Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 174588 December 11, 2013 DAV AO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES GLORIA ESPINO SALIGA and CESAR SALIGA, and SPOUSES DEMETRIO EHARA and ROBERTA SUGUE EHARA, Respondents.

The subject property had been

reclassified as non-agricultural prior

to June 15, 1988; hence, they are no

longer covered by R.A. No. 6657

At the core of the controversy is the questioned reclassification of the property to non-agricultural uses. This issue is intertwined with and on which depends the resolution of the issue concerning the claimed agricultural leasehold relationship.

In reversing the PARAD and holding that the property was still agricultural, the DARAB considered the Comprehensive Development Plan (approved by the HSRC through Board Resolution R-39-4 dated July 31, 1980) and Davao City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 (adopting the Comprehensive Development Plan) as invalid reclassification measures. It gave as reason the absence of the requisite certification from the HLURB and the approval of the DAR. In the alternative, and citing P.D. No. 27, in relation with R.A. No. 6657, as basis, the DARAB considered the alleged reclassification ineffective so as to free the property from the legal effects of P.D. No. 27 that deemed it taken under the government’s operation land transfer (OLT) program as of October 21, 1972.

We differ from, and cannot accept, the DARAB’s position.

We hold that the property had been reclassified to non-agricultural uses and was, therefore, already outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) after it took effect on July 15, 1988.

1. Power of the local government units to

reclassify lands from agricultural to nonagricultural

uses; the DAR approval is not

required

Indubitably, the City Council of Davao City has the authority to adopt zoning resolutions and ordinances. Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 226430 (the then governing Local Government Code), municipal and/or city officials are specifically empowered to "adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission."31

In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court held that this power of the local government units to reclassify or convert lands to non-agricultural uses is not subject to the approval of the DAR.33 There, the Court affirmed the authority of the Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning classification and to reclassify the property in dispute from agricultural to residential through the Council’s Kapasiyahang Bilang 30, as approved by the HSRC.

In the subsequent case of Junio v. Secretary Garilao,34 this Court clarified, once and for all, that "with respect to areas classified and identified as zonal areas not for agricultural uses, like those approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15, 1988, the DAR’s clearance is no longer necessary for conversion."35 The Court in that case declared the disputed landholding as validly reclassified from agricultural to residential pursuant to Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod.

Citing the cases of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. and Junio, this Court arrived at significantly similar ruling in the case of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) v. Nicolas.36

Based on these considerations, we hold that the property had been validly reclassified as non-agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988. We note the following facts established in the records that support this conclusion: (1) the Davao City Planning and Development Board prepared the Comprehensive Development Plan for the year 1979-2000 in order to provide for a comprehensive zoning plan for Davao City; (2) the HSRC approved this Comprehensive Development Plan through Board Resolution R-39-4 dated July 31, 1980; (3) the HLURB confirmed the approval per the certification issued on April 26, 2006;37 (4) the City Council of Davao City adopted the Comprehensive Development Plan through its Resolution No. 894 and City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982;38 (5) the Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator expressly certified on June 15, 1995 that per City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 as amended by S.P. Resolution No. 2843, Ordinance No. 561, series of 1992, the property (located in barangay Catalunan Pequeño) is within an "urban/urbanizing" zone;39 (6) the Office of the City Agriculturist confirmed the above classification and further stated that the property is not classified as prime agricultural land and is not irrigated nor covered by an irrigation project as certified by the National Irrigation Administration, per the certification issued on December 4, 1998;40 and (7) the HLURB, per certification dated May 2, 1996,41 quoted the April 8, 1996 certification issued by the Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator stating that "the Mintal District which includes barangay Catalunan Pequeño, is identified as one of the ‘urbaning [sic] district centers and priority areas and for development and investments’ in Davao City."

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 200454 October 22, 2014 HOLY TRINITY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ, LORENZO MANALAYSAY, RICARDO MARCELO, JR. and LEONCIO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

The Dakila property was not an agricultural land within the coverage of R.A.No. 6657 or P.D. No. 27

The CA declared that the Dakila property as an agricultural land; and that there was no valid reclassification under Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 because the law required an ordinance, not a resolution.

We agree in part with the CA.

Under Republic Act No. 7160, local government units, such as the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, are vested with the power to reclassify lands. However, Section 20, Chapter II, Title I of Republic Act No. 7160 ordains:

Section 20. Reclassification of Lands. – (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or(2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be passed after the conduct of public hearings.

The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. Given the foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution was ineffectual for that purpose. A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinionof the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was temporary in nature, and differed from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed a general and permanent character.49 We also note that the petitioner did not show if the requisite public hearings were conducted at all.In the absence of any valid and complete reclassification,therefore, the Dakila property remained under the category of an agricultural land.

Nonetheless, the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 171674 August 4, 2009 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), represented by HON. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, in his capacity as DAR OIC-Secretary, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN S. TONGSON, Respondent.

