examination sample

1.In the famous case of Salonga v. Paño (134 SCRA 438), the Supreme Court introduced the “symbolic function” principle. What do you understand by this “symbolic function of the Supreme Court”? Explain using the factual background of the case.

2.Decide whether the right against self-incrimination is violated under the following circumstances:

A.in a rape case it was alleged as an aggravating circumstance, that the rapist infected the victim with gonorrhea. The prosecution moved for the medical examination of the accused to check whether he has gonorrhea. The defense objected, invoking the right of the accused to self-incrimination.

B. In a theft case, the prosecution alleged that the diamond was swallowed by the accused, and moves that the accused be subjected to an x-ray examination.

C. In a falsification case, the prosecution wants to prove that it was the accused that signed the falsified indorsements in the check. It moves that the accused be compelled to submit his specimen signatures, or if there are none, for the accused to write three legible signatures on a blank piece of paper.

D. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee summoned the Secretary of Agriculture to appear before it to answer questions relative to the alleged unlawful disbursement of funds. He refused to appear and answer questions invoking his right against self-incrimination.

E.The prosecution did not have any other witness to prove its case, and would want to use the accused as hostile witness to testify. The accused refused to testify. The prosecution files a motion for a subpoena ad testificandum to compel the accused to testify.

3. a. What do you understand by the term “custodial investigation”?

b. Facts: The evidence shows that at around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, 37, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water.

The accused, Tampus, 27, and Avila, 28, prisoners in the same penal institution, who were tubercular patients in the hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted eight incised wounds on Saminado while Avila stabbed him nine times. Saminado died upon arrival at eleven o'clock on that same morning in the prison hospital.

Right after the murder, Tampus and Avila revealed to the jail guard that they murdered Saminado as they were motivated by revenge.

They executed affidavits, without the assistance of counsel, concerning the truth.

As they were dangerous criminals, the Court decided to conduct trial right in the national penitentiary. A public attorney assisted the accused during arraignment and trial.During trial the accused testified and admitted the killing himself.

The accused were convicted and sentenced to death.

On appeal, the defense states that the conviction of the accused be reversed, as his rights as accused were duly violated: (a) the confession was unlawful (b) he was not afforded his right to a public and impartial trial as the trial was conducted in the penitentiary (c) all the time he was under custodial investigation, and his rights as an accused, i.e., the right to remain silent, and to be informed of said right, and his right to have an independent and competent counsel of his own choosing were grossly violated (d) That during the time when the accused testified about his admission of the killing the Court did not advise him of his right to remain silent.

Rule on the issues raised by the defense. Would you reverse the conviction?

4.Facts: Jose Cruz upon suspicion of the military that he is an accomplice of the MNLF, was arrested in Siocon, Zamboang del Norte on January 5, 2006.He was then detained in the Provincial Jail, yet not charge has yet been formally filed against him. He wants to be released as he missed his family in Dapitan City.He files a petitin for a writ of habeas corpus with a supplementary motion that he be released on bail.The judge refused to grant him bail, on the ground that there is yet no charge and he has no way of fixing the amount of bail, as there is no criminal charge to base his computation of the bail.

Is the Judge correct? In short, can a person file his bail despite the fact that he is not yet charged of any offense? Cite a case.

5. The former secretary Dinky Soliman is charged by Party List Representative Marcoleta with Grave Oral Defamation, now pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.A warrant of arrest was issued against her, on a finding of probable cause, and bail was fixed by the Court at 12,000 pesos. Dinky was then attending a conference in Vietnam, and hence could not be served with such warrant. Upon knowing the warrant of arrest, Dinky called her husband to post the necessary bond. The Court refused the bailbond, and insisted on the warrant of arrest. Dinky claims that the government is persecuting her, knowing that she is against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Is the refusal of the Court to accept the bailbond violative of the right of Dinky Soliman on her right to bail?

