Thursday, February 16, 2012

quizzer in citizenship

1. Rosalinda Evasco was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Western Australia, to the spouses Telesforo Evasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarinez Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.On June 27, 1962, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila.Since then she has continuously participated in the electoral processnot only as a voter but as a candidate.She served as provincial board member of Davao City,and in 1992 was elected governor of Davao City.

Her losing Opponent filed a case to oust her as governor on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen, on the following grounds: in 1988 Rosalinda registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; she was issued an Australian Passport No. H7OOO78 on March 3, 1968.

Is Rosalinda Evasco a Filipino qualified to hold the office of governor?

ANSWER: Rosalinda Evasco is a Filipino citizen, for the main reason that her father is a Filipino citizen.The Philippine Bill of 1902 provides that the child of a Filipino father is also a Filipino citizen.


2 Jose Cruz was born in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960 of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Philippines took his oath of allegiance to the United States.On March 17, 1994 he repatriated under Republic Act No. 2630.He ran for and was elected as Congressman for the Second District of Pangasinan on May 11, 1998 elections. His losing opponent filed a petition for qou warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal claiming that Jose Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under ARTICLE VI, Section 6 of the Philippine constitution. Is Jose Cruz, a natural-born Filipino?

Jose Cruz is a natural born Filipino. RA 2630 provides that repatriation resrtores to a previous Filipino his natural Filipino citizenship.


3 Jose Lopez was born on August 20, 1939.His paternal grandfather,(a Spaniard), Lorenzo Lopez was married to a Filipina. Lorenzo resided in Pangasinan and died there on September 11, 1954.The father of Jose Lopez, Mariano Lopez, a famous businessman was born on May 17, 1915, who married Maria Gomez.Their relationship did not last long. Mariano had an illicit affiar with an American woman named Betsy Ford, and from said relationship, Jose Lopez came about.

Is Jose Lopez a Filipino citizen?

Jose Lopez is a Filipino. His paternal father though a Spaniard (by nationality) resided and died in Pangasinan hence covered by the mass Filipinization by virtue of the Phil. Bill of 1902. There is not showing that he executed any act to become a Spanish citizen.Since Lorenzo is a Filipino citizen, naturally Jose Lopez follows the citizenship of this father.


4 The record shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. In their comment on this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no error committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency of evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy.

On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal having been made with their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy, citing various cases in support thereof.

Question: Was there double jeopardy?

ANSWER: There is already double jeopardy. The dismissal by reason of insufficient evidence is actually an acquittal. The accused therefore having been acquitted, naturally double jeopardy attaches. It does not matter anymore whether it was upon their motion, or their express consent. The provision is clear, that from an acquittal of the accused, the state cannot appeal, for the reason that double jeopardy attaches.


5.Is the constitutional right against self-incrimination waivable? If so how is it waived? Give an example.

The right against self-incrimination can be waived personally by the accused. Impliedly, by no objecting when said right is violated, and expressly, when he waives it voluntarily and takes the witness stand.

The right can be waived, either directly or by a failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain and unequivocal, intelligently and willingly made. Thus one who under a subpoena duces tecum voluntarily surrenders and incriminating paper which is put in evidence against him is deemed to have waived the privilege, as so too is an accused who takes the witness stand and offers testimony in his behalf.


6. Salvador Parreño (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. On January 5,1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680.

Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.

Question: Parreno questions the constitutionality of of PD 1638. Rule whether PD 1638 is constitutional or not. Explain your answer.(Parreno v.COA, G.R. No. 162224. June 7, 2007)

PD 1638 is constitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no discrimination, that citizenship requirement is a valid classification.


7. On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building” owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.

On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an Information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." This information reads as follows:

The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:

That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.

The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.

Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information read as follows:

The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.

The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:

“The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash. In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, etc.. The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41, 062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections, which were done at one instance on a particular date between November 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices, etc." , it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.

When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 that had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16.




Pursuant to the ruling in the Relova case, there is already double jeopardy. The dismissal of the case for violating the ordinance bars the prosecution of the accused in another case arising from the same act under the Revised Penal Code.

The provision states: That if an act is punishable under an ordinance and a law, an acquittal under either shall constitute double jeopardy.


8.State whether there is double jeopardy in the following situations:

a. In 1992 Jose is charged before the Provincial Prosecutor’s office with Murder. During the preliminary investigation no witnesses from the private complainants appeared. Another date is fixed. Again no witness appeared. The Prosecutor then resolved to dismiss the case on the ground that there is no evidence to hold the accused for trial.

