1. Elma was appointed as Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998.
Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but
waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC. Question: Is the
appointment as CPLC valid? Explain.
ANSWER: The two offices are incompatible. Hence the
appointment is unconstitutional. When he accepted the CPLC appointment he is
deemed to have abandoned his being Chairman of the PCGG. (PUBLIC INTEREST
CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO, Petitioners, vs.MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government, and RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary,
Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 138965 March 5, 2007)
2. On October 4, 2006, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23,
2006.1
On
September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator
Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. Question: Is the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA
valid? Explain.
ANSWER: It is not
valid. It is an incompatible office. (DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs.EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA,
in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and as
Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), Respondents. G.R. No. 184740
, February 11, 2010)
3.What is the power of judicial review? What
are its limitations?
ANSWER:The power of
judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to check whether other
departments acted beyond their powers or have exercised grave abuse of discretion.
The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by
the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.20 Respondents assert
that the second requisite is absent in this case.
4.What is the meaning of a moot and academic
case? Can the Court render a decision when the case has become moot and
academic? What are the exceptions to this rule?
ANSWER:A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.24
However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,25
supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court
from rendering a decision if there is a
grave violation of the Constitution. Even
in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar,
and public.This is also known as the
symbolic function of the Supreme Court. There are exceptions: (a) when the issue is of paramount interest to the nation, (b)
when it is capable of evading judicial review.
5.What is
“appointment”? What is “designation”? Distinguish the two by giving at least
two examples.
ANSWER: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case
before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief
Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment
is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment
because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified
public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on
the person named.36
6.In a
constitutional government, what must prevail? What is the basic and paramount
law to which all other laws must conform? What is the principle of separation
of powers? What department of our government is considered as the guardian of
the constitution?
Answer: It cannot be overstressed
that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail. The Constitution is the basic and paramount
law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons including the
highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it
follows that the three branches of government must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under
the principle
of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The
legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application
to cases and controversies. The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain
inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk
the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not
go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire
Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties
of the people (CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE
MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity
as National Treasurer, respondents. G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992)
7. On June 20, 1953, House Bill No.
16297 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years
service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in
both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of
incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall
receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was
receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. President Aquino,
however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that
according to her "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's
collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on
standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known
as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said
that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group
of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy
preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service
servants." Questions: Is the veto of the president valid? Explain.
Answer: Invalid. The
subject veto is not an item veto; The veto by the Executive is violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers; The veto deprives the retired Justices of
their rights to the pensions due them; The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal
Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.(Bengzon v. Drilon, supra)
8. Congressman X is a full-pledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction
for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
pending appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.
Question: a)Does membership in
Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general?
b) The "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the
contentions that —
1. His reelection being an
expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving
priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their
elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar Congressman X from
performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed
mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The House treats Congressman X
as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government
to respect its mandate.
5. The concept of temporary
detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of Congressman X to discharge
his mandate.
Rule on the contentions of
Congressman X.
Answer(a) NO. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after
final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also
serves as an example and warning to others.
A person
charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the
public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the
injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the
accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk
of his absconding.(B) When the voters of his district
elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in
officeThe performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of
the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency
of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can
also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse
her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An
elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
(PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROMEO
G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant. EN BANC G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3,
2000)
9.
Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged, together with other aliens, with
having committed certain irregularities in violation of the Central Bank Rules
and Regulations before the Deportation Board in a complaint filed by a Special
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.
Acting on the complaint, the
Chairman of the Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest against Dalamal
pursuant to the authority given to said Board by Section 1-(b) of Executive
Order No. 398. Dalamal was accordingly
arrested, but he was subsequently released upon filing a bond in the amount of
P10,000.00.
Question: Is it within the power of
the Chairman of the Deportation Board to issue the warrant of arrest? Explain.