6.In a murder case, three accused-brothers were indicted. The prosecution presented five witnesses, after which it rested its case. A public attorney defended the accused who were poor, and whose father was a noted ex-convict. The two accused testified, and due to series of postponements caused by the defense counsel, as he was still looking for witnesses, the Judge finally considered the case submitted for decision. The defense counsel asked for another final setting so that the thrid accused could also testify on his behalf. Another setting was made, but the same was again postponed, for reason not attributable to the accused. The Judge issued an order requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of 30 days.

After a lapse of 30 days the Judge issued a judgment convictng the three accused.

On appeal the accused moved for a reversal of judgment, on the ground that the right of the accused to be heard was violated.

Rule on the issue.

7. State whether the right of the accused “to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him is violated” under the following circumstances:

a. An accused was charged with rape, but the evidence presented points that he can be liable only for qualified seduction. The judge acquitted him of rape, but convicted him of qualified seduction as warranted by the evidence presented, rationalizing that justice to the victim so demands the proper conviction.

b. the charge for rape was not conclusively proved (i.e. reasonable doubt), but the court nevertheless sentenced the accused to pay the accused civil liability of 100,000 pesos for having caused the death of the victim, who committed suicide two days after the alleged rape.

c.the accused was charged with robbery with homicide.Detained at the provincial jail, he escaped and went at-large. The trial judge set the case for trial, and based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, convicted the accused, on the ground that his having escaped shall be considered as waiver on his part to present his evidence..

d.accused was charged with murder, and on the basis of plea bargaining, the accused entered a plea of guilty to homicide. Later on he changed his mind, and in questioning his conviction of homicide, he claims that he was never charged on homicide, hence he was never informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

e. Accused was charged with serious physical injuries, trial ensued. The prosecution presented evidence showing that the victim finally died. The court convicted him with homicide pursuant to the evidence presented.

8.Jose Lopez was born on August 20, 1939.His paternal grandfather,(a Spaniard), Lorenzo Lopez was married to a Filipina. Lorenzo resided in Pangasinan and died there on September 11, 1954.The father of Jose Lopez, Mariano Lopez, a famous businessman was born on May 17, 1915, who married Maria Gomez.Their relationship did not last long. Mariano had an illicit affair with an American woman named Betsy Ford, and from said relationship, Jose Lopez came about.

Is Jose Lopez a Filipino citizen?

9. Jose Cruz was born in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960 of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Philippines took his oath of allegiance to the United States.On March 17, 1994 he repatriated under Republic Act No. 2630.He ran for and was elected as Congressman for the Second District of Pangasinan on May 11, 1998 elections. His losing opponent filed a petition for qou warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal claiming that Jose Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under ARTICLE VI, Section 6 of the Philippine constitution. Is Jose Cruz, a natural-born Filipino?

10. Rosalinda Evasco was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Western Australia, to the spouses Telesforo Evasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarinez Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.On June 27, 1962, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila.Since then she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate.She served as provincial board member of Davao City,and in 1992 was elected governor of Davao City.

Her losing Opponent filed a case to oust her as governor on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen, on the following grounds: in 1988 Rosalinda registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; she was issued an Australian Passport No. H7OOO78 on March 3, 1968.

Is Rosalinda Evasco a Filipino qualified to hold the office of governor?

11. Raffy, Carly and Josey were accused of murder before the RTC of Dipolog. Accused Josey turned state witness against his co-accused, and was accordingly discharged from the Information. Among the evidence presented by the prosecution was an extrajudicial confession made by Josey during the custodial investigation, implicating Raffy and Carly who, he said, together with him (Josey) committed the crime. The Extrajudicial confession was executed without the assistance of counsel.

Accused Raffy and Carly vehemently objected on the ground that the said extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against them.

Rule whether the said Extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence or not.

.

12.For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with homicide before the RTC of Dipolog. He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who cannot be found or located, the criminal case has been pending for a period of seven years. Upon motion of the accused Erning who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case.

Eventually, the said prosecution witnesses surfaced and a criminal case for homicide, involving the same incident was filed against Erning, who filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected reasoning that it was not able to present said witnesses earlier because they went into hiding for fear of their lives.

