Thursday, February 20, 2014



Multiple Choice. Write the letter of your choice in your notebook.

  1. Which of the following is NOT a legislative function of Congress?
(a)    taxation
(b)   appropriation
(c)    expropriation
(d)   impeachment

  1. Which of the following is an implied power of Congress?
(a)   power to punish contempt
(b)   declare the existence of a state of war
(c)    discipline its members
(d)   canvass presidential elections

  1. Which of the following is an INHERENT power of Congress?
(a)    concur to treaties
(b)   concur to amnesty with the President
(c)    determining its internal rules
(d)   propose constitutional amendments

  1. The power to make laws includes the power to –
(a)    the adoption of a bill
(b)   the framing of a statute
(c)    the repeal of a law
(d)   enact a bill

5.On a clash or conflict between an executive agreement and statute, the latter prevails because-
(a) the President cannot repeal a law through an executive agreement
(b)  the main function of Congress is to enact a law
(c) the statute is more authoritative than an executive agreement
(d) because the Supreme Court says so

6.What is done during the second reading of the bill?
(a) referral to Senate
(b) it is read in its entirety
© printed in its final form
(d) voting of the bill

7.Which of the following is considered a  bill of local application?
(a) bill granting honorary citizenship
(b) bill authorizing the release of funds
© bill fixing rates on imports
(d)bill creating a municipality

8.Which of the following statements is correct?
(a) Congress cannot increase the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
(b) Congress may increase the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
© Congress cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
(d)Congress may provided the Supreme Court concurs.

9.To prevent a log-rolling legislation-
(a) every bill may have many subtitles
(b) every bill must embrace only one subject matter
© every bill must be sponsored only by one member
(d)every bill must be debated and scrutinized.

10.The president may veto a bill, but this can be overridden by –
(a) 2/3 vote of all the members of Congress voting separately
(b) 2/3 voted of all the member of Congress voting jointly
© 2/3 vote of all members of each House
(d)majority vote only of all members of each House.

11.The general rule is that the President must approve entirely or disapprove in toto a bill. Which of the following is true?
(a) there is no exception to the rule
(b) he cannot veto an item
© he can veto partially a tariff bill
(e)    he can veto the whole of an appropriation bill.

12.Which is False concerning the power of legislative investigation?
(a) it is implied from the power of legislation
(b) it is expressly granted in the constitution
© it need not even be expressly granted
(d)it is not mandatory

13.Which is not true concerning the Arnault case?
(a) a person cited in legislative contempt cannot be detained for an indefinite period of time
(b) the Court may grant bail
© imprisonment could last only when Congress is in session
(d)the President may grant pardon.

14.Which of the following is not a constitutional limitation regarding an appropriation bill?
(a) that it must be devoted to a public purpose
(b) that is should originate from the House of Representatives
© the sum authorized to be released must be determinate or at least determinable
(d)it must be for reasons of necessity

15.Which of the following does not describe the power of taxation?
(a) it is inherent
(b) it must be uniform
©  it must be equal
(d)it must be equitable

16.The granting of tax exemtion requires-
(a) concurrence 2/3 of all members of Congress
(b) concurrence of majority of all members of Senate
© concurrence of majority of all member of Congress
(d)Concurrence of 2/3 of congress voting separately.

17.The power of the people to propose bill and laws is known as-
(a) referendum
© plebiscite
(d) special election

18.Which of the following is NOT  descriptive of  executive power?
(a) it is not defined under the 1987 constitution
(b) it is the power to enforce the law
© it is the power to administer the law
(d)it is limited only to the enumerated powers

19.The returns of every election for President shall be submitted to-
(b) House of Representatives
© the President of the Senate
(e)    Speaker of the House.

20.In which of the following shall the Vice-president become the president?
(a) when the President fails to qualify
(b) when the President shall not have been chosen
© when the president resigns
(d) when the president is disabled.