The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An emancipation patent constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner.³⁰G.R. No. 168533, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 627, 640.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 153817 March 31, 2006 NOLITO D. SOLMAYOR, VICENTE LASTIMA, JUANITO B. SUAREZ, GERVACIO BATAUSA (dec.) represented by Antonio Batausa, VICTORIANO CANDIA, PRIMITIVO BORRES (dec.) represented by Rogelio Borres, TIBURCIO MANULAT (dec.) represented by Teresita Manulat Palaca, PATRICIO ASTACAAN, JUANITO AMIGABLE, OZITA MENDOZA, LUIS CANDOG (dec.) represented by Jovencia Candog and SABINO CELADES (dec.) represented by Sergia Estante, Petitioners, vs. ANTONIO L. ARROYO, Respondent.

The crux of this case is whether or not grounds exist to warrant the cancellation of CLTs and EPs issued to appellees as the identified tenant-beneficiaries on the land. The determination of this issue in turn hinges on the question of whether or not the subject land is exempt under OLT coverage of PD 27.

In the recent case of Eudosia Daez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000, the Supreme Court set forth the requirements for coverage under the OLT program in this wise:

"PD 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT Program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either for [sic] those requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT.

x x x x

Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops."

Guided by the foregoing, it is essential to determine whether or not tenancy relationship exists between Mr. Arroyo and the appellees. In the absence of the all important element of tenancy, the subject land falls outside OLT coverage of PD 27 even if incidentally it is devoted to rice and/or corn. In the case of Prudential Bank vs. Gapultos, 181 SCRA 160 [1990], the Supreme Court lists the requisites essential for the establishment of tenancy relationship, thus:

"The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws."

x x x x

 

Applying the above-stated requirements in the case at bar, we find the absence of tenancy relationship between the parties. Firstly, subject land is not an agricultural land, as the term is understood. Uncontroverted evidence shows that the subject land had been classified as residential/commercial even prior to the effectivity of PD 27. Per Official Zoning Map of the City of Davao adopted under Resolution No. 711, Ordinance No. 281, s. of 1972 (p. 243, Records), the land was classified as "Commercial Zone and Residential Zone Class B". This classification confirmed the residential character of the subject land as appearing in Mr. Arroyo’s tax declarations filed way back in 1968 (pp. 187-190, Records). x x x

The residential character of the subject property is likewise confirmed by the following government agencies or offices:

1. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Davao City, which issued a Zoning Certification to the effect that the subject land is within the Residential/Commercial Zone under the Zoning Ordinance of Davao City adopted through a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution and ratified by the HLURB, through Board Resolution No. 39-4, s. of 1980 dated July 31, 1980 (p. 208, Records).

2. The Office of the Zoning Administrator, City of Davao, certifying to the effect that the subject land is within a Residential Zone Class "B" in the Zonification Ordinance of Davao City (p. 126, Records).

3. The Bureau of Soils of then Ministry of Agriculture, Davao City, which submitted a Certification to the effect that the subject land is suitable for urban use/housing projects (p. 127, Records).

4. The Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator, certifying to the effect that the subject land was classified as Major Commercial Zone (C-2) and High Density Residential Zone (R-2) in the City Ordinance No. 363, s. of 1982 or better known as Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City (p. 160, Records).

To cap it all, even the DAR Provincial Task Force on Illegal Conversion, after conducting on April 10, 2000 an investigation on the reported illegal conversion of the subject land, admitted on its report of June 2, 2000 that it is no longer agricultural, it being classified as commercial and residential zones. Consequently, they ruled out any act of illegal conversion. 

x x x

 

Secondly, the records show that the land in dispute was never intended for agricultural production. For one, no agricultural improvements were introduced upon the land since its acquisition by Mr. Arroyo in 1951. In fact, for more than a decade since 1972, the disputed land was subject of numerous business proposals (attached to Appeal/Memorandum) from various land developers for purposes of developing it into a residential and commercial area. For another, the subject property is situated in a commercial and residential area. As the records show, it is adjacent to the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) subdivision and other residential or commercial establishments, and surrounded by GSIS Heights, Villa Josefina Subdivision, Flores Village, Central Park Subdivision, Poly Subdivision, San Miguel Village, New Matina Golf Club, Davao Memorial Park, Shrine of the Infant Jesus, Matina Public Market and Venees hotel.

The fact that appellees may perhaps have planted rice or corn on the said land, situated in the middle of what appears to be a fast growing residential and business area in the heart of a metropolitan area, is of little moment. Such agricultural activity cannot, by any strained interpretation of law, amount to converting the land in question into agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian reform program of the government. The Supreme Court in Hilario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra) held that:

"x x x. But even if the claim of the private respondent that some corn was planted on the lots is true, this does not convert residential land into agricultural land.

The presumption assumed by the appellate court, that a parcel of land which is located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes, is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed residential, or commercial or non-agricultural unless there is clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural." (underlining supplied)

Clearly, therefore, two (2) requisites – that the land is agricultural and that the purpose thereof is agricultural production – necessary to establish the existence of tenancy relationship between Mr. Arroyo and the appellees are absent. On the other requirements for the creation of tenancy relationship, suffice it to reiterate the well-established rule that "[A]ll these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws" (Prudential Bank v. Gapultos, supra).