Is there really double jeopardy to warrant the dismissal of the case? Reason out your answer.

13. A Tamaraw FX was driven by Asiong, who was drunk, sideswiped a pedestrian along Quezon Avenue, Dipolog City, resulting in physical injuries to the latter. The prosecutor filed two separate Informations against Asiong, the first for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, and the second for violation of an ordinance in Dipolog City prohibiting and penalizing driving under the influence of liquor.

Asiong was arraigned, tried and convicted for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. With regard to the second case (i.e. violation of the city ordinance), upon being arraigned he filed a motion to quash the information invoking his right against double jeopardy. He contended that, under Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall const9tute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. He argued that the two criminal charges against him stemmed from the same act of driving allegedly under the influence of liquor which caused the accident.

Was there double jeopardy? Explain.

14. The crime of murder was committed on November 25, 1987 by the accused, Jose Go. The penalty for murder pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. On December 31, 1993, R.A. 7659 took effect, which increased the penalty of murder to reclusion perpetua.

On September 21, 2001 the accused after due trial, was convicted with murder and sentenced by Judge Gone to reclusion perpetua.

The counsel of the accused objected on the penalty meted.

Is the objection valid? On what ground?

15. The record shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. In their comment on this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no error committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency of evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy.

On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal having been made with their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy, citing various cases in support thereof.

Question: Was there double jeopardy?

16. The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975 (Case No. 3335) was as follows:

That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at Aquino Nobleza St., Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would have required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto attached.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 93-94, Record)

Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335. After conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28, 1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241) for serious physical injuries as follows:

That on or about April 12, 1975, in the Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, armed with pieces of stone did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw pieces of stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting him on the lower right eye which would heal from five (5) to nine (9) days barring complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right face of said Miguel Viajar.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 94-95, Record)

On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted.

Question:Is he correct? Why?

17.On 11 May 1978, an information charging petitioner with having violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, was filed with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Surigao del Norte (docketed Criminal Case No. 299). It read:

That on or before January 27, 1978 in the municipality of del Carmen, Province of Surigao del Norte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused who is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte and while a Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the aforestated school therefore was holding in trust moneys and/or properties of the government of the Republic of the Philippines and holding in trust public funds with all freedom, intelligence, criminal intent and intent of gain, did then and there voluntarily, unlawfully, feloniously and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines in the total sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS and SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P16,483.62), Philippine Currency, which total sum accused failed to account during an audit and failed as well to restitute despite demands by the office of the Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the Government equal to the amount misappropriated.

Act contrary to par. 4 of Article 217, of the Revised Penal Code with a penalty of Reclusion Temporal, minimum and medium periods and in addition to penalty of perpetual special disqualification and fine as provided in the same Article. 1

A warrant of arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, but accused-petitioner Ernesto Navallo still then could not be found.

Meanwhile, on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.

On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. On 27 January 1989, Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was docketed (Criminal Case No. 13696) with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. The bond, having been later found to be defective, on 30 August 1989, a new bond was approved and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan.

Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.

Question; Is Navallo correct in claiming that he was subjected to double jeopardy?