1. (a) Does the declaration of a state of rebellion amount to a declaration of martial law? (b) Does it also constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers of the President? Explain your answer.
Answer:. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.  There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights.  There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers.  In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23.  (1) ….
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.  Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief.  The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.  These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.(SANLAKAS V. REYES)
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary Reyes
[GR 159085, 3 February 2004]; also Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers/Member [GR 159103], Suplico, et al., vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. [GR 159185]; Pimentel et al. vs. Romulo et al. [GR 159196]
En Banc, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 2 join, 2 file own separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on leave
Facts: Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of 27 July 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the evening of 27 July 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on 1 August 2003, through Proclamation 435. In the interim, several petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the validity of Proclamation 427 and General Order 4.
Issue [1]: Whether the President’s declaration of state of rebellion is necessary in the exercise of the calling out power.
Held [1]: NO. For the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, “[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’” Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: “The executive power shall be vested in the President….” As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: “He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” The provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States. The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State. In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual power and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this distinction to the “unitary and highly centralized” nature of the Philippine government. She noted that, “There is no counterpart of the several states of the American union which have reserved powers under the United States constitution.” Thus, the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But the Court’s mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Should there be any “confusion” generated by the issuance of Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, the Court clarifies that the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion “with due regard to constitutional rights.”
Issue [2]: Whether apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests, during the declaration of a state of rebellion, are founded.
Held [2]: NO. A person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

2. (A) Is the position of Provincial Administrator primarily confidential? (2) Does the rule on nepotism apply to designation?(3) May a private citizen who does not claim any better right to a position file a verified complaint with the Civil Service Commission to denounce a violation by an appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and rules?
Answer: The position of Provincial Administrator . the position of Provincial Administrator is embraced within the Career Service under Section 5 of P.D. No. 807 as evidenced by the qualifications prescribed for it in the Manual of Position Descriptions, 16 to wit:
Education : Bachelor's degree preferably in Law/Public or Business Administration.
Experience : Six years of progressively responsible experience in planning, directing and administration of provincial government operations. Experience in private agencies considered are those that have been more or less familiar level of administrative proficiency.
Eligibility : RA 1080 (BAR)/Personnel Management Officer/Career Service (Professional)/First Grade/Supervisor).
It may be added that the definition of its functions and its distinguishing characteristics as laid down in the Manual, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Under the direction of the Provincial Governor, responsible for the overall coordination of the activities of the various national and local agencies in the province; and general planning, direction and control of the personnel functions and the administrative services of the Governor's Office.
This is the class for top professional level management, administrative and organizational work in the operation of provincial government with highly complex, involved relationships with considerable delegation of authority and responsibility and a high degree of public contact.
render indisputable the above conclusion that the subject position is in the career service which, per Section 5 of P.D. No. 807, is characterized by (a) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, (b) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, and (c) security of tenure. More specifically, it is an open career position, for appointment to it requires prior qualification in an appropriate examination. 17 It falls within the second major level of positions in the career service, per Section 7 of P.D. No. 807, which reads:
Sec. 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. — (a) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; . . .
Nepotism applies to designation. Any private citizen can file a protest. Not being primarily confidential, appointment thereto must, inter alia, be subject to the rule on nepotism. prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly"
Any citizen of the Philippines may bring that matter to the attention of the Civil Service Commission for appropriate action conformably with its role as the central personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil servants, 29 with the power and function to administer and enforce the Constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system. 30 Moreover, Section 37 of the decree expressly allows a private citizen to directly file with the Civil Service Commission a complaint against a government official or employee, in which case it may hear and decide the case or may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct an investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. This provision gives teeth to the Constitutional exhortation that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be, inter alia, accountable to the people. 31 An ordinary citizen who brings to the attention of the appropriate office any act or conduct of a government official or employee which betrays the public interest deserves nothing less than the praises, support and encouragement of society. The vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.
JOSE P. LAUREL V, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Batangas, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LORENZO SANGALANG, respondents. THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 71562 October 28, 1991

3. Alexander Albofera, a municipal treasurer was convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court on July 20, 1981. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending appeal before the Supreme Court, the President of the Philippines on January 2, 1987.upon recommendation of the National Amnesty Commission granted him absolute pardon. (a) Is the grant of pardon, under the said circumstances valid? (b) Is he entitled to be reinstated to his government position? (c) Is the payment of fine and civil liability extinguished ?

ANSWER: As a general rule, for pardon to be granted there must first be a conviction by final judgment. However, this applies only for pardons granted pursuant to the 1987 constitution. BEFORE that, pardon may be granted (under the 1973 constitution) even if there is no final judgment by conviction. In the problem, the pardon was granted on January 2, 1987, hence it is valid.
A person pardoned cannot be reinstated to his government position, unless the pardon expressly grants it. The person needs to reapply.
The payment of fine, being criminal in nature, is deemed suspended. But the payment of civil liability is not.
Absolute pardon having been granted to accused-appellants prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, when there was as yet no requirement that pardon may be extended only after conviction by final judgment, the pardon granted by the President on January 29, 1987, was, therefore, valid, binding and effective. Accused-appellants' criminal liability is thereby extinguished but their civil liability remains.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ALEXANDER ALBOFERA, AND ROMEO LAWI-AN accused-appellants. G.R. No. L-69377 April 8, 1988
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction[U1] . Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."[U2]  PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant. SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000]