In 1998, the private complainant appears and tell the prosecutor that his witnesses have surfaced and are now willing to testify. The Prosecutor set the case for another preliminary investigation. Jose files a motion to dismiss alleging that he cannot be tried for the same offense, as he is not put in double jeopardy, which is contrary to our constitution.

Answer: There is no double jeopardy. The accused was not arraigned on the first charge. In fact, it was not even filed in court yet. No first jeopardy therefore exists.

B. During the trial for Homicide, after he had been duly arraigned, the accused X moves for postponement for the reason that he has no counsel. The Judge granted his motion and set the case for trial. On the next hearing date, the Prosecution moved for postponement as its witness is not in Court. The Judge warned the Prosecutor that on the next hearing if he has no witness, the case shall be dismissed. On the next trial date, the Prosecutor moves for another postponement as he has not witness. The accused thru counsel moves to dismiss the case invoking his right to speedy trial. The Judge granted the same. The prosecution moves for a reconsideration. The judge did not reconsider.

Two weeks after the said dismissal, the Prosecutor refiled the same case for Homicide. The accused moves for the dismissal of the case invoking his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Is the accused correct? Explain your answer.

The accused is correct. The case was dismissed for the reason that the right of the accused to speedy trial is violated. The dismissal is tantamount to an acquittal, hence double jeopardy attaches.

c. Maria is charged with two counts of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). Considering that the penalty is lesser, she pleaded guilty to the charge and applied for probation. While her probation was pending, the Prosecutor filed another case for Estafa, involving the same transaction which lead to the filing of the BP 22 case, that is Maria issued checks in exchange for the rice which she obtained from Josefa.

Maria contends that the Estafa cases should be dismissed as she is already put in double jeopardy.

Rule on Maria’s contention. Is she correct?

There is no double jeopardy. The BP 22 is a charge under a special law, with different elements vis-à-vis the Estafa case, which is under a substantive law. It is basic that an accused cannot be put in double jeopardy under two separate offenses.

d. Mayor Tan is charged with murder before the RTC of Dipolog City. The case went on full blown trial. Eventually, Judge Romy Lim, acquitted him of the charge. The private complainant appealed the criminal case alleging that the Judge had been biased and did not correctly appreciate the evidence against the accused. Mayor Tan moves for the dismissal of the appeal alleging that he is already put in double jeopardy.

Is Mayor Tan correct? Explain your answer.

Mayor Tan is correct. An acquittal puts the accused in double jeopardy. The state cannot appeal an acquittal.

e. Luis Santos due to his reckless imprudence overran a child along the street. The child was hospitalized for about 6 months. While the child was hospitalized a case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was filed. After arraignment, the accused entered a plea guilty, in the presence of the Prosecutor and the private complainant. He was sentenced and applied for probation.

On the sixth month of the hospitalization, the child died.

The prosecution filed another case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting for Homicide.

The accused moves that the case should be dismissed as he is not put in double jeopardy.

Is his contention correct? Explain your answer.

There is already double jeopardy. When the accused pleaded guilty to the lesser charge, take note, that it was in the presence of the Prosecutor and the private complainant. There was no objection from them, hence the supervening event cannot be made applicable anymore. [(refer to Rule 117, sec 7(c)]


9. Define and distinguish, ex post facto law and bill of attainder.

An ex post facto law is a criminal law that is given retroactive effect, which is not beneficial to the accused who is not a recidivist.

A bill of attainder is a piece of legislation that punishes without the benefit of trial.


10. A criminal complaint was filed stating that “ the above-named accused with intent to gain did then and there willfully,unlawfully and feloniously owe to Jose Cruz, the sum of 10,000 pesos,Philippine currency; that said amount had long been due since January 28, 1979 and that the accused failed to pay her account inspite of due notice.

On the basis of said complaint, the Judge issued a warrant of arrest. IS the action of the judge correct? Explain.

WRONG. The complaint refers only to debt, and it is basic that no person shall be imprisoned for non-payment of debt.The warrant of arrest therefore is uncalled for. The obligation to pay in this case is merely a civil one, not criminal in nature, since there was not mention of deceit to categorize it as Estafa.(Serafin v. Lindayag, 67 Scra 166)


11. It was discovered that there is a shortage of cash collections in one of the PAL ticketing offices in Baguio City. A team was sent to conduct the investigation. During the investigation, Mr. Juan Cruz, readily admitted that it was him who used the amount of 90,000 pesos which he used to hospitalize his sick daughter stricken with cancer. He signed a promissory note admitting his liability.