18. Petitioner Manuel P. Martinez was charged by the assistant prosecutor of Manila before the RTC of a crime of libel in the complaint of private respondent Salvador H. Laurel where in Martinez allegedly wrote derogatory and scurrilous imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in his article entitled “The Sorrows of Laurel” published in his Manila Times column Narrow Gate. Martinez filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was denied by trial judge. Thereafter, the case was set for arraignment and pre-trial but this was cancelled due to the retirement of the trial judge. Two months after the arraignment and pre-trial was cancelled, private respondent Laurel filed a motion to set the case for arraignment and pre-trial under the successor of the retired judge. In the meantime, petitioner Martinez filed a petition with the DOJ seeking for review of the resolution of City Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel against him. Accordingly, 3^rd Asst. City Prosecutor filed a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by DOJ of Martinez’ petition for review, which was granted by the successor judge. But then again, private respondent filed a motion to set the case for arraignment and pre-trial. No action was taken on his said motion. Five months after, the DOJ thru Acting Justice Secretary Bello III sent a letter to City Prosecutor of Manila declared inter alia that while the language used in the article maybe unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as libel, as if embodied merely on opinion protected as a privileged communication under Art. 354 of the RPC. The appealed resolution was therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was directed to cause the dismissal of the information filed against Manuel F. Martinez. Consequently, a motion to dismiss of the above case was filed and set for hearing. At the hearing, complainant’s counsel manifested that he had received no copy of the motion to dismiss, then the trial court directed the case prosecutor to furnish him a copy and shall given ten (10) days to respond thereto but it was found out that the case prosecutor has not complied with the order of the court. Coming as it does from the officials having control of the prosecution and at this stage of the proceedings, there being no objection, the motion to dismiss was granted. Thereafter, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals on the order of dismissal of the case.

QUESTION::

1. Does the appeal against the order of dismissal on the above foreclosed by the rule of double jeopardy?

19. Before us for review, on appeal by the People of the Philippines, is an order, dated January 8, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing, upon motion of the defense, an indictment for rape against Willy Obsania. On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery.

After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".

The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.

QUESTION:

1. Are lewd designs an indispensable element that should be alleged in the complaint?

2. Does the present appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?

20. Private respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo while riding on a jeepney was overtaken and smothered in dust by a Nissan Patrol which he later ascertained to be owned and ridden by Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, herein petitioners.

Said incident was followed by an alleged gun pointing by the petitioners with Jose Bacho acting as back-up later that day in Kilawan Tanke, Talisay while the respondent was investigating a case, prompting him to call the police.

Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for grave threats against the Paulin and Bacho and a complaint for grave threats and oral defamation against private respondent Mabuyo 16 days after the incident.

The cases were jointly tried and on motion of the petitioners the case against them was dismissed by Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Mamerto Coloflores to which respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted. Herein petitioners sought to set aside said resolution but the same was denied in another resolution.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages with relief of preliminary injunction and issuance of temporary restraining order before Regional Trial Court Branch 5 which was subsequently dismissed by Judge Celso M. Gimenez.

Petitioners now contended that the decision of MTC in dismissing the case against them was a judgment of acquittal and may no longer be set aside without violating their rights against double jeopardy.

QUESTIONS:

1.Does the dismissal of MTC amounts to acquittal on the allegation that it was issued on merits of prosecution’s evidence?

2.When a “dismissal” is held final even if made on motion of the accused?

3.Does the dismissal of the case against the petitioners by the MTC constitute a bar for another prosecution, as it would violate their right against double jeopardy?

samplers

CASE NO. 1. Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957.

Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.

On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.

To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.

In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant for their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from confiscating their cash bond and from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case. 1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the parties, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment, viz:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

(b) Dismissing this petition with respect to petitioner FU YAN FUN, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

(c) Authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by herein petitioners CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of P4,000.00; and

(d) Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare Sec. 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 unconstitutional;

Without pronouncement, as to costs.

QUESTION: Is the ruling of the trial court valid? Explain.

CASE NO. 2.From mainland China where he was born of Chinese parents, Mr. Chan Sing Kha migrated to the Philippines in 1894.As of April 11, 1899, he was already a permanent resident of the Philippine Islands and continued to reside in this country until his death. During his lifetime and when he was already in the Philippines, he married Charing, a Filipina (his salegirl) with whom he begot one son, named Ho Pia Kha, who was born on October 18, 1897. Ho Pia got married (to his classmate) Mirtil, a Filipina, and one of their children is Todas Kha, who was born on September 27, 1936. Todas finished Commerce and engaged in business.

In the May 1989 election, Todas Kha ranfor and was elected Congressman. His rival candidate, Gavino Ang, filed a qou warranto or disqualification case against him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. It was pointed out that Todas Kha did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of 21.

Decide whether Todas Kha suffers from disqualification or not.