4. Does the President of the Philippines have the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases? Is such grant considered a political question beyond judicial review? What is the limitation of said power if there be any? Explain and cite your case.
Answer:YES. Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," We cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so We must no distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.X X X We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
X X X Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. In this connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051, is very enlightening, and We quote:
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Consfitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).
xxx xxx xxx
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the goverrunent, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L.R.A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Fan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. RA. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. CA 516, 30 L.R.A- 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 111, 41, 37 N.E. 683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitute delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary the department which is charged with the special duty of determinining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end that the government may be one of laws and not men" words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document.
Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution). "Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the govermental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view" (Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives & Ong, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and Balanquit vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives & Ong, G.R Nos. 92202-03, July 30, 1991).
In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases. We must not overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power of executive clemency is subject to constitutional l'um'tations. We will merely check whether the particular measure in question has been in accordance with law. In so doing, We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or motives which actuate the President as such is clearly beyond our power of judicial review.
RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner, vs.
EN BANCG.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991

5.      Enumerate some of the powers of the president as elucidated in the Marcos v. Manglapus case.

6.   (a) What do you mean by the "Calling-out Power" of the President under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?
Answer: Section 18, Article VII provides:The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
This is the “calling out power”. It is the most benign military power of the president. He can use that power to “prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion”. The ground is “whenever it becomes necessary” only.
(b)On February 24, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.1017 declaring a state of national emergency. Is this Proclamation constitutional? Explain.
Part of the proclamation has this provision: “Now, Therefore, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President... whenever it becomes necessary ... may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress .... rebellion ..., " and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
The portion on “calling out” is a valid exercise of her power as the commander-in-chief. But to enforce “ decrees” is invalid, as she does not exercise legislative powers.
©During the effectivity of this Proclamation, Gener, Lito, and Bong were arrested by the police for acts of terrorism. Is the arrest legal? Explain.
At that time when she proclaimed a national state of emergency, there was no law then on terrorism. The crime was still undefined, hence the arrest was illegal.

7. The President issued Proclamation No.1018 placing the Philippines under Martial Law on the ground that a rebellion staged by lawless elements is endangering the public safety .Pursuant to the Proclamation, suspected rebels were arrested and detained and military tribunals were set up to try them. Robert dela Cruz, a citizen, filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of Proclamation No.1018.
1.   Does Robert have a standing to challenge Proclamation No.1018? Explain. 2.5%
2.   In the same suit, the Solicitor General contends that under the Constitution, the President as Commander-in-Chief, determines whether the exigency has arisen requiring the exercise of his power to declare Martial Law and that his determination is conclusive upon the courts. How should the Supreme Court rule?
3.   The Solicitor General argues that, in any event, the determination of whether the rebellion poses dangers to public safety involves a question of fact and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. What should be the ruling of the Court? 2.5%
4.   Finally, the Solicitor General maintains that the President reported to Congress such proclamation of Martial Law, but Congress did not revoke the proclamation. What is the effect of the inaction of Congress on the suit brought by Robert to the Supreme Court?
Answer: (a) Yes, Robert has standing. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.(b) The Supreme Court has the power to review the factual basis. (c) The Solicitor General is wrong. The Supreme Court as a matter of exception now, can review the sufficiency of the FACTUAL basis. (d) Even the inaction of Congress does not negate the fact that the proclamation of martial law is only temporary in nature.

8. During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.  Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions intervened in the case.
Question: Is the act of the president in creating 33 municipalities valid? Explain.

The act of the president is unconstitutional. The creation of municipalities is an exercise of legislative power; hence the president cannot do so. There are only two situations where the president exercises delegated legislative power in the constitution: fixing of tariff rates and during a national emergency. In the case at bar, said legislative exercise is not authorized.

9. . Sometime before 1979, petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810, 91041 and F-138107). These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."  Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner.  The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were identified in the NBI report as having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of the charges there listed and Identified. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926. Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.Rule on petitioner’s contentions
Answer: Once pardon is granted, the relationship is transferred purely between the president and the convict. The condition of his pardon did not require a final conviction, hence his arrest is valid. There is no deprivation of due process. ONCE the conditional pardon is violated, the president has always the right to revoke the same at will.
“A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.” Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners, vs.

 [U1]This means that AMNESTY can be granted even without final conviction.

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