Laches is principally a doctrine of equity. Courts apply laches to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.¹² The principle of laches finds no application in the present case. There is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondent’s claim for compensation. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use.

Eminent domain is the inherent power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare.¹³ No one questions NIA’s authority to exercise the delegated power of eminent domain. However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless. NIA cannot exercise the power with wanton disregard for property rights. One basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that, "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."¹⁴

The thirteen-year interval between the execution of the 1980 deeds of sale and the filing of the complaint in 1993 does not bar respondent’s claim for compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Campos, Jr.,¹⁵ this Court reiterated the long-standing rule "that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe."¹⁶

Thus, in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr.¹⁷ the Court allowed the landowners to seek compensation twenty-six years after the government took their land. In Amigable v. Cuenca, etc., et al.,¹⁸ Amigable filed an action to claim compensation more than thirty years after the government constructed the roads on her lot. In both cases, the property owners were silent for several years before finally bringing their claims to the attention of the authorities. In contrast, in the present case, respondent has steadfastly pursued his claim with NIA since 1972.

NIA faults respondent for "desisting from claiming just compensation from NIA in 1980,"¹⁹ referring to the 1980 deeds of sale which were never implemented. NIA conveniently fails to mention that, as the other party to the 1980 deeds of sale, it was equally delinquent when it failed to perform its obligations under the deeds.

NIA is partly to blame for the delay in this case. The trial and appellate courts found that NIA stalled and prolonged negotiations with respondent. Eight years passed before NIA even offered to buy the area occupied by the canals. More than three decades later, respondent has yet to receive an iota of compensation from NIA. In the meantime, NIA has been charging respondent and the other farmers in the area irrigation fees for the beneficial use of these canals.²⁰

NIA’s conduct shows callous disregard for the rights of the Property’s owners and for NIA’s own duties under the law. As the expropriating agency in this case, NIA should have instituted the proceedings necessary to acquire the private property it took for public purpose and to compensate the Property’s owners. Section 2(e) of RA 3601, as amended by PD 552, expressly states that the NIA should "exercise the right of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the institution of expropriation proceedings."²¹

The exercise of eminent domain entails payment of just compensation. Otherwise, title over the expropriated property cannot pass to the government.²² Following its own enabling law, NIA should have taken steps to acquire the affected portion of the Property either through "any mode of acquisition" or "the institution of expropriation proceedings."²³ RA 3601, as amended, does not authorize NIA to simply appropriate part of the Property without instituting legal proceedings or compensating respondent.

G.R. No. 147245. March 31, 2005

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO DIAZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE MANUEL DIAZ, Respondents

XXX

Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government."⁴⁰ This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation.⁴¹

In affirming the trial court’s award, the Court of Appeals cited Garcia v. Court of Appeals,⁴² which provides an exception to the rule. In Garcia, the Court held that when the government takes property, not for the purpose of eminent domain, and the government does not initiate condemnation proceedings or other attempts to acquire such property, just compensation should be reckoned not at the time of taking but at the time the trial court made its order of expropriation.⁴³

However, the Garcia ruling does not apply to the present case. The 15,677, 1,897 and 4,499 square meter portions – a total of 22,073 square meters ("Canal Sites") – of the Property identified in the 1980 deeds of sale are occupied by irrigation canals. There is no dispute that the Canal Sites serve a public purpose because the canals provide much-needed irrigation to farms in the locality. There is also no dispute that when NIA actually took over the Canal Sites, the purpose was to exercise NIA’s delegated power of eminent domain.

Just compensation for the Canal Sites must thus be computed as of the time of taking. In this case, respondent does not contest that NIA’s valuation of P1.39 per square meter was the approximate fair market value of the Property in 1972. Respondent even agreed to this price when he signed the 1980 deeds of sale. At the least, P1.39 per square meter was "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price."⁴⁴

Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."¹³ The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights.¹⁴ As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped by any other branch or official of the government."¹⁵ Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.¹⁶ In National Power Corporation v. Bagui,¹⁷ where the same petitioner also invoked the provisions of Section 3A of RA No. 6395, we held that:

Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.¹⁸

Content-neutral restrictions (also called non-content-based restrictions)

Content-neutral restrictions (also called non-content-based restrictions) regulate speech without regard to its subject matter or the viewpoint conveyed.^[1] The Supreme Court has held that the “government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”^[2] Such content-neutral restrictions may be permissible even when they incidentally affect the content of speech to some degree because, in most cases, such regulations “pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.”^[3]

Examples of content-neutral restrictions that have been held to be constitutional include laws that restrict the distribution of printed materials to prevent litter in a public space^[4] or laws that prohibit the use of loudspeakers in order to reduce noise.^[5] Facially neutral regulations, however, can be invalid if they have a disproportionate effect on a particular type of speech or expression.^[6]