Farhanna B. Mapandi23CALACDAY
33 SCRA 382 (1970)
Martiniano P. Vivo : acting commissioner of Immigration-Petitioner Calacday’s citizenship is being questioned-Petitioner seeks to enjoin the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Vivo from taking them intocustody of conducting deportation proceedings against them or cancelling their identification certificateson the assumption that the previous decisions of the Board of Inquiry, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Commissioners declaring them Filipino citizens, had become final and conclusive-Based on this assumption, petitioner contends that respondent Vivo is devoid of any authority to takesteps to deport them under the appropriate provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, asamended.
WON the warrants of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration (Vivo) for the purposes of investigation and before a final judgment of the deportation proceedings is issued, are valid.
Art III, Sec 1 (3) states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, andthe persons or things to be seized.”
(the following is from Cruz, page 147)
Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities onlyfor the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an orderof contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. As held in Morano v. Vivo, “Theconstitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest…not as a measure indispensable to carry out avalid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commission of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.”
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”
Gabriel Diaz, by blows and kicks, inflicted bodily injuries to Cornelio Alcanzaren. For it, the latter was charged with assault and battery before the Justice of Peace of San Carlos where he was found guilty and was penalized accordingly.
Later, Alcanzaren died. Diaz was again charged before the same Justice of Peace with homicide on the argument that the death of Alcanzaren was due to physical assault made unto him by Diaz earlier, a matter which the Justice of Peace took as well founded. Accordingly, the Justice of Peace held that the accused to await the action of the court of first instance.
Diaz was charged in the Court of First Instance of Homicide, wherein, during arraignment he interposed a plea of former jeopardy which was overruled. After trial, he was found guilty and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment and other penalties.
Diaz appealed his case to the Supreme Court of the Philippines but the latter sustained his conviction. Hence, the case before the Supreme Court of the United States.
Whether or not Diaz is placed in a second jeopardy for being tried for a different offense arising from the same act considering that the latter offense could only be brought to court due to the resultant death of Alcanzaren.
No. Diaz is not placed in a second jeopardy.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.
Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]
Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and incompetence in connection with granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for child abuse.
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending the holding of a preliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the information against the accused on the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge ordered that a preliminary investigation be had by the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, he granted bail in favor of the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to which the latter failed to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondent of denying the prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong and that bail should not have been granted in his favor.
Whether or not there was an abuse of discretion resulting to denial of due process on the part of respondent?
There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to hold hearing so that the prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the accused was strong since a preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. At that point, bail was still a matter of right. Respondent judge, knowing that bail was indeed a matter of right at that stage, nevertheless set the hearing for the petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed to appear and present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appears that complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of his duties. Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, the accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right. Thus, respondent judge’s decision granting bail to the accused was proper and in accordance with law and jurisprudence.