ensure that government authority is entrusted only to qualified individuals. Reason therefore dictates that quo warranto should be an available remedy to question the legality of appointments especially of impeachable officers considering that they occupy some of the highest-ranking offices in the land and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy.
At this juncture, it would be apt to dissuade and allay the fear that ruling on the availability of quo warranto would allow the Solicitor General to "wield sword over our collective heads, over all our individual heads, and on that basis, impair the integrity of the Court as a court."[174]
Such view, while not improbable, betrays a fallacious and cynical view of the competence and professionalism of the Solicitor General and the members, of this Court. It presupposes that members of this Court are law offenders. It also proceeds from the premise that the Solicitor General is the Executive's pawn in its perceived quest for a "more friendly" Court. Verily, fear, particularly if unfounded, should not override settled presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties. This Court, absent a compelling proof to the contrary, has no basis to doubt the independence and autonomy of the Solicitor General.[175] It is worthwhile to note that while the Solicitor General has a prerogative in the institution of an action for quo warranto, its exercise of such discretion is nevertheless subject to the Court's review. In Topacio v. Ong,[176] this Court explained:
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warrantowhere there are just and valid reasons. Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court ruled:Neither should it be forgotten that the Solicitor General is an officer of the Court, tasked "to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may be enjoined in the same manner that a special prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court from committing any act which may tend to "obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice."[177] Either way, in the event that quo warranto cases against members of the Judiciary inundate the courts' dockets, it does not follow that the courts are powerless to shield its members against suits which are obviously lacking in merit, or those merely intended to harass the respondent.
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited.Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by law but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. (Emphasis ours)
The Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers
Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.
Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of person to occupy a public position. It is a direct proceeding assailing the title to a public office.[178] The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying a public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority, the relief that the Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office.[179] In other words, while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.
Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such remedy is unavailing to determine whether or not an official has committed misconduct in office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in the office. Apropos, an action for quo warrantodoes not try a person's culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.
In Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,[180] the Court further explained the court's authority to issue a writ of quowarranto, as complementary to, and not violative of, the doctrine of separation of powers, as follows:
And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The question of whether franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees' violation of the franchises extended to them. (Emphasis ours)Applying the ratio in Divinagracia, the Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
Indeed, respondent's case is peculiar in that her omission to file her SALN also formed part of the allegations against her in the Verified Complaint for Impeachment. Verily, the filing of the SALN is a Constituional requirement, and the transgression of which may, in the wisdom of the impeachment court, be interpreted as constituting culpable violation of the Constitution. But then, respondent, unlike the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, apart from having to comply with the Constitutional SALN requirement, also answers to the unique Constitutional qualification of having to be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence-qualifications not expressly required by the fundamental law for the other impeachable officers.[181] And as will be extensively demonstrated hereunder, respondent's failure to file her SALNs and to submit the same to the JBC go into the very qualification of integrity. In other words, when a Member of the Supreme Court transgresses the SALN requirement prior to his or her appointment as such, he or she commits a violation of the Constitution and belies his or her qualification to hold the office. It is not therefore accurate to place Members of the Supreme Court, such as, respondent, on absolutely equal plane as that of the other impeachable officers, when more stringent and burdensome requirements for qualification and holding of office are expressly placed upon them.
In the same vein, the fact that the violation of the SALN requirement formed part of the impeachment complaint does not justify shifting responsibility to the Congress, no matter how noble the respondent and the intervenors portray such act to be. The fact remains that the Republic raised an issue as to respondent's eligibility to occupy the position of Chief Justice, an obviously legal question, which can be resolved through review of jurisprudence and pertinent laws. Logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law. Evidently, this scenario would involve waste of time, not to mention unnecessary disbursement of public funds.
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