A week after, a criminal case for estafa was filed against him.During the trial, the promissory note which he signed was used as evidence against him. He objected saying that it violated his right as an accused for the reason that he signed the same without the assistance of counsel, neither was he informed of his right to have counsel during that investigation.

Is he correct?

He is wrong. The rights of the accused is not applicable in the case at bar, for the main reason that he was not under custodial investigation. By custodial investigation is meant that a private person is investigated by government enforcement agents and deprived of his freedom (i.e. place under custody). Note that the PAL committee which investigated him are not government enforcement agents. HE was not even a suspect yet, he just volunteered to tell the truth.

Hence there being no violation of his right, the evidence is admissible. (PP. v. Ayson)


12. Lopez, administrative officer of the DECS, was investigated by the COA, concerning anomalous purchases. The COA made some findings and recommended for the filing of the criminal case for graft and corruption before the Ombudsman on Dec. 22, 1993.

On July 17, 1998, the investigating Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation and agreed with the findings of the COA. He issued a Resolution on December 9, 1998 recommending the filing of criminal information against Lopez.

On Feb. 27, 1999, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito Gervacio forwarded the Resolution to Ombudsman Chief Aniano Desierto, who then filed the Information against Lopez before the Sandiganbayan on May 5, 1999.

Lopez filed a motion to dismiss the Information on the ground that there was undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed against him which violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Is the Information dismissible? Explain your answer.

The information is dismissible. In one case, the SC ruled that a delay in the filing of the information results to the denial of the accused to his right to a speedy disposition of his case, which is already a violation of his constitutional right. From 1993 to 1999, or six years, is already considered a delay.


13. On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:

1.Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and

2.Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner:

Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent court.

In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.

The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.

In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.

The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed.

Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:




Answer: The judge did not err. The extradition treaty can be given retroactive effect as it is not considered a criminal law. Take note that the retroactivity principle is only applicable to criminal law. (Wright v. CA)


14. The complaint for illegal possession of untaxed blue seal cigarettes against petitioner was filed on November 3, 1964. He was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge on December 21, 1964, manifesting likewise his readiness for trial. It was, however, postponed to January 18, 1965. Five minutes after 9:00 o'clock on that day, the case was called for trial, but neither the prosecutor nor the witnesses had as yet arrived. It took respondent Judge only twenty minutes before issuing an order of provisional dismissal, which reads thus: "This case was called for trial at exactly 9:05 A.M. without the presence of the government witnesses and the government prosecutor. In order not to prejudice the interest of the government, they were given a time extension; but according to the counsel it is now 9:25 a.m. and still we do not have here the presence of the government prosecutor and the government witnesses. In view of the apparent lack of interest on the part of the government to proceed, let this case be dismissed provisionally. The bail bond filed by the accused for his provisional release is hereby cancelled." On that very same day, January 18, 1965, the other respondent, Captain Felix C. Ochotorena, as Assistant Provincial Commander, did file anew the very same case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7732. 5 There was motion to quash by petitioner on January 27, 1965 on the ground that he had been placed in double jeopardy by virtue of the provisional dismissal on January 18, 1965. 6 Then came the order of March 6, 1965 wherein respondent Judge granted the motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact of the previous dismissal being of a provisional character. There was a motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution on March 15, 1965. Then came the challenged resolution, worded thus: "This case was dismissed by this court because of the prosecution's apparent neglect to appear when this case was called several times. ... As the present motion to reconsider is a good demonstration of prosecution's interest to proceed, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby granted and the case restored to its previous status as a pending case."( reference: G.R. No. L-25595 February 15, 1974 AGUSTIN TALADUA vs. FELIX C. OCHOTORENA, ET AL).

QUESTION: Rule on the validity of the judge’s order. IS double jeopardy present? Reason.

The order of the judge is invalid. IT was capriciously done. It deprived the prosecution of due process as the dismissal was unreasonable and whimsical. The court’s abuse of its discretion amounted to a loss of jurisdiction. There being no jurisdiction, double jeopardy did not attach.


15. State whether the right of the accused was violated under the following circumstances:

1.A person charged with rape, but was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. The judge of qualified seduction instead convicted him.

The elements of rape are different from qualified seduction. TO convict him of qualified seduction is a violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, as the same was not duly recited in the Information, thus depriving him of the right to adduce evidence in this behalf and confront the charge.

2.A witness was subpoenaed on request of the accused but instead of taking steps to compel her attendance; the judge held the defense responsible for bringing her to the trial, stating that her testimony would be dispensed with if she failed to appear.

