BILL OF RIGHTS: PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
G.R. NO. 171980
October 6, 2010
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Olive Rubio Mamaril, Accused-appellant
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’clock in the evening, SPO4 Alexis Gotidoc, along with the members of Intel Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), implemented Search Warrant No. 144C dated 18 March 2003 issued by Judge Alipio Yumul of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court, Capas, Tarlac against the appellant in her residence at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City, Province of Tarlac.
Prior to the search, the police team invited Barangay Kagawad Oscar Tabamo of Barangay Maliwalo to witness the conduct of the search and seizure operation in the appellant’s house. With Barangay Kagawad Tabamo, the police team presented the search warrant to appellant and informed her of the purpose of the search and her constitutional rights.
Afterwards, SPO4 Gotidoc, the designated searcher, started searching the appellant’s house, in the presence of the appellant and Kagawad Tabamo. During his search, he found on the top cover of the refrigerator one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter he prepared a Certificate of Good Search and Confiscation Receipt which the appellant refused to sign.
The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory located at Tarlac Provincial Hospital for qualitative examination. The examination conducted by Engr. Marcene G. Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the white crystalline substance, yielded positive results for 0.055 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
The factual version presented by the defense is:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’ clock in the evening the police officers arrived at appellant’s house and showed her a search warrant. Thereafter, the policemen searched her house but found nothing. Then a certain Police Officer Pangilinan asked her where she was sleeping. When she replied that she was inside the hut, the police officers proceeded to and searched the place and found the plastic sachet containing the shabu.
Thereafter, she was brought to the sub-station at Maliwalo and was told, particularly by SPO4 Gotidoc and a certain Ma’am Dulay that in exchange of P20,000.00, no case would be filed against her. When she told them that she did not have money, she was detained. However, on cross-examination, the appellant admitted that the alleged extortion of P20,000.00 was not reported to the higher ranking police officers.
Appellant claims that the police officers framed her up and planted the shabu inside her house because of her refusal to give them money.
Whether or not the accused-appellant is innocent of violating Section 11, Article II, of RA 9165.
No. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a regulated drug, namely, (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.
Centered on the conduct of the search of appellant’s house that yielded the prohibited substance, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the finding that “after a careful evaluation and analysis of the arguments presented by the prosecution and the defense, we hold that the search conducted by the INTEL Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station, in coordination with the PDEA, on the residence of the accused-appellant on 25 March 2003 at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City and the seizure therein of one (1) plastic pack of white crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” weighing 0.055 gram are legal. As a consequence of the legal search, the said methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” seized on the occasion thereof, is admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant.”
The accused-appellant, through her new counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office, goes further back, presenting new arguments, that (1) the search warrant was not based on probable cause, hence, the evidence allegedly obtained through it may not be admitted to support the accused-appellant’s conviction and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
The original position of the accused which, in this petition, begins with the contention of non-compliance with all the requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. We agree with the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there was indeed full satisfaction of the requisites for the conviction of the accused.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not adequately defeated. Re-stating that in illegal possession of prohibited drugs, there are only three (3) elements to secure conviction: (1) accused is in possession of the prohibited drugs; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) accused consciously and freely possessed the prohibited drugs, the trial court held that all these were established beyond doubt. It determined that appellant failed to proffer evidence enough to discredit the prosecution and render doubtful his guilt.
The argument is without merit.
In the case at hand, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration of the police officer who implemented the search warrant, was found after trial and appellate review as the true story. It is on firmer ground than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up.The defense cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive. Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that “no proof was proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers’ alleged ill motive.”
G.R. No. 164195,
April 5, 2011
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFC’s land and P164.40 million for HPI’s land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFC’s account and P45M into HPI’s account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996. Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARAB’s failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.
Whether or not there was just compensation.
No. AFC’s and HPI’s land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The RTC’s finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners’ properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFC’s and HPI’s lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stone’s throw from the residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest per annum plus attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the just compensation or P138 million.
G.R. No. 185091,
August 8, 2010
Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows:
Lot 1 – 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga
Lot 2 – 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
Lot 3 – 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and
Lot 4 – 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa.
As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4. Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax-declared.
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled.
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property. When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republic’s immunity from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republic’s consent was not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it.
In light of the RTC’s decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case before it. The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal. Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor. PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes.
In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the Mendozas’ registered title and the imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any person occupying the property. The CA held that, this being the case, the Republic’s possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into ownership.
The CA also rejected the Republic’s claim of ownership since it presented no documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the government. Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the government’s favor, the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas’ title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school.
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or its notice. Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. No one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas’ title over the property has not been disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957.
That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas’ title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership.
The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it had held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas’ formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas’ remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the RTC’s power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas’ right to just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza’s action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an action for payment of just compensation against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate, against the City of Lipa.
G.R. No. 170623,
July 7, 2010.
A. Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. represented by CARMEN Z. ARNAIZ, petitioner
OFFICEOF THE PRESIDENT; DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; REGIONAL DIRECTOR,DAR REGION V, LEGASPI CITY; PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, DARPROVINCIAL OFFICE, MASBATE, MASBATE; MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER,DAR MUNICIPAL OFFICE, MASBATE, MASBATE, respondents
A. Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc., filed a petition for exclusion from the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program (CARP) coverage dated April 25, 1994 before the Regional Director of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Asid, Sinalugan, Masbate, Masbate since the land has been devoted to cattle-ranching purposes since time immemorial, not tenanted and has more than 18% slopes. However the petition was denied and ordered to be still in the coverage of the acquisition of the properties under the coverage of CARP. It was established that a portion of land was leased to Monterey Farm for 10 years. Petitioner sold its entire herd of cattle to Monterey Farms Corporation before the expiration of lease agreement. It was also established that said land is not owned by the petitioner but rather by Nuestra Senora del Carmen Marble, Inc with a new TCT number. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in December 8, 1995.Petitioner appealed again the Order to the Sec. of Agrarian Reform for two separate motions for ocular inspection. The Sec. of Agrarian Reform dismissed for lack of merit on Oct. 23, 1996.Ordering CARP to identify portions and areas not suited for agriculture and be excluded from the program and do the necessary notices. Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but was denied on February 13, 1998. Petitioner then sought recourse before the Office of the President (OP) on Sept. 19, 2001 but dismissed the appeal. Petitioner again filed for motion for reconsideration on the argument that OP seriously erred but CA rendered that petition for review is DENIED DUE COURSE and was DISMISSED on August 11, 2005. CA ratiocinated that DAR were supported that substantial evidence which the petitioner failed to established. On a petition for motion for reconsideration which was again denied on Nov. 24, 2005,Petitioner argued and insists that they were not given due process, and that subject lands are not suitable for agriculture if they contain slope more than 18%. Petitioner also added that DAR should allow for the ocular inspection to be conducted invoking the Luz Farms v Secretary of Department of Agri and Department of Agri v Sutton that the petitioner’s property should be excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process.
No, Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
Even if no formal hearing took place, it is not sufficient ground for petitioner to claim that due process was not afforded it. In the present case, petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove and establish its claim that the subject properties were excluded from the coverage of the CARP. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings by submitting various pleadings and documentary evidence. In fact, petitioner filed motions for reconsideration in every unfavorable outcome of its actions in all tiers of the administrative and judicial process - from the Order of the DAR Regional Director up to the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court has consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly, the requirement of the law was afforded to petitioner.
To be sure, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more so if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DAR, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction. The Courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies, because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. The only time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which are ordinarily accorded great respect, is when they are not borne out by the records or are not based on substantial evidence. In the case at bar, no reason exists for us to disregard the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings being borne out by the record and supported by substantial evidence.
G.R. No. 181560,
November 15, 2010
Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and catering services business named Glamours Chicken House, with address at Parang Road, Cotabato City. Since 1993, Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch, had been her supplier of poultry meat. In 1995, however, her account was transferred to the newly opened Vitarich branch in General Santos City.
In the months of July to November 1996, Losin’s orders of dressed chicken and other meat products allegedly amounted to P921,083.10. During this said period, Losin’s poultry meat needs for her business were serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and Allan Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay), a supervisor of said corporation. Unfortunately, it was also during the same period that her account started to experience problems because of the fact that Directo delivered stocks to her even without prior booking which is the customary process of doing business with her.
On August 24, 1996, Directo’s services were terminated by Vitarich without Losin’s knowledge. He left without turning over some supporting invoices covering the orders of Losin. Rosa and Baybay, on the other hand, resigned on November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1996, respectively. Just like Directo, they did not also turn over pertinent invoices covering Losin’s account.
On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to Losin covering her alleged unpaid account amounting to P921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked her records and discovered that she had an overpayment to Vitarich in the amount of P500,000.00. She relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informed the latter that checks were issued and the same were collected by Directo.
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to P288,463.30 which were dishonored either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) or Stop Payment.
On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Losin, Directo, Rosa, and Baybay before the RTC.
On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Vitarich rendered in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant Chona Losin to pay plaintiff the following:
1. P297,462.50 representing the three checks which had been stopped payment with interest at 12% per annum from the date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
2. P101,450.20 representing the unpaid sales (Exhibits ‘L’ and ‘M’) with interest at 12% from date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
3. P20,000.00 in concept of attorney’s fees; and
4. The cost of suit.
As to the complaint against defendant Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay, the same is dismissed. The complaint against Rodrigo Directo still remains and is hereby ordered archived until he could be served with summons.
Whether or not the respondent was being violated her right by overpayment to the Vitarich?
No. Records bear out that the Court already resolved to deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration of Losin challenging the Court's Decision dated November 15, 2010. The instant Urgent Manifestation with a Dire Request to Take a Very Close Look on the Fact That RCBC Check No. CX046324 Dated August 27, 1996 in the Amount of P93,888.80 Was Already Paid Way Back on August 29, 1996 appears to be a second motion for reconsideration although not denominated as such by Losin. Thus, it is essentially a prohibited pleading. It has been settled that only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained. The Court finds no reason to depart from the general rule.
The Court already ruled that Losin was liable to pay petitioner Vitarich Corporation the amount of P93,888.80, as indicated in RCBC Check No. CX046324 dated August 27, 1996, as part of her total liability which had been stopped payment by Losin.
The attached bank statement marked as Exh. "BB" and referred to by Losin bearing the amount of P93,888.80 does not clearly prove payment of the said amount. In fact, the entry in the said bank statement with this amount has not been specifically sub-marked at all. If indeed the questioned amount was already paid by Losin, it could be threshed out in the court of origin in connection with the execution of the final judgment.