Thursday, September 13, 2012

samplers

CASE NO. 1. Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957.

Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.

On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.

To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.

In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant for their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from confiscating their cash bond and from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case. 1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the parties, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment, viz:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

(b) Dismissing this petition with respect to petitioner FU YAN FUN, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

(c) Authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by herein petitioners CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of P4,000.00; and

(d) Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare Sec. 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 unconstitutional;

Without pronouncement, as to costs.

QUESTION: Is the ruling of the trial court valid? Explain.

CASE NO. 2.From mainland China where he was born of Chinese parents, Mr. Chan Sing Kha migrated to the Philippines in 1894.As of April 11, 1899, he was already a permanent resident of the Philippine Islands and continued to reside in this country until his death. During his lifetime and when he was already in the Philippines, he married Charing, a Filipina (his salegirl) with whom he begot one son, named Ho Pia Kha, who was born on October 18, 1897. Ho Pia got married (to his classmate) Mirtil, a Filipina, and one of their children is Todas Kha, who was born on September 27, 1936. Todas finished Commerce and engaged in business.

In the May 1989 election, Todas Kha ranfor and was elected Congressman. His rival candidate, Gavino Ang, filed a qou warranto or disqualification case against him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. It was pointed out that Todas Kha did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of 21.

Decide whether Todas Kha suffers from disqualification or not.

CASE NO. 3.For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with homicide (docketed as Crim. Case No. 4567) before the RTC of Dipolog City.He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution particularly on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who cannot be found or located, the criminal case has been pending trial for a period of 8 years. Upon motion of the accused Erning, who invoked his right to a speedy trial, the court dismissed the case.

Eventually, the said prosecution witnesses appeared and agreed to testify. Another criminal case for homicide (now docketed as Crim. Case No. 8910) involving the same incident was filed against Erning, who moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected submitting the reason that it was not able to present said witnesses earlier because the latter went to hiding for fear of their lives.

Resolve the motion of Erning.

CASE NO. 4. . The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this Case filed by the prosecuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the liability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil.

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.

QUESTION: Is the action of the judge in not dismissing the Information, despite the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Prosecutor valid? Reason out your answer.

CASE NO. 5. On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building” owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.

On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an Information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." This information reads as follows:

The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:

That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.

The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.

Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information read as follows:

The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.

The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:

“The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash. In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, etc.. The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41, 062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections, which were done at one instance on a particular date between November 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices, etc." , it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.

When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 that had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16.

QUESTIONS: 1.WAS THE ACCUSED SUBJECTED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND INFORMATION?

2.STATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REGARDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

CASE NO. 6. At the time the accused committed the offense punishable by death, Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, required a unanimous vote of all the Justices of the Supreme Court for the imposition of death penalty. Subsequently, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted requiring an affirmative vote of only eight justices to impose the death penalty.

Is the New Judiciary Act applicable to the accused? Will it not be a case of an ex post facto law? Explain your answer.

CASE NO. 7. What do you understand by the writ of habeas corpus? It is a principle that it is not the writ itself, which is suspended, but the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What is the significance of this concept? Finally what are the grounds for the suspension of the privilege?

CASE NO. 8. On the right against self-incrimination:

a. The prosecution alleged that John swallowed the diamond, which was missing. To prove that John was the thief, the prosecution moved that John be x-rayed to show that the diamond is still in his stomach. John objected invoking his right against self-incrimination. Is the objection valid?

b. In a prosecution for adultery, the prosecution moved that the accused be subjected to a pregnancy test, on the allegation that she is pregnant. As judge would you grant the motion?

c. On a charge for falsification, the accused denied that he signed the check, and that it was a forgery. The prosecutor moved that the accused be made to sign his name three times so that specimen signatures be obtained from him. The accused objected. Is the objection proper?

CASE NO. 9. What is “custodial investigation”? What are the rights of a person under “custodial investigation”?

CASE NO. 10. The purpose of the impairment clause under the constitution is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreement against unwarranted interference by the state. As a rule, they should be respected by the legislature and tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will of the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must not be impaired.

It should be stressed at the outset, however, that the protection of the impairment clause is not absolute.

In what instances can the state validly impair a valid contract? Explain.

CASE NO. 11. The crime of murder was committed on November 25, 1987 by the accused, Jose Go. The penalty for murder pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. On December 31, 1993, R.A. 7659 took effect, which increased the penalty of murder to reclusion perpetua.

