1.The Philippines under the 1987 constitution is taking a “hands-on approach” in the utilization of natural resources. There are four modes by which it takes full control and supervision over its resources. Enumerate these four modes.
Answer: Under the 1987 Constitution, the State is
expected to take on a more hands-on approach or "a more dynamic role in
the exploration, development[,] and utilization of the natural resources of the
country"[130] as a consequence of its full control and
supervision over natural resources. It exercises control and supervision
through the following modes:
1. The
State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The
State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress
may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens;
4. For
the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
2. Dr. Galeon of the graduate school
allegedly conducts his classes without requiring his students to regularly
report to class. He however required them to comply with the required research
works assigned to them. A complaint was filed against him for allegedly passing
in his class said “ghost students”. Is
his manner of teaching allowed in the name of academic freedom? Explain.
Answer: Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the
right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty.[24] It is defined as a
right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to
interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalty because these
conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the
institution.[25] As applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr.
Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of
teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at that),
subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Considering that the
Board of Regents, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the
University of Southeastern Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we
see no reason for petitioner to complain before us simply because he holds a
contrary opinion on the matter.
4.What do you understand
by the Heckler’s veto? Is this not a violation of the right to peaceably
assemble and air one’s grievance over the government? Explain.
ANSWER:
The heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of speech is
curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting
party's behavior. The common example is that of demonstrators (reacting party)
causing a speech (given by the acting party) to be terminated in order to
preserve the peace.
Heckler’s veto is a form of curtailment of one's freedom of expression. It occurs when the government restricts the right to speak or to express ones opinion or reaction. It is commonly resorted to to avoid expression of negativity. Wikipedia defines heckler's veto as:
In the free speech context, a heckler's veto is either of two situations in which a person who disagrees with a speaker's message is able to unilaterally trigger events that result in the speaker being silenced.In the strict legal sense, a heckler's veto occurs when the speaker's right is curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting party's behavior. The common example is the termination of a speech or demonstration in the interest of maintaining the public peace based on the anticipated negative reaction of someone opposed to that speech or demonstration. The term was coined by University of Chicago professor of law Harry Kalven.In common parlance, the term is used to describe situations where hecklers or demonstrators silence a speaker without intervention of the law.
In the United States, case law regarding the heckler's veto is mixed.[2] Most findings say that the acting party's actions cannot be pre-emptively stopped due to fear of heckling by the reacting party, but in the immediate face of violence, authorities can force the acting party to cease their action in order to satisfy the hecklers.
The best known case involving the heckler's veto is probably Feiner v. New York, handed down by the Supreme Court in 1951. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, writing for the majority, held that police officers acted within their power in arresting a speaker if the arrest was "motivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order and protection of the general welfare". 340 U.S. 315.
In Gregory v. Chicago (1969), Justice Hugo Black, in a concurring opinion, argued that arresting demonstrators as a consequence of unruly behavior of by-standers would amount to a heckler's veto.[3]
In Hill v. Colorado (2000),[4] the Supreme Court rejected the heckler's veto, finding "governmental grants of power to private actors" to be "constitutionally problematic" in cases where "the regulations allowed a single, private actor to unilaterally silence a speaker".[4]
Heckler's veto is often used outside a strict legal context. One example is an article by Nat Hentoff in which he claims that "First Amendment law is clear that everyone has the right to picket a speaker, and to go inside the hall and heckle him or her—but not to drown out the speaker, let alone rush the stage and stop the speech before it starts. That's called the 'heckler's veto'."[5]
In Hentoff's formulation, the heckler him or herself is the party which directly carries out the "veto" and suppresses speech. This runs counter to the legal meaning of the phrase. Note that, to a lawyer familiar with the First Amendment law, the phrase "heckler's veto" means something different from what the plain English interpretation of the words suggests. In First Amendment law, a heckler's veto is the suppression of speech by the government, because of [the possibility of] a violent reaction by hecklers. It is the government that vetoes the speech, because of the reaction of the heckler. Under the First Amendment, this kind of heckler's veto is unconstitutional.'[6]
University of California, Irvine Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky invoked the concept in an editorial following an incident on February 8, 2010, in which heckling by individual students disrupted a speech by the Israeli ambassador Michael Oren. Chemerinsky explained that broad freedom exists to invite speakers and hold demonstrations, but that once a speaker has begun an invited lecture, “You have the right—if you disagree with me—to go outside and perform your protest. But you don’t get the right to come in when I’m talking and shout me down. Otherwise people can always silence a speaker by heckler’s veto, and Babel results”.[7]
Michigan State University professor of political science William B. Allen has used the phrase "verbal terrorism" to refer to the same phenomenon, defining it as "calculated assault characterized by loud side-conversations, shouted interruptions, jabbered false facts, threats and personal insults".[8]
Conservative writer and commentator Ben Shapiro cited the term during a 2017 testimony to Congress in reference to suppression of right-wing speakers on college campuses.[9]
5. Note the following provisions:
(a) Each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.(Art.
