We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where We observed that the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows: The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88555 November 21, 1991

EDUARDO N. ASWAT, petitioner,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEJANDRO GALIDO, in his capacity as Commander of the Southern Luzon Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City, respondent.

Pacifico M. Monje for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial which was convened by then respondent Brigadier General Alejandro Galido 1 as Commanding General of the Southern Luzon Command ("SOLCOM") to try petitioner for a specification (offense) committed outside a military reservation or installation.

Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP") respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido's Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of Brigadier General Galido's wife. On 29 December 1988, petitioner was involved in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted in the death of Nebres.

Records disclose that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities and was briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on 31 December 1988. Petitioner has been detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters in Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City since then.

On 20 April 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial ("SOLCOM-GCM") with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War ("A.W."), the specification being homicide.

While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant petition, contending: (1) that the specification of homicide with which he was charged was committed outside a military installation and hence the offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution; and (3) that he should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside from the allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of his detention.

The Court en banc issued the writ of habeas corpus and required respondent to make a return of the writ before the Third Division of the Court. 2 After hearing, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to require the parties to file their memoranda in amplification of their respective oral arguments. 3

Petitioner seeks to make a distinction between offenses committed outside and those committed inside a military installation or reservation. He assails the jurisdiction of the SOLCOM-GCM, alleging that the specification of homicide was committed in Baguio City and in an area outside any military installation or reservation.

The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument was obliterated sometime ago. As the law now stands, as long as the accused is subject to military law, as defined under Article 2, A.W., 4 he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

Art 94. Various Crimes.—Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct: In imposing the penalties for offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or in such municipal ordinances shall be taken into consideration. 5 (Emphasis supplied).

Article 94, A.W., in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a Philippine military reservation as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948, however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article 94, A.W. by providing that offenses committed outside a military reservation shall also be punished as a court-martial may direct, but only "when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one)" is similarly subject to military law. 6

There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to military law at the time the latter was shot and killed.

Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOM-GCM, he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such jurisdiction.

Petitioner next contends that his right to bail is explicitly guaranteed in Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.

Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled that the guarantee is not without any exception. In Comendador vs. De Villa, et al., 7 the Court en banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Cruz, held:

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where We observed that the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, as already noted, is a person subject to military law, and under Article 70, A.W., "any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these article shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require."

Confinement is one way of ensuring presence during sessions of the General Court-Martial; the more important reason underlying the authority to impose confinement is the need to enable the proper military authority to instill discipline with the command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By confining the petitioner, petitioner's unmilitary conduct may be curtailed from spreading within the ranks of the command. The necessity for such confinement is a matter properly left to the sound discretion of petitioner's superior officers. In Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense, 8 the Court en banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Vasquez, held:

The petitioner is a person subject to military law facing charges before a general court-martial, and his release from confinement pending the trial of the charges against him is a matter that lies largely in the discretion of the military authorities. They are undeniably in a better position to appreciate the gravity of said charges and the feasibility and advisability of releasing him or relaxing the terms of his confinement pending the trial and disposition of the case filed against him.

The authority of the respondent to order the arrest and confinement of the petitioner flows from his general jurisdiction over his command. Petitioner being assigned to SOLCOM, he is directly under the command of then Brigadier General Galido.

The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns his right to receive base pay and other pay during the pendency of his detention. At present, petitioner is receiving a monthly allowance of P540.00. 9

The law defines "pay" to include "base pay and all additional pay for the length of service or type of duty such as longevity pay and flying pay," and distinguishes "pay" from "allowances" which is limited to "quarters, subsistence, travel, and such other allowances as may by law become payable to army personnel." 10

Concerning this issue, Section 18, Article 6 of R.A. No. 138, as amended, provides:

Sec. 18. An enlisted man awaiting trial by Court-martial or the result thereof, is not entitled to receive pay as distinguished allowances until the result of the trial is known; Provided, that any enlisted man who is placed on a full duty status and performs regular duties while awaiting trial by court-martial, or the result thereof, shall be entitled to receive all his pay and allowances for the period of such duty unless the same shall have been lawfully forfeited by the approved sentence of a court-martial prior to actual payment thereof to the enlisted man. For the purposes of this section, the restoration to full duty status of enlisted men awaiting trial by court-martial, or the result thereof, shall be as directed by the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense.' (as amended by R.A. 1067). (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, during detention, ceased to perform his ordinary military duties. His continued detention necessarily restrains his freedom of work, and he cannot carry out his normal military functions. There is no showing by petitioner that he was placed on "full duty status" and performing "regular duties" pending trial. On the premise of "no work no pay", petitioner cannot insist on his right to receive base pay or any other pay while under detention. However, while petitioner is not entitled to receive any base pay or any other pay during his detention, the law expressly permits him to receive his regular and other allowances, if otherwise entitled thereto, while under detention.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Habeas Corpus for lack of merit. No pronouncement to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Brigadier General Alejandro Galido who had died after commencement of this case, was substituted by Brigadier General Federico Ruiz, Jr.

2 Rollo, p. 7.

3 Id., p. 21.

4 Article 2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, provide:

Art 2. Persons subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or persons subject to military law, whenever used in these articles:

a. All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;

b. Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;

c. All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is though not otherwise subject to these articles;

d. All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial. (as amended by R.A. 242 and R.A. 516).

5 As amended by R.A. No. 242 and further amended by P.D. No. 1166.

6 In Arula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA 540, 555 (1969), the Court held that "whenever persons subject to military law commit offenses punishable under Article 94 outside a military reservation and the offended party (or any one of the offended parties if there be more than one) is not a person subject to military law, they fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts."

7 G.R. No. 95020, 20 August 1991.

8 124 SCRA 529, 543 (1983).

9 TSN, 28 October 1989, p. 32.

10 Section 1, R.A. No. 138, as amended.

It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military court to the petitioner should, in accordance with the precedents above cited, be a bar to petitioner's further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First Instance of Zambales.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6277             February 26, 1954

JUAN D. CRISOLOGO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. PABLO VILLALOBOS, respondents.

Antonio V. Raquiza, Floro Crisologo and Carlos Horrilleno for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondents.
Pablo Villalobos in his own behalf.

REYES, J.:

The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war and at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an information filed in the People's Court. But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947, indicted for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by the authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the first and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information and aid to the enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second war was that of having certain civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of the second, he was on May 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment.

With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People's Court, the criminal case in that court against the petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and, after petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.

The petition is opposed by the Solicitor General who, in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial judge, denies that petitioner is being subjected to double jeopardy.

As we see it, the case hinges on whether the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further prosecution for the same offense in the civil courts.

The question is not of first impression in this jurisdiction. In case of U.S. vs. Tubig, 3 Phil., 244, a soldier of the United States Army in the Philippines was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with having assassinated one Antonio Alivia. Upon arraignment, he pleaded double jeopardy in that he had already been previously convicted and sentenced by s court-martial for the same offense and had already served his sentence. The trial court overruled the plea on the grounds that a the province where the offense was committed was under civil jurisdiction, the military court had no jurisdiction to try the offense. But on appeal, this court held that "one who has been tried and convicted by a court martial under circumstances giving that tribunal jurisdiction of the defendant and of the offense, has been once in jeopardy and cannot for the same offense be again prosecuted in another court of the same sovereignty." In a later case, Grafton vs. U.S. 11 Phil., 776, a private in the United States Army in the Philippines was tried by a general court martial for homicide under the Articles of War. Having been acquitted in that court, he was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for murder under the general laws of the Philippines. Invoking his previous acquittal in the military court, he pleaded it in bar of proceedings against him in the civil court, but the latter court overruled the plea and after trial found him guilty of homicide and sentenced him to prison. The sentence was affirmed by this Supreme Court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the sentence was reversed and defendant acquitted, that court holding that "defendant, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide alleged to have been committed by him by a court martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under the authority of the United States, cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in the Philippines."