ANSWER: No. The power to issue a warrant of arrest only
belongs to the Judicial Members or judges. Whenever, therefore, the President exercises
his power of deporting an alien upon prior investigation conducted in the
manner and form prescribed in Section 69 of the Administrative Code of 1917, he
does so, not only as an act of state, but also "under the combined
powers" of the President and the Legislature. As an act of state, the President
has the inherent power to order the deportation of an alien and as incident
thereof, his arrest, while at the same time that power may be deemed vested in
him thru delegation by the Legislature thru the enactment of an appropriate
statute (Section 69, Revised Administrative Code.) But insofar as his power to
order the arrest of an alien is concerned, either as a measure to insure his
appearance at the investigation proceedings to determine if he is liable to
deportation, or an incident of his inherent power to deport to make effective
his deportation order, assuming only arguendo
that he has such incidental power, that power cannot be delegated either under
the principle of delegata potesta non
potest delegare,1or upon the theory that it is non-delegable
because it involves the exercise of judgment or discretion. (KISHU DALAMAL,
petitioner, vs.DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent. EN BANC G.R. No.
L-16812 ,October 31, 1963)
10. The
Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative
Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding,
including work incidental to those processes, required by the National
Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law
or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it
is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit.
Question: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued?
Explain.
ANSWER:Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.
(Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if
it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding
against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government
cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection (BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN
SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs.THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and
TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents. EN BANC G.R. No. L-15751,January 28, 1961)
11. What are the four parameters in a
Philippine-style party-list election system? Explain each parameter.
Answer: To summarize,
there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of
the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to
party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat
for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The
guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to
parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after
allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list
organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total
votes.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the
allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this
threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional
seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation
according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009
as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is
constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent
any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the
Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute
proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts
will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative
of the Constitution.( BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor. G.R. No. 179271 ,July 8, 2009)
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor. G.R. No. 179271 ,July 8, 2009)
12.On January 29, 1964, the
Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of
1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at
the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries."Question: Is this ordinance constitutional? Explain
your answer.
ANSWER: Not
constitutional. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned
ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity
to be levied upon. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC.,
plaintiff-appellant, vs.THE TREASURER OF ORMOC
CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY,
HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc
City and ORMOC CITY,
defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968
13. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. Question: What are the requirements for a reasonable or valid classification?
ANSWER: A classification
is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
14. Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the
law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent
Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent
Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or
the Fair Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A.
8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the
start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official
may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.
QUESTION: Are
these provisions constitutional? How did the Supreme Court rule on these
provisions? Explain.
Answer:
All the provisions are constitutional. There is a substantial distinction
between elected official and appointive officials, hence they are not treated
equally. Thus elective officials are not deemed resigned, while the appointive
officials are deemed resigned.
(ELEAZAR
P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR.,
Petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent G.R. No. 189698
February 22, 2010)
15. . In a speech delivered before
the House of Representatives, Congressman X,
said: “The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that
under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the
government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are
for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case,
the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come
across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would
reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. .
. . .”.
The allies of the President passed a
Resolution for Congressman X to substantiate his charges, and if he cannot do
so, he shall be suspended from the House.
Congressman X
did not substantiate the charges against the President of the Philippines. By a vote of 2/3 of
the House, Congressman X was suspended for fifteen months for reason of
“disorderly behavior”.
Arguing
that the House has committed grave abuse of discretion, Congressman X went to
the Supreme Court on Certiorari, contending that (1) the Constitution gave him
complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he
ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly
behavior for which he could be punished; and
(3) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one
of its members.
Rule on the
three contentions of Congressman X.
ANSWER (1) it is true that under the constitution he enjoys
parliamentary immunity. He cannot be held liable for his speech in Congress
while it is in session. (2) However if he is declared having a disorderly
behavior, this matter belongs to Congress alone based on its internal rules,
which becomes then a political question, and hence beyond the scope of the
power of judicial review of the SC, OTHERWISE, there will be undue interference,
amounting to the violation of the principle of separation of powers. (3) Definitely, it is within the power of
Congress to discipline or suspend any of its members.
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs.SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO,
JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY,
FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE
ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and
EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 ,October 28, 1960
16. The
Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered
by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
Questions:
(1) Is said constitutional provision a self-executing one? Explain. (2) Does the
51% shares therein form part of the patrimony of the nation? Explain.
ANSWER:The Supreme Court ruled that this provision is
self-executing. Though late in Tanada v. Tuvera, it said that this is only an
exception to the rule, because the general rule is that the provision on
Declaration of Principles and State Polices are merely guidelines of the other
departments.
(MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. EN BANC[G.R.
No. 122156. February 3, 1997])
17.
