SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 165922 BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (BAMARVEMPCO), represented by RECTO INSO, Operations Manager, Petitioner, vs. HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Respondent.

Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935¹³ and the 1973¹⁴ Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or supplement" such rules.¹⁵

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power.¹⁶ This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice¹⁷ that this Court’s power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court with Congress":

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII¹⁸ x x x .

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x 

Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds."¹⁹ Reaffirming Echegaray’s construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as "one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence":

[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain.²⁰ x x x (Emphasis supplied)