There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil and military laws subjects the offender to punishment by both civil and military authority, a conviction or an acquittal in a civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the military court, and vice versa. But the rule "is strictly limited to the case of a single act which infringes both the civil and the military law in such a manner as to constitute two distinct offenses, one of which is within the cognizance of the military courts and the other a subject of civil jurisdiction" (15 Am. Jur., 72), and it does not apply where both courts derive their powers from the same sovereignty. (22 C.J.S., 449.) It therefore, has no application to the present case the military court has convicted the petitioner and the civil court which proposes to try him again derive their powers from one sovereignty and it is not disputed that the charges of treason tried in the court martial were punishable under the Articles of War, it being as a matter of fact impliedly admitted by the Solicitor General that the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense charged.

It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court is different from that charged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical the military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People's Court had previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the amended information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military court. But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt acts "he has done or might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense." (Guinto vs. Veluz,¹ 44 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco,² L-4570, promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration of additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from that of treason, and this Court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason that those overt acts are not separate offense distinct from that of treason but constitutes ingredients thereof. Respondents cite the cases of Melo vs. People,³ 47 off. Gaz., 4631, and People vs. Manolong,⁴ 47 Off. Gaz., 5104, where this court held:

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be second jeopardy if indicted for a new offense.

But respondents overlook that in the present case no new facts have supervened that would change the nature of the offense for which petitioner was tried in the military court, the alleged additional overt acts specified in the amended information in the civil court having already taken place when petitioner was indicted in the former court. Of more pertinent application is the following from 15 American Jurisprudence, 56-57:

Subject to statutory prohibitions and the interpretation thereof for the purpose of arriving at the intent of the legislature enacting them, it may be said that as a rule only one prosecution may be had for a continuing crime, and that when a n offense charged consists of a series of acts extending over a period of time, a conviction or acquittal for a crime based on a portion of that period will bar a prosecution covering the whole period. In such case the offense is single and indivisible; and whether the time alleged is longer or shorter, the commission of the acts which constitute it within any portion of the time alleged, is a bar to the conviction for other acts committed within the same time. . . .

As to the claim that the military court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known is the rule that when several courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed. (22 C.J.S., pp. 186-187.) The record in the present case shows that the information for treason in the People's Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet been arrested or brought into the custody of the court — the warrant of arrest had not even been issued — when the indictment for the same offense was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that court priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the person of defendant.

It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military court to the petitioner should, in accordance with the precedents above cited, be a bar to petitioner's further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First Instance of Zambales.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted and the criminal case for treason against the petitioner pending in that court ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

¹ 77 Phil., 801.

² 93 Phil., 521.

³ 85 Phil., 766.

⁴ 85 Phil., 829.

guide questions for the midterm (for the first year )

1.                  In the case of Marcos v, Manglapus, Imelda Marcos filed a petition in court so that the dead body of Pres. Marcos be transported from Hawaii to the Philippines, so that he could be buried in his own country. The Supreme Court through Justice Irene Cortes, denied the petition. State the justifications made by the said decision why Pres.Marcos’s dead body could not be returned to the Philippines.

2.                  The Department of Education issued a circular that all students must salute the national flag and sing the national anthem. Some students who belong to the Jehovah’s witnesses were prohibited by their religious leaders to do so in the belief that that would be worshipping another God. Is the DepEd circular constitutional? Will it not violate the freedom of religion of the Jehovah’s witnesses? Explain.

3.                  Freedom of expression is a constitutionally protected right. What kinds of expressions however are not protected by the constitution? Enumerate these excluded expressions.

4.                  To determine the liability of the individual for ideas expressed by him, three major criteria have been applied on the freedom of expression. What are these three major criteria? Explain each.

5.                  A lawyer refused to join the Integrated Bar of the Philippines stating that he cannot be compelled to become a member of that association. He argued that the constitutional right to associate includes necessarily the freedom not to associate. He did not pay his IBP dues hence he was disbarred. Is the disbarment proper under the circumstances? Can a lawyer who does not want to be a member of the IBP be compelled to join? Will you respect his right to be left alone in the practice of law? Explain.

