Thursday, September 19, 2019

EN BANC G.R. No. 216691 July 21, 2015 MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO III, Respondents

Apparently, contrary to Payumo’s assertion, the manual COCP is the official Comelec document in cases wherein the canvassing threshold is lowered, In fact, clear from the language of the Resolution is that the winners, in such instances, are proclaimed "by manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate," the format for which is appended to Comelec Resolution No. 9700. It is incorrect to state, therefore, that only the printed COCP can serve as basis for ascertaining the date of Garcia’s proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual COCP which contains the true and exact date of Garcia’s proclamation – May 14, 2013, not the printed COCP.
Payumo’s reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced. To be sure, Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes necessary only for purposes of transmitting the results to the next level canvassing, and not for proclaiming the winning candidates, insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have been lowered are concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling. Furthermore, it appears that May 15, 2013 is the date the printed COCP was generated, which, as the members of the MBOC claimed, the Comelec-issued laptop does not allow to be modified.23 And as justified by the MBOC, they were only able to produce the printed COCP on May 15, 2013, the day after the actual proclamation, because that was only when they were able to retrieve from the Regional Election Director the username and password for generation the document, denominated as CEF 29.24
As aptly concluded by the RTC.25
The declaration made by the individual members of the MBOC that the proclamation of protestee [herein private respondent] was done on May 14, 2013, coupled with the issuance of the manual certificate of canvass and proclamation on the same date, is sufficient proof that protestee’s proclamation was in fact done on May 14, 2013 and not on May 15, 2013. The printed certificate of canvass and proclamation already on May 15, 2013 was not meant to supersede the proclamation already been done on May 14, 2013, but only to comply with the "official format" of the COMELEC, according to Municipal Election Officer Miguel. The printed document merely affirmed what had already been accomplished with the manually written document.
Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate on May 14, 2013, it is then plain to see that Payumo’s election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period and ought to be dismissed outright.
The ruling Federico v. Comelec is not a precedent to the instant case
Payumo next seeks refuge under the case of Federico, in which the Court indeed nullified the proclamation of therein petitioner Renato Federico (Federico) as mayor of Santo Tomas, Batangas even though private respondent Osmundo Maligaya (Maligaya) filed the election protest more than ten (10) days after such fact. There, the Court reckoned the 10-ady prescriptive period not from the date of proclamation but from the date of proclamation but from the date Maligaya received notice of the event, rendering the actual date of proclamation immaterial. It is this holding in Federico that Payumo adamantly urges that We apply.
The argument is specious.
Guilty of reiteration, Rule 2, Sec. 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC provides:
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of proclamation.
The above provision is the procedural equivalent of Sec. 251 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. – A sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election.
As can be gleaned, Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the 10-day period ought to be reckoned from the date of proclamation and not from the date of notice. As the elementary rule in statutory construction goes, when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.26 This is known as the plain-meaning or verbal egis rule, expressed in the Latin maxim "verba legis non est recedendum," or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."27 Since the afore-quoted provision, as couched, us clear and free from ambiguity, its literal meaning must be applied without attempted interpretation.28
The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not difficult to deduce – every candidate interested in the outcome of the election is expected to be vigilant enough in protecting his or her votes and would, therefore, enlist the aid of volunteer pool watchers in every clustered precinct to guard against or document possible irregularities, or that the candidate would personally be present at or, at the very least, would send representatives to the to the canvassing areas to ensure the proper tallying of votes and to monitor the real-time results of the elections as they are electronically transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact moment the winning candidate is proclaimed by the board of canvassers concerned.

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THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 235658, June 22, 2020 ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAUL DEL ROSARIO Y NIEBRES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

  THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 235658, June 22,  2020  ] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAUL DEL ROSARIO Y NIEBRES, ACCUSED...