VI,5(3))
(b) Section 10. No province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. (Constitution, Article X - Local Government).
It seems that provision (a) did not actually specify the
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district for a
province. What provision in the constitution states that the creation of a
province requires a population, income and territorial area requirement? State
these required components.
ANSWER: LGC,
Title IV, Chapter ISection 461. Requisites for Creation. - (a)
A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:(i) a
continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or(ii) a population of not less
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the
creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.(b) The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.(c) The average
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
6. Is impeachment a political question? To which branch of
government does the power to impeach belong? Under the 1987 constitution to
what extent can the political question doctrine apply to impeachment cases?
Explain.
ANSWER: First. The
matter of impeachment is a political question that must rightfully be addressed
to a political branch of government, which is the Congress of the
Philippines. As enunciated in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[3] we do not automatically assume jurisdiction
over actual constitutional cases brought before us even in instances that are
ripe for resolution -
One
class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are “political
questions.” The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure
being assailed. Moreover, the political question being the function
of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the
workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the
courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
Clearly,
the constitutional power of impeachment rightfully belongs to Congress in a
two-fold character: (a) The power to initiate impeachment cases
against impeachable officers is lodged in the House of Representatives; and,
(b) The power to try and decide impeachment cases belongs solely to the Senate.
In Baker
v. Carr[4] repeatedly mentioned during the oral arguments,
the United States Supreme Court held that political questions chiefly relate to
separation of powers issues, the Judiciary being a co-equal branch of
government together with the Legislature and the Executive branch, thus calling
for judicial deference. A controversy is non-justiciable where there
is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department, or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it." But perhaps it
is Nixon v. United States[6] which
provides the authority on the “political question” doctrine as applied in
impeachment cases. In that case the U.S. Supreme Court applied
the Baker ruling to reinforce the “political question”
doctrine in impeachment cases. Unless it can therefore be shown that
the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Congressional exercise
of judgment must be recognized by this Court. The burden to show
that the House or the Senate gravely abused its discretion in impeaching a
public officer belongs exclusively to the impeachable officer concerned.
Second. At
all times, the three (3) departments of government must accord mutual respect
to each other under the principle of separation of powers. As a
co-equal, coordinate and co-extensive branch, the Judiciary must defer to the
wisdom of the Congress in the exercise of the latter’s power under the Impeachment
Clause of the Constitution as a measure of judicial comity on issues properly
within the sphere of the Legislature.
Third. It
is incumbent upon the Court to exercise judicial restraint in rendering a
ruling in this particular case to preserve the principle of separation of
powers and restore faith and stability in our system of government. Dred
Scott v. Sandford[7] is a
grim illustration of how catastrophic improvident judicial incursions into the
legislative domain could be. It is one of the most denounced cases
in the history of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making. Penned by
Chief Justice Taney, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 7-2, denied that a
Negro was a citizen of the United States even though he happened to live in a
“free” state. The U.S. High Court likewise declared unconstitutional
the law forbidding slavery in certain federal territories. Dred
Scott undermined the integrity of the U.S. High Court at a moment in
history when it should have been a powerful stabilizing force. More
significantly, it inflamed the passions of the Northern and Southern states
over the slavery issue thus precipitating the American Civil
War. This we do not wish to happen in the Philippines!
It must
be clarified, lest I be misconstrued, this is not to say that this Court is
absolutely precluded from inquiring into the constitutionality of the
impeachment process. The present Constitution, specifically under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, introduced the expanded concept of the power of judicial
review that now explicitly allows the determination of whether there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. This is evidently in response to the
unedifying experience of the past in frequently resorting to the “political
question” doctrine that in no mean measure has emasculated the Court’s
authority to strike down abuses of power by the government or any of its
instrumentalities.
7. State four situations
where the Supreme Court will still decide a case despite its being moot and
academic.
