The Court’s Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”[10] Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”[11] However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[12]
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[13] we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.[14]
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.”[16]
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State,[17] is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,[18]we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that “there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.”[Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, “unduly vex the peace of nations.” [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.[19] (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,[20] we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - thatall states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.[21] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.[22]
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,[23] one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.[24]
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,[25] we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.” The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
x x x x
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.[27]
The international law of the sea is generally defined as “a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans.”[28] The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).[29] The freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law.[30] The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.[31]
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.[32]
In the case of warships,[33] as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)
A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority – over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world’s leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objectionable provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in international institutions. Most recently, 111th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included “voting out” UNCLOS for full Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.[34]
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will “recognize the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states”, and President Clinton’s reiteration of the US policy “to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise.” Since Article 31 relates to the “traditional uses of the oceans,” and “if under its policy, the US ‘recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,’” Justice Carpio postulates that “there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case.”
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US’ refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its [the US’] acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps publicly endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against “jurisdictional creep” by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries and government aircraft.
x x x x
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.[35]
We fully concur with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.[36] The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
Sec. 17. Institution of separate actions.—The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view thata ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.[37]
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
Sec. 15. Judgment.—Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
x x x x
Sec. 3. Referral to mediation.–At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
Sec. 4. Preliminary conference.–If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
x x x x
Sec. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.–The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
x x x x
Sec. 10. Efforts to settle.–The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral reef damage caused by the grounding.[38]
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will “initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists.” The US team intends to “help assess damage and remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities.”[39]
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens’ suit under the Rules, viz:
RULE 5
Section 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.–If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—“the political”--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”[40]
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,[41] the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.[42] The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., see concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., on official leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part.
[1] Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park –
[2] Id.
[3] “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE TUBBATAHA REEFS NATURAL PARK IN THE PROVINCE OF PALAWAN AS A PROTECTED AREA UNDER THE NIPAS ACT (R.A. 7586) AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN (SEP) FOR PALAWAN ACT (R.A. 7611), PROVIDING FOR ITS MANAGEMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
[4] Rollo, pp. 194-199.
[5]
[6] “Joint Statement Between The Philippines And The United States On The USS Guardian Grounding On Tubbataha Reef,” February 5, 2013.Accessed at US Embassy website -
[7] Rollo, pp. 89-92.
[8] Id. at 156-191. In a letter dated 27 May 2013, the DFA’s Office of Legal Affairs informed this Court that it has received from the Embassy of the United States the Notice sent by this Court, with a request to return the same. It said that the US Embassy “asserts that it is not an agent for the service of process upon the individuals named in court documents, and that the transmission of the Court documents should have been done through diplomatic channels.” (Id. at 255.)
[9] Id. at 215-247.
[10] Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 641 SCRA 244, 254, citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755 (2006).
[11] Id., citing Jumamil v. Cafe, 507 Phil. 455, 465 (2005), citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632-633 (2000).
[12] Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935& 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 151, citing Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., 591 Phil. 393, 404 (2008); Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321 (1997) and De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.
[13] G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
[14] Id. at 804-805.
[15] Id. at 802-803.
[16] See Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
[17] Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36, 41.
[18] 261 Phil. 777 (1990).
[19] Id. at 790-792.
[20] 445 Phil. 250 (2003).
[21] Id. at 269-270. Citations omitted.
[22] Id. at 268, citing J.L. Brierly, “The Law of Nations,” Oxford University Press, 6th Edition, 1963, p. 244.
[23] Supra note 18, at 788-789 & 797.
[24] United States of America v. Ruiz, 221 Phil. 179, 182-183 & 184 (1985).
[25] G.R. No. 90314, November 27, 1990, 191 SCRA 713.
[26] Id. at 727-728.
[27] 24 FSupp. 2d 155, 159 (D.P.R. 1997).
[28] Merlin M. Magallona, A Primer on the Law of the Sea, 1997, p. 1.
[29] Bertrand Theodor L. Santos, “Untangling a Tangled Net of Confusion: Reconciling the Philippine Fishery Poaching Law and the UNCLOS” World Bulletin, Vol. 18: 83-116 (July-December 2002), p. 96.
[30] Anne Bardin, “Coastal State’s Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels” 14 Pace Int’l. Rev. 27, 28 (2002).
[31] Id. at 29.
[32] Art. 2, UNCLOS.
[33] Art. 29 of UNCLOS defines warship as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.”
