As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative
power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution
• Aside from its conceptual origins related to the separation of powers principle, Corwin, in his
commentary on Constitution of the Unikd States made the following observations:
At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that
legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers:
Why
go to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if they can straightway
remerge on their own motion? The second is the concept of due process of law, which
precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of
agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari," which John Locke borrowed and formulated
as a dogma of political science ... Chief .Justice Taft offered the following explanation ofthe
origin and limitations of this idea as a postulate of constitutional Jaw: ''The well-known
has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. 195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting
as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This
premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and
the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to
legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, 197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. 198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a
restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). 199 The conceptual
treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a
relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception
to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
maxim 'delegata potestas non pot est delefari,' applicable to the law of agency in the general
common law, is well understood and has had wider application in the construction of our
Federal and State Constitutions than it has in private law ... The Federal and State
Constitutions than it has in private law ... The Federal Constitution and State Constitutions
of this country divide the governmental power into three branches ... In carrying out that
constitutional division ... it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up
its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it
attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power of judicial power. This
is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each
in the field of its duties may not invoke government and that each in the field of its duties may
not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be an
assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what it may
do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must
be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
coordination. (Emphases supplied)multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."xxxx[Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that] [t]he rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution
• Aside from its conceptual origins related to the separation of powers principle, Corwin, in his
commentary on Constitution of the Unikd States made the following observations:
At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that
legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers:
Why
go to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if they can straightway
remerge on their own motion? The second is the concept of due process of law, which
precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of
agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari," which John Locke borrowed and formulated
as a dogma of political science ... Chief .Justice Taft offered the following explanation ofthe
origin and limitations of this idea as a postulate of constitutional Jaw: ''The well-known
has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. 195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting
as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This
premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and
the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to
legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, 197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. 198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a
restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). 199 The conceptual
treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a
relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception
to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
maxim 'delegata potestas non pot est delefari,' applicable to the law of agency in the general
common law, is well understood and has had wider application in the construction of our
Federal and State Constitutions than it has in private law ... The Federal and State
Constitutions than it has in private law ... The Federal Constitution and State Constitutions
of this country divide the governmental power into three branches ... In carrying out that
constitutional division ... it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up
its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it
attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power of judicial power. This
is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each
in the field of its duties may not invoke government and that each in the field of its duties may
not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be an
assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what it may
do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must
be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
coordination. (Emphases supplied)multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."xxxx[Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that] [t]he rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
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