ANSWER: The "moot and
academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: (1) there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue
raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
8. Under the 1987 constitution there are only four
groups of officers whom the president shall appoint. What are these?
ANSWER: There
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law;Third, those whom the president may be
authorized by law to appoint;Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. 7
Mison also opined:
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there
were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were
(1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement
of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of
appointments made under the second sentence of the section from the same
requirement. . . .
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within
the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to
in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the
extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative.
Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court respects
the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the
constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor
Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
over appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render
fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
9. Executive power
is vested in the President of the Philippines. Is executive power defined under
the 1987 constitution? What are the powers which are classified as executive in
nature? Is executive power limited in the constitution?
ANSWER: As stated
above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define
what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches
on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power
of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief
clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or
guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to
address Congress [Art. VII, Sec.
14-23]."x x xOn these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot
be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
10. JBC recently imposed a requirement
that before one could apply for promotion to a higher judicial office, he must
first serve five years in the station where he is presently serving. Judge X
was appointed as MTC judge in 1995. In 1997 he applied for an RTC position but
JBC denied his application by virtue of said new qualification requirement.
Judge X complains that said 5 year-service is not mentioned in the constitution
but merely an administrative invention of the JBC. He also complained that said
requirement was never published in the newspaper of general circulation hence
the same is invalid. Rule on Judge X’s contention.
ANSWER: Consideration of
experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not
discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of service
provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured
by experience, among other factors.
xxxx
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
xxxx
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
11. What is
an “executive privilege”? What is its use in the constitution? Who can invoke
it and what are its varieties? State there of the varieties of executive
privilege.
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary
concept. 66 It
has encompassed claims of varying kinds.67Tribe,
in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive
privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be
actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be
asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial
or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege,
Tribe explains, is the state
secrets privilege invoked by
U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information
is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to
disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law
to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic
privilege for internal deliberations has
been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68
12. The corollary rule to the control
powers of the president is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. What is
the meaning of this doctrine? What is the reason for its existence?
ANSWER: Equally
well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is
the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot
be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, 20he will have to
delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this
doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, 21 "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive." 22
13. Cognizant of such
possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987 Constitution endeavored to
institute a system of checks and balances to limit the President's exercise of
the martial law and suspension powers, and to establish safeguards to protect
civil liberties. State these checks and balances.
ANSWER: Lagman v. Pimentel III,[81] the
Court discussed these safeguards to wit:
Nevertheless, cognizant of such
possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987 Constitution endeavored to
institute a system of checks and balances to limit the President's exercise of
the martial law and suspension powers, and to establish safeguards to protect
civil liberties. Thus, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution:
(a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus only when there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety requires such declaration or suspension.(b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a period not exceeding 60 days.(c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President must submit a Report in person or in writing to Congress.(d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can revoke the proclamation or suspension.(e) The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of his proclamation or suspension.(f) The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation or suspension. He should ask the Congress' approval.(g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can extend the proclamation or suspension for such period as it may determine.(h) The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only be approved when the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.(i) The Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension or the extension thereof, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.(j) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 days from the filing of the appropriate proceeding.(k) Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.Accordingly, the Bill of Rights remains effective under a state of martial law. Its implementers must adhere to the principle that civilian authority is supreme over the military and the armed forces is the protector of the people. They must also abide by the State's policy to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights.
(l) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function.(m) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.(n) Finally, during the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained should be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he should be released
(a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus only when there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety requires such declaration or suspension.(b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a period not exceeding 60 days.(c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President must submit a Report in person or in writing to Congress.(d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can revoke the proclamation or suspension.(e) The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of his proclamation or suspension.(f) The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation or suspension. He should ask the Congress' approval.(g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can extend the proclamation or suspension for such period as it may determine.(h) The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only be approved when the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.(i) The Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension or the extension thereof, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.(j) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 days from the filing of the appropriate proceeding.(k) Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.Accordingly, the Bill of Rights remains effective under a state of martial law. Its implementers must adhere to the principle that civilian authority is supreme over the military and the armed forces is the protector of the people. They must also abide by the State's policy to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights.
(l) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function.(m) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.(n) Finally, during the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained should be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he should be released
14. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Reconcile these two provisions. Can the president appoint a justice
to a recently vacated position despite the fact that it shall be done a month
before the next presidential election? Explain.
ANSWER: Prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary
Two constitutional
provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4
(1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five,
or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
In the consolidated
petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and
Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the
prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII
does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
The Court agrees
with the submission.
First. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted
time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the
provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their
vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution
consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome
powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative
(Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments
(Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of
separation of powers that underlies the political structure, as Constitutional
Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of the Court) explained in
his sponsorship speech:
We have in the
political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in
government because we believe that the only way to protect freedom and liberty
is to separate and divide the awesome powers of government. Hence, we return to
the separation of powers doctrine and the legislative, executive and judicial
departments.66
As can be seen,
Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists
the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power
of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is
dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications
of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of
this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of
a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article
mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy.
Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article
VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or
Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Although Valenzuela67 came
to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by
then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former
member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation
Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Second. Section 15,
Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question
that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of
Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with in the
leading case of Aytona v. Castillo.75 In
fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so observed, stating that:
xxx it appears that
Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1)
those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The
first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Third. As earlier stated,
the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the
Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC
itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some
sectors about the "constitutionality of xxx appointments" to the
Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured
that "on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission's records, the
election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals."79 This
confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for
consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.80
The fault of
Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the
confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on
interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt about the
President's power to appoint during the period of prohibition in Section 15,
Article VII could have been dispelled since its promulgation on November 9,
1998, had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the confirmation of a
distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections
in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the
appointing powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of
the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an Acting
President,81 and
evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no
application to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting
appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their
being revocable at will.82 The
letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there
is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of appointments in the
Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the
first and second level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may
only be removed for cause, but the Members of the Supreme Court may be removed
only by impeachment.
Section 16 covers only
the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the requirement
of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments after the requirement was
removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII,
the restored requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.83
Section 14, Section
15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16
refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive
that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.84 It
is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely
within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Fifth. To hold like the
Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the
Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the
independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative
Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a
presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President,
instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is
itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee
can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the
appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of
compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June
30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has
been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent
President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief
Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway
there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1),
Article VIII remaining.
The argument is
flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief
Justice Puno's retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section
4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
The argument also
rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be time remaining in
the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily
demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its comment.
Section 4 (3),
Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of
May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the
latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of
the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period
of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than
the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The
result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between
the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory
period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no
position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the
Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could
not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the
mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4
(1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred
to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its
effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they
never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme
Court, or in any of the lower courts.
Seventh. As a matter of
fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is
necessary at all for the President - any President - to appoint a Chief Justice
if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII
says:
xxx. The Members of
the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx
The provision
clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside,
that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of
candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or
sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the
JBC.
Can the President,
therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?
The question is not
squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper
analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the
proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate President
Juan Ponce Enrile's statement that the President can appoint the Chief Justice
from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.
15. The 1987 constitution provides for questioning “in aid
of legislation” (Sec. 21) and questioning of department heads during the
Question Hour (Sec. 22). Distinguish the two provisions.
ANSWER:
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to
conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that
extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction,
departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department
heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean
that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in
all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the
performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz
observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to
tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right
to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a
clear separation between the legislative and executive branches. It is this
very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from
the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected
representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close
rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country,
comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the
nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question
period have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain
information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its
legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive
information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours
becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for
its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the
executive.89 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related
and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance
as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is
"in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory
for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90
16.What do you understand by “judicial
clemency”? In what situation under the law is such principle used? State some of the guidelines concerning
judicial clemency laid by the Supreme Court.
ANSWER: The Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus:
"1. There must be proof of remorse and
reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in
an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition
of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency."
17. The 1987
Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5),
Article VIII. (1) What is the scope of the rule making powers of the supreme
court? What are its limitations? Can Congress repeal or amend a rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court?
ANSWER: Until
the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a
power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of
judicial rules. Thus, both the 193513 and the
197314 Constitutions
vested on the Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." However, these constitutions also granted to the
legislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or supplement"
such rules.15
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the
power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of
Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power.16 This
glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice17 that this
Court’s power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress":
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this
Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII18 x x x .
The rule making power of this Court
was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But
most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x
x
Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual
evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling
denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for
exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter,
Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from "all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or dues of all kinds."19 Reaffirming
Echegaray’s construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive
power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as "one of
the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence":
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it
cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the
safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain.
18. The case of Major General
Garcia v. the Executive Secretary clarifies the nature of a court martial.
