The release of petitioners by respondents in a petition for habeas corpus does not automatically abate a decision on the case. Similarly, a recall of the custody order challenged by petitioners will not necessarily call for a dismissal on the ground of mootness alone. Although the general rule is mootness of the issue warrants a dismissal, there are well-defined exceptions.
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[15] twenty-six (26) petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew during the pendency of the petition. The fact that the petition was rendered moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever.
Even petitioners cite Tibo v. The Provincial Commander[16] and Toyoto, et al. v. Ramos, et al.,[17] where respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. This Court, as in Moncupa, chose to decide the said cases. The Court sustained petitioners’ plea that their case be considered moot and academic only “if their release would be permanent.”
In Acop, et al. v. Guingona, Jr.,[18] petitioning PNP officers questioned, via petition for injunction, the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Witness Protection Program. Petitioners contended that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers like the said SPO2 are disqualified from being admitted into the program, though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers.
In its comment, the OSG claimed that the petition lacked merit and that the same was rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the program was already terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated February 10, 1999. In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agreed with the OSG.
Denying the OSG motion, this Court held:
In the recent landmark cases of David, et al. v. Arroyo, et al.,[19] involving seven petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the President lifted the declaration of a state of national emergency during the pendency of the suits. In effect, Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 were withdrawn. The OSG thus moved and prayed for the dismissal of the petitions, arguing there is no more justiciable controversy as the issue has been mooted.
This Court denied the motion and proceeded to declare the constitutional infirmity of the Presidential issuances. On the issue of mootness, the Court summed up the four exceptions to the rule, thus:
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[15] twenty-six (26) petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew during the pendency of the petition. The fact that the petition was rendered moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever.
Even petitioners cite Tibo v. The Provincial Commander[16] and Toyoto, et al. v. Ramos, et al.,[17] where respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. This Court, as in Moncupa, chose to decide the said cases. The Court sustained petitioners’ plea that their case be considered moot and academic only “if their release would be permanent.”
In Acop, et al. v. Guingona, Jr.,[18] petitioning PNP officers questioned, via petition for injunction, the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Witness Protection Program. Petitioners contended that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers like the said SPO2 are disqualified from being admitted into the program, though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers.
In its comment, the OSG claimed that the petition lacked merit and that the same was rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the program was already terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated February 10, 1999. In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agreed with the OSG.
Denying the OSG motion, this Court held:
Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of the Program. However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R. A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol, and Viola vs. Alunan III, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied)This Court then sustained the RTC observation that law enforcement officers may be admitted into the Witness Protection Program in cases where they are witnesses in legislative investigations.
In the recent landmark cases of David, et al. v. Arroyo, et al.,[19] involving seven petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the President lifted the declaration of a state of national emergency during the pendency of the suits. In effect, Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 were withdrawn. The OSG thus moved and prayed for the dismissal of the petitions, arguing there is no more justiciable controversy as the issue has been mooted.
This Court denied the motion and proceeded to declare the constitutional infirmity of the Presidential issuances. On the issue of mootness, the Court summed up the four exceptions to the rule, thus:
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. (Emphasis supplied).
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