THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RH LAW

Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following

GROUNDS:

·                     The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.^[35]

·                     The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one’s health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.^[36]

·                     The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutionalguarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.^[37]

RULING: Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALexcept with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2] Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3] Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4] Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8] Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 204819, April 08, 2014 ]

JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG AND BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG AND MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS. 

VALIDATING THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN MINDANAO

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.XXXthe Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial la has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion^[12] since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory.^[13] It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda^[14] and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the Maute Group is a mere private army, citing as basis the alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand theatrically to inflate perceived capability".^[15] The Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing, representatives of the military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS threat in the country but that they merely gave an evasive answer^[16] that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".^[17] The Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to capture Hapilon.^[18] Based on said statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute Group's armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute brothers from the government forces, and not to lay siege on Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic.^[19] It then posit that if at all, there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial law.^[20]

 RULING:Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial law would engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated assumptions.

Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declate martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the previous regime."^[261] Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 231658, July 04, 2017 ]

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJAÑO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO AÑO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, RESPONDENTS.

 

GRACE POE'S QUALIFICATION AS CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."^[1]

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,^[2] the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-

Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents.^[3] Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.^[4]

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.^[5]

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287^[6] by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.^[7]

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines^[8] but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.^[9]

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.^[10] Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991.^[11]

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.^[12] Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively.^[13]

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.^[14] She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.^[15]

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004.^[16]

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition.^[17] Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.^[18]

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.^[19] The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester;^[20] coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;^[21] and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.^[22] As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.^[23]

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005^[24] and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed^[25] while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.^[26]

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.^[27] The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.^[28] Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings.^[29] She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.^[30]

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.^[31] The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.^[32]

Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.^[33]

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home^[34] and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.^[35] A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1 June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.^[36] Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.^[37]As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.^[38]

Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children.^[39]

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.^[40] She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.^[41] This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.^[42]

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).^[43] Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,^[44] in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.^[45] The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI^[46] and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.^[47] From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.^[48]

^{issue: Whether she is qualifired to be a candidate for President of the Philippines?}

Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016 ]

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, RESPONDENTS.

THE DISMISSAL OF SERENO AS CHIEF JUSTICE

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, RESPONDENT.

Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the present Petition^[5] for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent therefrom. The Issues

From the arguments raised by the parties and the issues as delineated in the Advisory governing the special Oral Arguments by way of accommodation to respondent, the paramount issues to be resolved by the Court are:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives;

2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription;

3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

a. Whether the determination of a candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;

b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.

4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer.

RULING: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be person of proven integrity

constitutional provisions are generally NOT SELF-EXECUTING

WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Are the provisions in the constitution self-executing?

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15

EN BANC

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner, 
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.