CASE NO. 3.For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with homicide (docketed as Crim. Case No. 4567) before the RTC of Dipolog City.He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution particularly on the ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who cannot be found or located, the criminal case has been pending trial for a period of 8 years. Upon motion of the accused Erning, who invoked his right to a speedy trial, the court dismissed the case.

Eventually, the said prosecution witnesses appeared and agreed to testify. Another criminal case for homicide (now docketed as Crim. Case No. 8910) involving the same incident was filed against Erning, who moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected submitting the reason that it was not able to present said witnesses earlier because the latter went to hiding for fear of their lives.

Resolve the motion of Erning.

CASE NO. 4. . The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this Case filed by the prosecuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the liability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil.

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.

QUESTION: Is the action of the judge in not dismissing the Information, despite the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Prosecutor valid? Reason out your answer.

CASE NO. 5. On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building” owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.

On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an Information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." This information reads as follows:

The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:

That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.

The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.

Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information read as follows:

The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.

The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:

“The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash. In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, etc.. The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41, 062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections, which were done at one instance on a particular date between November 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices, etc." , it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.

When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 that had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16.

QUESTIONS: 1.WAS THE ACCUSED SUBJECTED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND INFORMATION?

2.STATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REGARDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

CASE NO. 6. At the time the accused committed the offense punishable by death, Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, required a unanimous vote of all the Justices of the Supreme Court for the imposition of death penalty. Subsequently, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted requiring an affirmative vote of only eight justices to impose the death penalty.

Is the New Judiciary Act applicable to the accused? Will it not be a case of an ex post facto law? Explain your answer.

CASE NO. 7. What do you understand by the writ of habeas corpus? It is a principle that it is not the writ itself, which is suspended, but the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What is the significance of this concept? Finally what are the grounds for the suspension of the privilege?

CASE NO. 8. On the right against self-incrimination:

a. The prosecution alleged that John swallowed the diamond, which was missing. To prove that John was the thief, the prosecution moved that John be x-rayed to show that the diamond is still in his stomach. John objected invoking his right against self-incrimination. Is the objection valid?

b. In a prosecution for adultery, the prosecution moved that the accused be subjected to a pregnancy test, on the allegation that she is pregnant. As judge would you grant the motion?

c. On a charge for falsification, the accused denied that he signed the check, and that it was a forgery. The prosecutor moved that the accused be made to sign his name three times so that specimen signatures be obtained from him. The accused objected. Is the objection proper?

CASE NO. 9. What is “custodial investigation”? What are the rights of a person under “custodial investigation”?

CASE NO. 10. The purpose of the impairment clause under the constitution is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreement against unwarranted interference by the state. As a rule, they should be respected by the legislature and tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will of the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must not be impaired.

It should be stressed at the outset, however, that the protection of the impairment clause is not absolute.

In what instances can the state validly impair a valid contract? Explain.

CASE NO. 11. The crime of murder was committed on November 25, 1987 by the accused, Jose Go. The penalty for murder pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. On December 31, 1993, R.A. 7659 took effect, which increased the penalty of murder to reclusion perpetua.

On September 21, 2001 the accused after due trial, was convicted with murder and sentenced by Judge Gone to reclusion perpetua.

The counsel of the accused objected on the penalty meted.

Is the objection valid? On what ground?

CASE NO. 12. Lopez, administrative officer of the DECS, was investigated by the COA, concerning anomalous purchases. The COA made some findings and recommended for the filing of the criminal case for graft and corruption before the Ombudsman on Dec. 22, 1993.

On July 17, 1998, the investigating Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation and agreed with the findings of the COA. He issued a Resolution on December 9, 1998 recommending the filing of criminal information against Lopez.

On Feb. 27, 1999, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito Gervacio forwarded the Resolution to Ombudsman Chief Aniano Desierto, who then filed the Information against Lopez before the Sandiganbayan on May 5, 1999.

Lopez filed a motion to dismiss the Information on the ground that there was undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed against him which violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Is the Information dismissible? Explain your answer.