6.                  State the grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Does the declaration of martial law include the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? Explain.

7.                  Jose was murdered right in his own house. His daughter was also raped. No one knew who the perpetrators were. The police officers were having a hard time. Three days after the commission of the crime, Lucio voluntarily appeared in the police station and confessed as the author of the crime. He also confessed that there were three of them who entered the house to include Amancio and Luis. He executed an affidavit stating how the crime was committed. An information was thus filed in court against the three accused: Lucio, Amancio and Luis.

During the trial, Lucio testified implicating Amancio and Luis, who both denied participation. Questions: (1) is the testimony of Lucio admissible in court? (2) Amancio and Luis who claimed innocence, filed an application for bail. Would you grant the bail? Explain.

8. On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.⁴

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. Decide the case.

9. The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalog,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

Petitioner argued that under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Is he correct? As judge will you convict him for performing an illegal marriage ceremony? Explain.

10. On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angeles Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, where the latter is a third year high school student, to inform her that he will drive both accused to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. When the latter failed to return that evening, Delfa, as early as 4:30 o'clock a.m. of December 6, 1988 inquired on his whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of such inquiry, a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was discovered on the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in Atimonan. Forthwith, they proceeded to the said place and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab wounds in different parts of his body.

Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was sighted at Barangay Malinao, Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue sidecar which they brought back with them to their headquarters. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of P4,000.00. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.

After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to present any document evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily surrendered it to the police who turned it over, together with the sidecar, to the Atimonan Police Station for safekeeping.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.²

Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of accused Amido to Teves. He recounted that sometime in December 1988, Amido sought him at his house and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being offered for sale. Upon proof shown that it was indeed registered under Amido's name, he accompanied the latter to Manila on board the said motorcycle and they approached Antonio Carandang. The latter, thereafter, brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves with whom the sale was finally consummated. He allegedly received P150.00 as his commission.

Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that although a tricycle driver by occupation, he was at Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question, some seven kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the renovation of his mother's house. He narrated that the victim was his friend and, therefore, he could not have participated in the gruesome death of the latter.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations, this Court finds Herson Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail, Lucena City, is hereby ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito Amido, unless he is being detained thereat for some other lawful cause.

Questions: (1) is the conviction of the accused proper under the above set circumstances?

(2) May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?

11. In the case of Comendador v. Villa, the Supreme court stated that while the right to bail is applicable to all persons, there is also an exception to this rule. What is that exception? Explain.

13. To protect a person under “investigation” he has certain rights which are embraced in that “Miranda doctrine”. What are these rights? What kind of “investigation” is covered by the Miranda doctrine? Explain.

 

14. Upon complaint filed by Angelita P. Bangit, accused-appellant Joselito Agbulos was charged with the offense of forcible abduction with rape. On January 23, 1981, Agbulos arraigned and pleaded not guilty.¹

On April 25, 1984, the prosecution rested its case. On August 13, 1984, a warrant for the arrest of Agbulos was issued for his failure to appear at the scheduled hearing. On September 24, 1984, the order of arrest was recalled and set aside because notice had been sent to the wrong bonding company. Hearing was reset on November 5, 1984, and the accused was notified at his home address.²

On November 5, 1984, the accused failed to appear and his arrest was again ordered.³ The bonding company was given 30 days to produce the person of the accused and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against its undertaking.

On December 18, 1984, the trial court issued an order reading as follows:

Upon motion of the Fiscal, it appearing that the bonding company of the herein accused failed to produce the person of the latter within the specified period, let judgment issue against the full amount of his bond.

Upon motion of the defense counsel, over the vigorous objection of the Fiscal, the continuation of the trial of this case today for presentation of evidence for the defense is hereby cancelled and reset to January 30, 1985, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

It is understood that should the accused still fail to appear and present evidence at the next setting, it shall be deemed that he has waived his right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for decision based on the evidence on record.