The right of the accused to compulsory process is denied of him by the judge.

3.In a criminal case for murder, the fiscal was not ready because his witness was absent. The accused insisted on his right to speedy trial. The judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case without the accused’s express consent.

There is denial of the state’s right to adduce evidence. There is no showing that the fiscal had been remiss in producing his witnesses. There is therefore no violation of the right of the accused’s right to speedy trial. There is no showing that the delay is unreasonable.

4.The accused was first prosecuted for slight physical injuries, but after he had pleaded not guilty, the charge was changed to serious physical injuries, when it appeared that the wounds inflicted on the victim after healing, had left permanent scars on his face.

There is no violation of the right of the accused for the reason of the supervening event, which of course, justifies for the amendment of the complaint.

5.Jose obtained sacks of rice from Maria and issued a check worth 20,000. The check bounced. He was convicted of BP 22 (Bouncing checks law). He applied for probation and was placed thereon. Later he was again charged of Estafa, based on the same act.

THERE is no violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. BP 22 and Estafa are distinct offenses.


16. On the right to be presumed innocent:

1.For purposes of disqualification in an election, Section 4 of BP 52 says:” the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military court after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact (disqualification). Is this valid?

There is a violation of the presumption of innocence. The mere filing is not yet a conviction, which should disqualify the candidate.

2.Section 40 of the Local Government Code disqualifies from running for office a “ fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad”. If applied to one who has not yet been convicted of any offense but was merely fleeing from trial, would there be a violation of the presumption of innocence?

There is a violation. A fugitive from justice should mean a person convicted of an offense. Since the disqualification refers to a person not yet convicted, then the violation applies.

3.Does preventive suspension pendente lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?

NO. A preventive suspension is not yet a penalty, but merely a preventive measure.

4.Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code says that failure of an accountable officer to produce money in his charge upon demand shall be prima facie evidence of malversation. Does such law violate the presumption of innocense of the accused?

NO. What is touched upon here is only the reversal of the presentation of evidence or the burden of proof which is shifted to the accused.

5.Art. 315 of the RPC prescribes a period of 3 days from notice within which the issuer of the check must pay the creditor, otherwise, a prima facie inference of deceit constituting false pretence of fraudulent act shall arise. Does this offend against the constitutional presumption of innocence?

NO. What is shifted is only the burden of proof. The accused is still presumed innocent.


17. Rosalinda is the daughter of Telesforo. She was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia (which adopts the jus soli principle). Her mother is an Australian citizen named Teresa.Telesforo was born in Daet, Camarines Norte on January 5, 1879, (where he registered as a Spanish citizen) but died in Australia at the age of 80. Rosalinda is a holder of an Australian passport and had with her an Australian Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) in 1988.

She went back to the Philippines, lived in their ancestral house in Daet, married and had children to a Filipino husband.

She ran for a congressional seat and won in the district of Daet.

Her rival files a disqualification case citing:

1.That Rosalinda is not a Filipino citizen hence disqualified for public office.

2.That under section 40 of the Local Government Code, “The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position x x x (d) those with dual citizenship.”

Rule on the two issues above cited.

Rosalinda is not a Filipino citizen. Her father Telesforo is a Spanish citizen, hence she adopts his citizenship. In fact, her mother is an Australian citizen, and she was also born in Australia. By all means, she is an Australian citizen. Her marriage to a Filipino does not make her automatically a Filipino citizen. She has to prove yet that she does not have the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.


18.What is the meaning of a “supervening event”? What are the 3 requirements for the supervening event principle to apply? (see your book, this is just a bonus question)


19.State whether the following officials can issue a warrant of arrest (a) Secretary of Labor (b) Comelec Commissioner (c) MTC judge (d) Immigration and Deportation Secretary (e) Chief of Police

Only the judge under our constitution can issue a warrant of arrest. The immigration and deportation can issue a warrant only if there is a court order which says that the alien is already adjudged to be deported. Hence, for purpose of investigation, the immigration secretary cannot order the arrest of an alien.


20. Juan is charged with direct assault. He was arraigned and trial proceeded. He pleaded guilty. Later on based on the same act, he was charged again with serious physical injuries. Is the prosecutor in error in charging him again? Explain.

Yes, the prosecutor is in error. The accused is already put in double jeopardy for the reason that the elements of direct assault is basically the same offense to serious physical injuries. By sameness of offense means that when some elements of the offense (i.e physical injuries are found in another offense i.e. direct assault) then double jeopardy attaches.

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