[34] Commander Robert C. “Rock” De Tolve, JAGC, USN, “At What Cost? America’s UNCLOS Allergy in the Time of ‘Lawfare’”, 61 Naval L. Rev. 1, 3 (2012).
[35]
[36] See BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 652 (2000).
[37] Rule 10, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
[38] “USS Port Royal (CG73)” –
[39]
[40] Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, 619 SCRA 533, 559, citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
[41] Supra note 36.
[42] Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, et al., 598 Phil. 262, 280 & 285.
SERENO, CJ:
I concur.
Sovereign immunity serves as a bar for the foreign sovereign to be subjected to the trial process. Supported both by local jurisprudence, as as international law (which forms part of the Philippine legal structure), the doctrine should not be reversed in this particular case.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN PHILIPPINE LAW
Sovereign immunity in Philippine law has been lengthily discussed by the Court in China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Santamaria in the following manner:
This Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and international trading.
x x x x
In JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court affirmed the Philippines’ adherence to the restrictive theory as follows:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine.
x x x x
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz –
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.[1] (Emphases supplied. Citations omitted)
From the Philippine perspective, what determines its ability to impose its law upon the foreign entity would be the act of the foreign entity – on whether the act is an aspect of its sovereign function or a private act.
In this case, the two Naval Officers were acting pursuant to their function as the commanding officers of a warship, traversing Philippine waters under the authority of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). While the events beg the question of what the warship was doing in that area, when it should have been headed towards Indonesia, its presence in Philippine waters is not wholly unexplainable. The VFA is a treaty, and it has been affirmed as valid by this Court in Bayan v. Zamora,[2] and affirmed in Lim v. Executive Secretary[3] and Nicolas v. Romulo.[4] It has, in the past, been used to justify the presence of United States Armed Forces in the Philippines. In this respect therefore, acts done pursuant to the VFA take the nature of governmental acts, since both the United States and Philippine governments recognize the VFA as a treaty with corresponding obligations, and the presence of these two Naval Officers and the warship in Philippine waters fell under this legal regime.
From this, the applicability of sovereign immunity cannot be denied as to the presence of the warship and its officers in Philippine waters. This does not, however, put an end to the discussion, because even if immunity is applicable to their presence, the specific act of hitting the Tubbataha Reef and causing damage thereto is a presumably tortuous act. Can these kinds of acts also be covered by the principle of sovereign immunity?
TORT EXCEPTION
Under the regime of international law, there is an added dimension to sovereign immunity exceptions: the tort exception. Whether this has evolved into a customary norm is still debatable; what is important to emphasize is that while some states have enacted legislation to allow the piercing of sovereign immunity in tortuous actions, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United States (FSIA)[5] contains such privilege. Specifically, the FSIA contains exceptions for (1) waiver;[6] (2) commercial activity;[7] (3) expropriation;[8] (4) property rights acquired through succession or donation;[9] (5) damages for personal injury or death or damage to or loss of property;[10] (6) enforcement of an arbitration agreement;[11] (7) torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support to such an act, if the state sponsors terrorism;[12] and (8) maritime lien in a suit for admiralty based on commercial activity.[13]
Any claim under the FSIA goes through a hierarchical process between the diplomatic channels of the United States and the forum state. However, by explicitly including the tort exception in its local legislation under the 4th exception discussed above - with due consideration to the heavy requirements for any doctrine to attain customary status - it becomes plausible that the exception can be applied to the United States, if not through customary international law, then by reason of acquiescence or estoppel.
As explained by Jasper Finke,
x x x x the current state practice may not support a rule of customary international law according to which states must deny sovereign immunity in case of tortious acts committed by another country in the forum state. Even though such an obligation is included in the ECSI and the UNCJIS, a considerable number of states do not apply this exception. But this does not answer the question whether states are prohibited from doing so. Section 1605 of the FSIA, for example, denies immunity in cases ‘in which money damages are sought … for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state’. If sovereign immunity is the default rule and all exceptions must reflect customary international law, and if the tort exception has not yet evolved into custom, then states such as the US, UK, Canada, and Australia that have included the tort exception in their national immunity laws automatically violate international law – a conclusion which no commentator so far has suggested. But if states that enact this exception as law do not violate international law, why then should a state do so if its courts apply this exception not on the basis of national law, but on the basis of how they construe and interpret the doctrine of sovereign immunity under international law?[14] (Emphasis supplied)
What Finke suggests is that a local court need not find the tort exception concept in its national law if it can interpret the doctrine from its understanding of international law. Can the Philippines then interpret the exception as being part of its acceptance of “general principles of international law” under the Constitution?[15]
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A POLITICAL DECISION
In Vinuya v. Romulo, we stated that “the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.”[16] Immunity then, unlike in other jurisdictions, is determined not by the courts of law but by the executive branches. Indeed, this was extensively discussed in Chief Justice Puno’s concurring opinion in Liang v. People, to wit:
Petitioner's argument that a determination by the Department of Foreign Affairs that he is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a political question binding on the courts, is anchored on the ruling enunciated in the case of WHO, et al. vs. Aquino, et al., viz:“It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.”