CASE NO. 13. On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:

1.Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and

2.Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner:

Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent court.

In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.

The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.

In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.

The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed.

Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:

I.THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.

II.THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

RULE ON THE ASSIGNED ERRORS.

CASE NO. 14. The complaint for illegal possession of untaxed blue seal cigarettes against petitioner was filed on November 3, 1964. He was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge on December 21, 1964, manifesting likewise his readiness for trial. It was, however, postponed to January 18, 1965. Five minutes after 9:00 o'clock on that day, the case was called for trial, but neither the prosecutor nor the witnesses had as yet arrived. It took respondent Judge only twenty minutes before issuing an order of provisional dismissal, which reads thus: "This case was called for trial at exactly 9:05 A.M. without the presence of the government witnesses and the government prosecutor. In order not to prejudice the interest of the government, they were given a time extension; but according to the counsel it is now 9:25 a.m. and still we do not have here the presence of the government prosecutor and the government witnesses. In view of the apparent lack of interest on the part of the government to proceed, let this case be dismissed provisionally. The bail bond filed by the accused for his provisional release is hereby cancelled." On that very same day, January 18, 1965, the other respondent, Captain Felix C. Ochotorena, as Assistant Provincial Commander, did file anew the very same case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7732. 5 There was motion to quash by petitioner on January 27, 1965 on the ground that he had been placed in double jeopardy by virtue of the provisional dismissal on January 18, 1965. 6 Then came the order of March 6, 1965 wherein respondent Judge granted the motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact of the previous dismissal being of a provisional character. There was a motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution on March 15, 1965. Then came the challenged resolution, worded thus: "This case was dismissed by this court because of the prosecution's apparent neglect to appear when this case was called several times. ... As the present motion to reconsider is a good demonstration of prosecution's interest to proceed, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby granted and the case restored to its previous status as a pending case."( reference: G.R. No. L-25595 February 15, 1974 AGUSTIN TALADUA vs. FELIX C. OCHOTORENA, ET AL).

QUESTION: Rule on the validity of the judge’s order. IS double jeopardy present? Reason.

CASE NO. 15. The petition before us arose from a November 10, 1989 incident when the jeep ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with dust.

Irked by this incident, Mabuyo followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of Rattan Originals in Tanke, Talisay Cebu. Inquiring from a nearby security guard as to who owns the Nissan Patrol, he was informed that it belonged to and was driven by petitioner Dr. Ramon Paulin.

Later, while Mabuyo was investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr. Ramon Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a companion of the spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to call the police in Talisay and the rest to block the exit of the spouses and their lone companion.

Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon the arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the police station. On the same date, Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204. On November 20, 1989, the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave threats and oral defamation," against private respondent Mabuyo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5213.

The cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu (Branch IX), acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204. On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3, 1990.

At the hearing of Criminal Case No. 5213 on July 5, 1990, petitioners vigorously sought the setting aside of the July 3, 1990 resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the same was denied in another resolution.

Not satisfied with the resolution of respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores, petitioners filed on July 31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, which was thereafter docketed as Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207 and later re-raffled to Branch 5 stationed in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso M. Gimenez, who dismissed the petition in a decision dated December 19, 1991. The decretal portion of the decision states:

All the foregoing considered, for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure, as revised, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Public respondent is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of Crim. Case Nos. 5204 and 5213 and to decide both cases on their merits within the period provided under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued dated May 9, 1991, is hereby lifted and set aside.

Still not contented, petitioners have now resorted to the instant petition, arguing that (a) the decision of the municipal trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case against them was a judgment of acquittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating petitioners' right against double jeopardy; and (b) the regional trial court, in dismissing the petition in CEB-9207 abused its discretion as it ignored petitioners' right against double jeopardy.

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal as the same would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy.

QUESTION: Ruleon the main issue: whether double jeopardy exists.