On September 21, 2001 the accused after due trial, was convicted with murder and sentenced by Judge Gone to reclusion perpetua.

The counsel of the accused objected on the penalty meted.

Is the objection valid? On what ground?

CASE NO. 12. Lopez, administrative officer of the DECS, was investigated by the COA, concerning anomalous purchases. The COA made some findings and recommended for the filing of the criminal case for graft and corruption before the Ombudsman on Dec. 22, 1993.

On July 17, 1998, the investigating Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation and agreed with the findings of the COA. He issued a Resolution on December 9, 1998 recommending the filing of criminal information against Lopez.

On Feb. 27, 1999, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito Gervacio forwarded the Resolution to Ombudsman Chief Aniano Desierto, who then filed the Information against Lopez before the Sandiganbayan on May 5, 1999.

Lopez filed a motion to dismiss the Information on the ground that there was undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed against him which violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Is the Information dismissible? Explain your answer.

CASE NO. 13. On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:

1.Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and

2.Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner:

Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent court.

In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.

The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.

In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.

The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed.

Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:

I.THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.

II.THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

RULE ON THE ASSIGNED ERRORS.

CASE NO. 14. The complaint for illegal possession of untaxed blue seal cigarettes against petitioner was filed on November 3, 1964. He was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge on December 21, 1964, manifesting likewise his readiness for trial. It was, however, postponed to January 18, 1965. Five minutes after 9:00 o'clock on that day, the case was called for trial, but neither the prosecutor nor the witnesses had as yet arrived. It took respondent Judge only twenty minutes before issuing an order of provisional dismissal, which reads thus: "This case was called for trial at exactly 9:05 A.M. without the presence of the government witnesses and the government prosecutor. In order not to prejudice the interest of the government, they were given a time extension; but according to the counsel it is now 9:25 a.m. and still we do not have here the presence of the government prosecutor and the government witnesses. In view of the apparent lack of interest on the part of the government to proceed, let this case be dismissed provisionally. The bail bond filed by the accused for his provisional release is hereby cancelled." On that very same day, January 18, 1965, the other respondent, Captain Felix C. Ochotorena, as Assistant Provincial Commander, did file anew the very same case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7732. 5 There was motion to quash by petitioner on January 27, 1965 on the ground that he had been placed in double jeopardy by virtue of the provisional dismissal on January 18, 1965. 6 Then came the order of March 6, 1965 wherein respondent Judge granted the motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact of the previous dismissal being of a provisional character. There was a motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution on March 15, 1965. Then came the challenged resolution, worded thus: "This case was dismissed by this court because of the prosecution's apparent neglect to appear when this case was called several times. ... As the present motion to reconsider is a good demonstration of prosecution's interest to proceed, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby granted and the case restored to its previous status as a pending case."( reference: G.R. No. L-25595 February 15, 1974 AGUSTIN TALADUA vs. FELIX C. OCHOTORENA, ET AL).

QUESTION: Rule on the validity of the judge’s order. IS double jeopardy present? Reason.

CASE NO. 15. The petition before us arose from a November 10, 1989 incident when the jeep ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with dust.

Irked by this incident, Mabuyo followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of Rattan Originals in Tanke, Talisay Cebu. Inquiring from a nearby security guard as to who owns the Nissan Patrol, he was informed that it belonged to and was driven by petitioner Dr. Ramon Paulin.

Later, while Mabuyo was investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr. Ramon Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a companion of the spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to call the police in Talisay and the rest to block the exit of the spouses and their lone companion.

Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon the arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the police station. On the same date, Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204. On November 20, 1989, the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave threats and oral defamation," against private respondent Mabuyo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5213.

The cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu (Branch IX), acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204. On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3, 1990.

At the hearing of Criminal Case No. 5213 on July 5, 1990, petitioners vigorously sought the setting aside of the July 3, 1990 resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the same was denied in another resolution.

Not satisfied with the resolution of respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores, petitioners filed on July 31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, which was thereafter docketed as Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207 and later re-raffled to Branch 5 stationed in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso M. Gimenez, who dismissed the petition in a decision dated December 19, 1991. The decretal portion of the decision states:

All the foregoing considered, for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure, as revised, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Public respondent is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of Crim. Case Nos. 5204 and 5213 and to decide both cases on their merits within the period provided under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued dated May 9, 1991, is hereby lifted and set aside.