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja; The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr; Lasco vs. UN; and DFA vs. NLRC.
The case of WHO vs. Aquino involved the search and seizure of personal effects of petitioner Leonce Verstuyft, an official of the WHO. Verstyft was certified to be entitled to diplomatic immunity pursuant to the Host Agreement executed between the Philippines and the WHO.
ICMC vs. Calleja concerned a petition for certification election filed against ICMC and IRRI. As international organizations, ICMC and IRRI were declared to possess diplomatic immunity. It was held that they are not subject to local jurisdictions. It was ruled that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor over the case would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations from political pressure or control by the host country and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
In Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. involved an action for annulment of sale of land against the Holy See, as represented by the Papal Nuncio. The Court upheld the petitioner’s defense of sovereign immunity. It ruled that where a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state, which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in that case is the Holy See.
In Lasco vs. United Nations, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration was sued before the NLRC for illegal dismissal. The Court again upheld the doctrine of diplomatic immunity invoked by the Fund.
Finally, DFA v. NLRC involved an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development Bank. Pursuant to its Charter and the Headquarters Agreement, the diplomatic immunity of the Asian Development Bank was recognized by the Court.
x x x x
Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his international functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the principle that an international official is independent of the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to waive an official's immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over and individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. Provisions for immunity from jurisdiction for official acts appear, aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of most modern international organizations. The acceptance of the principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as declaratory of international law.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
In this view, the prudent interpretation of the tort exception would be to allow the executive branch to first determine whether diplomatic or sovereign immunity can be invoked by the foreign officials involved. If it can be invoked, then the next analysis should be whether this invoked immunity is absolute, as in the treatment of diplomatic envoys. If it is not absolute, then and only then can the Court weave the tort exception into the law of sovereign immunity and thus attain jurisdiction over the Naval Officers involved. This is important because the practice has been to afford the foreign entity absolute immunity, but withdraw the same from its personnel when they commit private acts.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The basic concept of state immunity is that no state may be subjected to the jurisdiction of another state without its consent.[18] According to Professor Ian Brownlie, it is “a procedural bar (not a substantive defence) based on the status and functions of the state or official in question.”[19] Furthermore, its applicability depends on the law and procedural rules of the forum state.[20] In the recent judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening) case,[21] the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applied in the following context:
In 1995, successors in title of the victims of the Distomo massacre, committed by the German armed forces in a Greek village in June 1944, brought proceedings for compensation against Germany before the Greek courts. The Greek court ordered Germany to pay compensation to the claimants. The appeal by Germany against that judgment was dismissed by a decision of the Hellenic Supreme Court, which ordered Germany to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings. The successful Greek claimants under the first-instance and Supreme Court judgments applied to the Italian courts for exequatur of those judgments, so as to be able to have them enforced in Italy. This was allowed by the Florence Court of Appeal and confirmed by the Italian Court of Cassation.
Germany raised the dispute before the ICJ, claiming these decisions constituted violations of its jurisdictional immunity.