CASE NO. 16.State whether the right of the accused was violated under the following circumstances:

1.A person charged with rape, but was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. The judge of qualified seduction instead convicted him.

2.A witness was subpoenaed on request of the accused but instead of taking steps to compel her attendance; the judge held the defense responsible for bringing her to the trial, stating that her testimony would be dispensed with if she failed to appear.

3.In a criminal case for murder, the fiscal was not ready because his witness was absent. The accused insisted on his right to speedy trial. The judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case without the accused’s express consent.

4.The accused was first prosecuted for slight physical injuries, but after he had pleaded not guilty, the charge was changed to serious physical injuries, when it appeared that the wounds inflicted on the victim after healing, had left permanent scars on his face.

5.Jose obtained sacks of rice from Maria and issued a check worth 20,000. The check bounced. He was convicted of BP 22 (Bouncing checks law). He applied for probation and was placed thereon. Later he was again charged of Estafa, based on the same act.

CASE NO. 17.State whether the right of the accused against self-incrimination is violated, in the following instances:

1.An unknown assailant murdered the victim. Three days later, Victor was arrested by the police officer, and detained in jail. In there, he confessed that he was the murderer. He further confessed that Romy and Sonny were his companions. They were made to re-enact how the crime was committed. Is the re-enactment admissible as evidence in court?

2.Victor was interviewed over the DXKD, and in said interview, he revealed the truth that it was really him who murdered the victim. Is the tape recorded/video interview admissible against Victor?

3.Victor talked to the mayor, and made the same revelation. Is said evidence admissible against him?

CASE NO. 18. On the right to bail:

1.Who have the constitutional right to bail?

2.Does a soldier under court martial custody enjoy the right to bail?

3.Robert is charged with murder. His case is still under preliminary investigation by Judge Lupos of the MTC of Polanco. In the course of the preliminary investigation, the judge arrives at a probable cause of homicide only.(Note: Murder is non-bailable, but homicide is). The judge then issued a warrant of arrest but fixed bail at 200,000 pesos. Is the judge correct?

4.Granting that the judge finds probable cause for murder, is there no way by which Robert can avail of the right to bail? Explain.

5.Mark committed estafa in the United States.He fled to the Philippines. USA filed an extradition request against him. The RTC, pursuant to the extradition proceedings issued a warrant of arrest against Mark. Does Mark have the right to be released on bail? Explain.

CASE No. 19.On the right to be presumed innocent:

1.For purposes of disqualification in an election, Section 4 of BP 52 says:” the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes beforre a civil court or military court after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact (disqualification). Is this valid?

2.Section 40 of the Local Government Code disqualifies from running for office a “ fugitive from justice in criminal or non-olitical cases here or abroad”. If applied to one who has not yet been convicted of any offense but was merely fleeing from trial, would there be a violation of the presumption of innocence?

3.Does preventive suspension pendente lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?

4.Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code says that failure of an accountable officer to produce money in his charge upon demand shall be prima facie evidence of malversation. Does such law violate the presumption of innocense of the accused?

5.Art. 315 of the RPC prescribes a period of 3 days from notice wihtin which the issuear of the check mus pay the creditor, otherwise, a prima facie inference of deceit constituting false pretence of fraudulent act shall arise. Does this offend against the contitutional presumption of innocense?

CASE NO . 20.Rosalinda is the daughter of Telesforo. She was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia (which adopts the jus soli principle). Her mother is an Australian citizen named Teresa.Telesforo was born in Daet, Camarines Norte on January 5, 1879, (where he registered as a Spanish citizen) but died in Australia at the age of 80. Rosalinda is a holder of an Australian passport and had with her an Australian Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) in 1988.

She went back to the Philippines, lived in their ancestral house in Daet, married and had children to a Filipino husband.

She ran for a congressional seat and won in the district of Daet.

Her rival files a disqualification case citing:

1.That Rosalinda is not a Filipino citizen hence disqualified for public office.

2.That under section 40 of the Local Government Code, “The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position x x x (d) those with dual citizenship.”

Rule on the two issues above cited.