Having read that case, answer the following questions: (1) Is a court martial
considered a court of law? (2) Is conviction of an accused before a court
martial, a bar to the prosecution for the same offense before our criminal
courts? (3) In said case Major Garcia was sentenced to 2
years of “hard labor” is that penalty valid ? (4) Under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, preventive detention shall offset the final penalty of
imprisonment, thus Major Garcia asserts that his “preventive imprisonment” for
more than six years, is already enough to consider his penalty of 2 years, to
satisfy the same. Is his contention correct? Explain.(5) is the right to bail
applicable to persons charged before the court martial? Explain:
ANSWER:
refer to MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN;
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN,
JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, Respondents. : G.R. No. 198554
,July 30, 2012
19. The idyllic morning calm in San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots
fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of young Alex
Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost his
left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled
through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his
stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal
Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide - were
originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal
employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December 1993, however, the
charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading
the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim.
Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition,
with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying
of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed.
After a series of legal maneuvers by the
parties, venue of the cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped with new docket numbers
(Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively), and
raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course
of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled
to respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated
decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court found the
accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder
and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of
the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from
the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not
a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez
is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this Court in a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of
the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of
the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso
Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately
and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if
judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion
and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by
the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is
necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted
with a verdict of guilt.
The main hypothesis of the Government is
that elevating the issue of criminal culpability of private respondent Galvez
before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial court should not be
considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional doctrine in the United States
that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US
trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should
judgment be overturned.1 Since
Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American
constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case
of Kepner v. United States,2and
because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event
an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to
take the same directional course. Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to
take a second look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the
battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause" in the Philippines3 and
seriously examine whether the precedents it established almost a century ago
are still germane and useful today in view of certain modifications wrought on
the doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v.
Wilson4 and United
States v. Scott.5
Two (2) threshold issues therefore,
interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed. One is the propriety of certiorari as
an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the
result actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal of private respondent
Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a review by the Court of a judgment
of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy. QUESTIONS:
Is certiorari a proper remedy in reviewing the findings of facts of Judge
Velasco? Granting that there was a grave abuse of discretion on his part in
appreciating the evidence which led to the acquittal of Mayor Galvez, will this
be a ground for reversing a judgment of acquittal? Explain.
ANSWER:,Read:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. TIRSO D. C.
VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and
HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents. EN BANCG.R. No. 127444,September 13,
2000
20. (a) Mr. X was charged of malversation
before the Sandiganbayan. He received a subpoena that he will be investigated
by the Senate. He asks your advice if he can be compelled to appear before said
body for the said investigation. What are the limitations of legislative
investigation in aid of legislation.
(b) Mr. Y (undersecretary of national defense) received summons from
the House of Representatives requiring him to be present as he will testify on
the details concerning the purchase of a lot for government use. He does not
want to appear there so he filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, so
that the said body may be prohibited from making him appear before the H of R.
The presiding judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction against the House
of Representatives. Is his action proper? Explain.
ANSWER: (A) It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee
decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No.
0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint
shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as
defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said
complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers
thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one
over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the
issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan
would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative
commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be
reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence
being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be
discounted.(Bengzon v.Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 1991)
(b) The principle of separation of powers essentially
means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and
settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from
invading the domain of the others.11 When
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to
appear and testify before it in connection with its investigation of the
alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to
its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly
provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, thus:
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit
the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and testify before it.
The ruling in Bengzon, cited by
respondent, does not apply in this case. We agree with petitioner Committee
that the factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at
bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of
the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. More specifically, the investigation in the said case was an
offshoot of the privilege speech of then Senator Enrile, who urged the Senate
to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
by the relatives of then President Corazon Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo
Lopa, in connection with the alleged sale of 36 to 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear
legislative purpose, as stated in Senate Resolution No. 160, and the
appropriate Senate Committee was directed to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate
legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Further, in Bengzon, the validity of the
sale of Romualdez’s corporations was pending with the Sandiganbayan when the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee decided to conduct its investigation. In short,
the issue had already been pre-empted by the court.
In the instant case, the complaint
against respondent Flaviano regarding the anomaly in the sale of Lot X, MR-1160
was still pending before the Office of the Ombudsman when the Committee served
subpoena on him. In other words, no court had acquired jurisdiction over the
matter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment by the legislature into the
exclusive jurisdiction of another branch of the government. Clearly, there was
no basis for the respondent Judge to apply the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the
denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition amounted
to grave abuse of discretion.(Senate Blue Ribbon v. Majaducon, 2003)
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