Still not contented, petitioners have now resorted to the instant petition, arguing that (a) the decision of the municipal trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case against them was a judgment of acquittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating petitioners' right against double jeopardy; and (b) the regional trial court, in dismissing the petition in CEB-9207 abused its discretion as it ignored petitioners' right against double jeopardy.

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal as the same would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy.

QUESTION: Ruleon the main issue: whether double jeopardy exists.

CASE NO. 16.State whether the right of the accused was violated under the following circumstances:

1.A person charged with rape, but was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. The judge of qualified seduction instead convicted him.

2.A witness was subpoenaed on request of the accused but instead of taking steps to compel her attendance; the judge held the defense responsible for bringing her to the trial, stating that her testimony would be dispensed with if she failed to appear.

3.In a criminal case for murder, the fiscal was not ready because his witness was absent. The accused insisted on his right to speedy trial. The judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case without the accused’s express consent.

4.The accused was first prosecuted for slight physical injuries, but after he had pleaded not guilty, the charge was changed to serious physical injuries, when it appeared that the wounds inflicted on the victim after healing, had left permanent scars on his face.

5.Jose obtained sacks of rice from Maria and issued a check worth 20,000. The check bounced. He was convicted of BP 22 (Bouncing checks law). He applied for probation and was placed thereon. Later he was again charged of Estafa, based on the same act.

CASE NO. 17.State whether the right of the accused against self-incrimination is violated, in the following instances:

1.An unknown assailant murdered the victim. Three days later, Victor was arrested by the police officer, and detained in jail. In there, he confessed that he was the murderer. He further confessed that Romy and Sonny were his companions. They were made to re-enact how the crime was committed. Is the re-enactment admissible as evidence in court?

2.Victor was interviewed over the DXKD, and in said interview, he revealed the truth that it was really him who murdered the victim. Is the tape recorded/video interview admissible against Victor?

3.Victor talked to the mayor, and made the same revelation. Is said evidence admissible against him?

CASE NO. 18. On the right to bail:

1.Who have the constitutional right to bail?

2.Does a soldier under court martial custody enjoy the right to bail?

3.Robert is charged with murder. His case is still under preliminary investigation by Judge Lupos of the MTC of Polanco. In the course of the preliminary investigation, the judge arrives at a probable cause of homicide only.(Note: Murder is non-bailable, but homicide is). The judge then issued a warrant of arrest but fixed bail at 200,000 pesos. Is the judge correct?

4.Granting that the judge finds probable cause for murder, is there no way by which Robert can avail of the right to bail? Explain.

5.Mark committed estafa in the United States.He fled to the Philippines. USA filed an extradition request against him. The RTC, pursuant to the extradition proceedings issued a warrant of arrest against Mark. Does Mark have the right to be released on bail? Explain.

CASE No. 19.On the right to be presumed innocent:

1.For purposes of disqualification in an election, Section 4 of BP 52 says:” the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes beforre a civil court or military court after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact (disqualification). Is this valid?

2.Section 40 of the Local Government Code disqualifies from running for office a “ fugitive from justice in criminal or non-olitical cases here or abroad”. If applied to one who has not yet been convicted of any offense but was merely fleeing from trial, would there be a violation of the presumption of innocence?

3.Does preventive suspension pendente lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?

4.Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code says that failure of an accountable officer to produce money in his charge upon demand shall be prima facie evidence of malversation. Does such law violate the presumption of innocense of the accused?

5.Art. 315 of the RPC prescribes a period of 3 days from notice wihtin which the issuear of the check mus pay the creditor, otherwise, a prima facie inference of deceit constituting false pretence of fraudulent act shall arise. Does this offend against the contitutional presumption of innocense?

CASE NO . 20.Rosalinda is the daughter of Telesforo. She was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia (which adopts the jus soli principle). Her mother is an Australian citizen named Teresa.Telesforo was born in Daet, Camarines Norte on January 5, 1879, (where he registered as a Spanish citizen) but died in Australia at the age of 80. Rosalinda is a holder of an Australian passport and had with her an Australian Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) in 1988.

She went back to the Philippines, lived in their ancestral house in Daet, married and had children to a Filipino husband.

She ran for a congressional seat and won in the district of Daet.

Her rival files a disqualification case citing:

1.That Rosalinda is not a Filipino citizen hence disqualified for public office.

2.That under section 40 of the Local Government Code, “The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position x x x (d) those with dual citizenship.”

Rule on the two issues above cited.



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