As requested by the defense counsel, let an Order of Arrest issue against the herein accused at his address at 119 Dionisio St., Doña Adela Subdivision, Cabanatuan City, to be coursed through the INP Station at Cabanatuan City.

SO ORDERED.

On January 30, 1985, the accused still failed to appear.⁴ His counsel manifested in court that he was adopting the prosecution witness Ernesto Tamayo as evidence for the accused. Thereafter, the defense rested its case.

On July 11, 1985, judgment was rendered against the bonding company for failure to produce the accused and to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited.

On June 15, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused Joselito Agbulos guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim Angelita Bangit in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.⁵

Question: Is the conviction of the accused valid on the basis of the above mentioned facts? Explain.

15. If you were the judge and you are going to rule on the motion to grant bail to a person accused of a capital offense, what are the factors that you must consider to grant it? What will you require of the petitioner who applies for bail? What must be contained in your Order to justify the granting of bail in capital offenses? Explain.

 

 16.What are the two kinds of subpoena that a court can issue? Distinguish one from the other.

17. On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.⁴ This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.⁵ The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.⁶Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay":⁷

TEAM BUHAY	TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV	Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio	Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos	Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko	Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio	Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia	Hontiveros, Risa
Party List Buhay	Legarda, Loren
Party List Ang Pamilya	Party List Gabriela
	Party List Akbayan
	Party List Bayan Muna
	Party List Anak Pawis

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials⁸ addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).⁹

On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied¹⁰ requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.¹¹

QUESTION: Is the act of the Diocese in posting said political tarpaulins a violation of the separation of the church and state? As Election Officer would you insist that they should be removed because of a constitutional violation? Explain.

18. In the Hall of Justice, a judge sponsored a catholic mass for all catholics working there to hear the mass. The Virgin Mary and the cross were displayed in her courtroom where mass was celebrated by a catholic priest at 3 o clock every last Friday of the month. A member of the Iglesia ni Cristo who works are stenographer there complained that this activity violates the freedom of religion or the establishment of religion since it is only held for the catholics, to the exclusion of the Iglesia ni Cristo believers. Explain if indeed this violates the non-establishment of religion clause in our constitution.

19. Mr. Jose is a cash clerk of the city of Dapitan. On Jan 5, 2019 he was audited by a team of auditors who found out that he fell short of cash in his collections. Mr. Jose admits that he used the money for the hospitalization of his son and he promised to pay the whole amount. To show his sincerity, he signed a promissory note.

Two months later , a case for malversation was filed against him. One of the evidences used against him was the promissory note which he signed. His lawyer objected to the admissibility of said evidence, claiming that it violated his right against self-incrimination and his right to have counsel when the audit team investigated him about the shortage. Question: Is the evidence against Mr. Jose admissible against him? Is there no violation of his Miranda rights? Explain.

20. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.⁵ Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, "doctored" or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the President’s favor. ⁶ It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction. ⁷

2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.⁸

3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.⁹

4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, "I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned." ¹⁰

5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: ¹¹

NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS

xxx xxx xxx

Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use [their] stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversations which they claim involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of election laws.

These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal wiretapping operations.

Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be said at this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and television stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.

In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program standards to be observed by radio and television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 explicitly states, among others, that "all radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other matters being broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false information or such other willful misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition." The foregoing directive had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their stations to broadcast or telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in subversive or treasonable acts.

The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their owners/operators.

6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement which states, among others, that: ¹²

·                     NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information on matters of public concern. KBP & its members have always been committed to the exercise of press freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.

·                     NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship. The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the interview of members of the opposition or free expression of views.

·                     What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be] done responsibly.

·                     KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news and public affairs programs. These include verification of sources, non-airing of materials that would constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.

·                     The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is made in the treatment of news or commentaries.

·                     The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly giving due consideration to the process being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity and actual content of the same."

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, "praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents."¹³

Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,¹

QUESTION: Decide whether respondents violated the freedom of expression and of the press and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Explain your answer.

END OF THE EXAMINATION