The ICJ analyzed the case from the vantage point of immunity, such that the jurisdictional immunity of states refers primarily to an immunity from the trial process and is thus preliminary in character, as stated in the following manner:
At the outset, however, the Court must observe that the proposition that the availability of immunity will be to some extent dependent upon the gravity of the unlawful act presents a logical problem. Immunity from jurisdiction is an immunity not merely from being subjected to an adverse judgment but from being subjected to the trial process. It is, therefore, necessarily preliminary in nature. Consequently, a national court is required to determine whether or not a foreign State is entitled to immunity as a matter of international law before it can hear the merits of the case brought before it and before the facts have been established. If immunity were to be dependent upon the State actually having committed a serious violation of international human rights law or the law of armed conflict, then it would become necessary for the national court to hold an enquiry into the merits in order to determine whether it had jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the mere allegation that the State had committed such wrongful acts were to be sufficient to deprive the State of its entitlement to immunity, immunity could, in effect be negated simply by skilful construction of the claim.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
The ICJ continued dissecting national law in order to determine whether jurisdictional immunity could be defeated by reason of serious violations of human rights law or the law of armed conflict. In this, the ICJ clearly saw that there was no customary international law norm that led to the defeat of immunity by reason of these violations, including the tort exception, viz:
Apart from the decisions of the Italian courts which are the subject of the present proceedings, there is almost no State practice which might be considered to support the proposition that a State is deprived of its entitlement to immunity in such a case. Although the Hellenic Supreme Court in the Distomo case adopted a form of that proposition, the Special Supreme Court in Margellos repudiated that approach two years later. As the Court has noted in paragraph 76 above, under Greek law it is the stance adopted in Margellos which must be followed in later cases unless the Greek courts find that there has been a change in customary international law since 2002, which they have not done. As with the territorial tort principle, the Court considers that Greek practice, taken as a whole, tends to deny that the proposition advanced by Italy has become part of customary international law.
In addition, there is a substantial body of State practice from other countries which demonstrates that customary international law does not treat a State’s entitlement to immunity as dependent upon the gravity of the act of which it is accused or the peremptory nature of the rule which it is alleged to have violated.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
As things stand in the international sphere, the immunity of the state (and by extension, its agents, in the performance of their governmental functions jure imperii) must stand against even serious violations of international law, including breaches of international environmental law (which is an aspect of human rights law as well). The ICJ concluded that
x x x[U]nder customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict. In reaching that conclusion, the Court must emphasize that it is addressing only the immunity of the State itself from the jurisdiction of the courts of other States; the question of whether, and if so to what extent, immunity might apply in criminal proceedings against an official of the State is not in issue in the present case.[24]
This does not mean that the act of the state is to be considered lawful. However, this also does not mean that state immunity is waived in the context of an international breach of even a jus cogens norm, as explained in this manner:
The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful. That is why the application of the contemporary law of State immunity to proceedings concerning events which occurred in 1943-1945 does not infringe the principle that law should not be applied retrospectively to determine matters of legality and responsibility (as the Court has explained in paragraph 58 above). For the same reason, recognizing the immunity of a foreign State in accordance with customary international law does not amount to recognizing as lawful a situation created by the breach of a jus cogens rule, or rendering aid and assistance in maintaining that situation, and so cannot contravene the principle in Article 41 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility.[25]
CONCLUSION OF JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS AND IMMUNITY
What the Court is left to work with is a process by which jurisdiction and immunity can be determined by answering several questions, summated thusly:
- Is the act of the foreign national or entity an act jure imperii, such that it can be considered an act of state entitled to immunity, or an act jure gestionis, in which case it is to be considered a private act?
- In respect of the above question, has the executive branch, in the exercise of its political power, determined whether absolute diplomatic immunity is applicable?
- If it is an act jure imperii and thus entitled to sovereign immunity, does an exception apply to withdraw the immunity privilege of such acts?
In this case, it is apparent that the act of the U.S.S. Guardian and its officers in entering Philippine waters is allowed by the VFA, and as a treaty privilege should be considered an act jure imperii. Its deviation into the waters of Tubbataha, and whether this can be considered a private act, is a factual issue that should be determined by the proper body. Indeed, while Philippine authorities may not have authorized the deviation, if the United States government affirms that it gave the Guardian sufficient discretion to determine its course, then the act is not necessarily robbed of its jure imperii character and is thus entitled to immunity. The course of action of the Philippine government would be to engage in diplomatic negotiations for potential treaty breach liability.
As of this moment, the executive branch has not made a determination of the applicable immunity. No correspondence has been sent to the Court as to the issue. Thus, the Court must act in deference to the executive prerogative to first make this determination under the presumption of regularity of performance of duties, before it can exercise its judicial power.
Finally, no exception exists in Philippine or international law that would remove the immunity of the United States in order to place it under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The Writ of Kalikasan is a compulsory writ, and its issuance initiates a legal process that would circumvent the internationally established rules of immunity. Should the Court issue the Writ, it could possibly entail international responsibility for breaching the jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign state.
I therefore vote to dismiss the Petition.
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