Given the PROPOSITION: “DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES
VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN
GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?”
Questions: (1) Is this a proposal to
amend the constitution? Or a proposal to
revise the constitution? Explain. (2) In what ways can the constitution be
REVISED? (3) Can the above proposition be “directly proposed by the people through initiative”? (4) What
are the two essential elements that must
be present for such a proposal?
ANSWERL1) In Lambino, the SC ruled that
practically the proposal offers a qualitative overhaul of the government, and
thus this would tantamount to a REVISION of the Constitution, and not merely an
amendment. There are only two ways to a proposal for Revision: constitutional
convention and constituent assembly. The people’s initiative applies only to
amendment. Hence, the above proposition cannot therefore be directly proposed
to the people through initiative. (4)First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
( Lambino v. Comelec G.R. 174153 October 25, 2006)
18.
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive
Order No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila
International Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter"). Executive Order
No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 9091
and 2982 amended the MIAA Charter.
As
operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements
and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land,3 including the runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under
the Bureau of Air Transportation.4 The MIAA Charter further provides that no
portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or
any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.5
On
21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued
Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991
withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of
the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real
estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax
already due.
Questions:
(1) Is the Opinion of the OGCC correct? (2)
What is the nature of the MIAA? Is it a government owned or controlled
corporation?(4) Is it subject to the real property tax of the City of Paranaque? (5) Is there an
exception to its taxability or non-taxability? Explain your answer.
ANSWER: MIAA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA
is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA
is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions
of the Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality"
as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate
powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the
government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it
remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain,12
police authority13
and the levying of fees and charges.14
At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under
the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order."15
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally
autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government
machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The MIAA
Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and
autonomous body"16
will make its operation more "financially viable."17
X x x
Under Section 2(10) and
(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which governs
the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices within
the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code, MIAA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person
because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind"
by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property
to a "taxable person" as provided in Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code, in which case the specific real property leased becomes
subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport
Lands and Buildings leased to taxable
persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the
Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to public
use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.
Article 420 specifically mentions "ports x x x constructed by the
State," which includes public airports and seaports, as properties of
public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of public dominion
owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands
and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of
the Local Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties
of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.(MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY
MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF
PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF PARAÑAQUE, EN BANC G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006)
19. On January
27, 1985 at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading
and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After
waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to
a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses
and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed
therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and
pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine
General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken
home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and
the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries
and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him
in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner
who charged therefor P14,000.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the
trial court.
The first issue raised by the
latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No.
409 (Charter of the City of Manila)
reading:
The city shall not be
liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to
enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail
over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the
Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
QUESTIONS: (1) Is the contention of Manila
correct? (2) Is the City of Manila
liable for damages? Explain.
ANSWER: (1) Manila’s
contention is not correct. (2) It is therefore liable for damages. As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon
an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico
alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his
injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under
the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended
complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in
good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes
thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who
"have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect,
admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is
a national highway was made, for the
first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which
had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the
first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the
appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is
not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to
the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic
Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative
powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
x x x
x x x x x x
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide
for the laying out, construction and
improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning,
and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and
regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other
pipes, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the
erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein,
. . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public
places; to provide for the abatement
of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to
provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges,
viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop
rolling, and other amusements which may annoy
persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other
animals; to regulate the speed of
horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives
within the limits of the city; to regulate
the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide
for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any
such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or
changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part
thereof, to provide suitable
protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains,
sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural
drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted
by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon
which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the
highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and
municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective
boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of
said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the
highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of
national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads
shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision
of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in
annual or special appropriation Acts."
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs.GENARO N. TEOTICO
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. EN BANCG.R. No. L-23052
January 29, 1968
20. . (a)The general rule is that Courts shy away from deciding cases
which have become moot and academic. State the four exceptions to this rule
(b) For Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators to be accorded standing to sue, what requirements must be
met?
ANSWER:(a)The "moot and academic" principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;32
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
(b) Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are
met:
(1) the cases involve
constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers,
there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters,
there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
(4) for concerned
citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators,
there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators (PROF.
RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE,
JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO
BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON.
AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF
OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. G.R. No. 171396 May 3,
2006)
