That such informal practices do exist and have,
in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been
substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers [of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress] has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that [had] been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 The project identifications made by the Executive should always be in the nature of law enforcement
and, hence, for the sole purpose of enforcing an existing appropriation law. In relation thereto, it may purpose of


(a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or
 (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into
actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making. 


There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule making
are indeed adequate.

The first test is called the "completeness test."
Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate.

 On the other hand,
the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds
that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is
to b e t.m p 1e mente d .2 48

the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to
information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of
L egaspz· v. c z·v z· z se rvz·c e c ommz·s sw· n: 256
[W]hile the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the
duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion
of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may
be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, riot being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us,
the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is,
whether the information sou~ht by the petitioner is within the ambit
of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257 (Valmonte), it
has been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to
compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the
same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a welldefined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without
the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for
information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does
not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that
the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia,
G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request
of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on
the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.

what is an operative fact doctrine?

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that
until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus,
entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and
complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation/66 the doctrine merely "reflect[ s]
awareness that. precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure
is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power
of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the
language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.

WHY IS THE PORK BARREL SYSTEM UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted
in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent
defects in the rules within which it operates.

(1)To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; 

(2)insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which
they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power;

(3) insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process,
denied the President the power to veto items;

(4) insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the
affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy;
and again,

(5)insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other
purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once
more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the
multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein
pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by
any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or
effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally
unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards
in government to look forward with the optimism of change and
the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous
public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may
not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides
this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may
heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is
the Court's bounden duty and no other's.

The State's policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section
25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X ofthe 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enJOY local
autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local
autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end,
the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal
the policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to
develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to
the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl
Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court?28
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of
the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to
provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of
our local political subdivisions as "self-reliant communities." In the
words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from
which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local
governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources
and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in
public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be
blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely
local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of
such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to
the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork
Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. 230
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the
unequal" and that "[i]t is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are
likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents
and the priority to be given each project. "231 Drawing strength from this
pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that
"the relatively small projects implemented under [the Congressional Pork
Barrel] complement and link the national development goals to the
countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of
PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal,
which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities
that the LGU concerned cannot afford. 233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an
inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
"making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge
of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities
of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of
equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a
far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped"
compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even
Senators and Party-List Representatives- and in some years, even the VicePresident
- who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the
Congressional Pork Barrel's original intent which is "to make equal the
unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under
the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole
account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various
Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to
"assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, 235
their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no
law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The underminingeffect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred
to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has
not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but
has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and
coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in
purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
is deemed unconstitutional.

Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables
politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing prov1s1on is
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be
defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself,
provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there
appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score
to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the
Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.