Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables
politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing prov1s1on is
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be
defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself,
provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there
appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score
to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the
Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should
exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability
from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper
expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be
performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power
of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of
its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation
of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
I eg1.s I a t•w n. 224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in
some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF
Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual
legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation .law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be
tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that:
221
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or itssubsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit
or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation - a matter before another office of government -
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
. The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same postenactment
authority and/or the individual legislator's control of his PDAF
per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator's use thereof may be linked to
this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter
which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case
basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close
operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department,
through the former's post-enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does
not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System's intrinsic constitutionality. As
such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional
oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus
impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be
kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has alsoprovided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the vanous departments of the
government. 203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
President's power to veto an item written into an appropriation,
revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
process known as "bill presentment." The President's item-veto power is
found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as
follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object. '
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the
President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for
law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the
final step in the law-making process is the "submission [of the bill] to the
President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication."205 Elaborating on the President's item-veto power and
its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained
that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the
Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making
power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is
essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the
Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must
determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the
legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a
grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the
affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of
the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his
authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise
interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in
favor of the constitutionality of a veto [in the san1e manner] as they will
presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature. (Emphases supplied)The justification for the President's item-veto power rests on a variety
of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal
restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch's role
in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President's item-power as
"a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of
that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor
of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
m. a dv ertence, or de s1. gn. ,209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily
follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation
or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in
itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision
of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases
supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to
ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto,
must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must
be an item characterized by singular correspondence - meaning an
allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular
purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only
allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly
veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity
Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations
which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be
considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item
veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly
apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial
that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper
line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid
appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting
and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE
(maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related
purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the
President's item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary
funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto
for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein
discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations
bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 25(6),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations
which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type
necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be
chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the
appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money" and
hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a
practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of
either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to
hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state
that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the
implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since
the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to
appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative
power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution
• Aside from its conceptual origins related to the separation of powers principle, Corwin, in his
commentary on Constitution of the Unikd States made the following observations:
At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that
legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers:
 Why
go to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if they can straightway
remerge on their own motion? The second is the concept of due process of law, which
precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of
agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari," which John Locke borrowed and formulated
as a dogma of political science ... Chief .Justice Taft offered the following explanation ofthe
origin and limitations of this idea as a postulate of constitutional Jaw: ''The well-known

has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. 195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting
as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This
premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and
the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to
legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, 197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. 198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a
restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). 199 The conceptual
treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a
relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception
to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
maxim 'delegata potestas non pot est delefari,' applicable to the law of agency in the general
common law, is well understood and has had wider application in the construction of our
Federal and State Constitutions than it has in private law ... The Federal and State
Constitutions than it has in private law ... The Federal Constitution and State Constitutions
of this country divide the governmental power into three branches ... In carrying out that
constitutional division ... it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up
its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it
attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power of judicial power. This
is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each
in the field of its duties may not invoke government and that each in the field of its duties may
not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be an
assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what it may
do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must
be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
coordination. (Emphases supplied)multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."xxxx[Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that] [t]he rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the
celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 162 it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress, 164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the President, 165 belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166
belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have
been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "[ e ]ach department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature
has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these
powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single
branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. 169 To
achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in
exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in
the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self interest
assertions of another or others. 170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers
principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain
of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "[o]ne branch
may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its
constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and "[a]lternatively, the doctrine
may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly
is entrusted to another." 172 In other words, there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department's functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the
GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget
execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and
accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all
"other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle. 174 This
is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. 175 Thus,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as
any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much
more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain
of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress
enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the
President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and
wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid
from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law."
Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress' law-making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive's role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in
Abakada where the Court held that "[f]rom the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
172 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), Springer v. Philippine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928) cited in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
173 273 Phil. 443 (1991).
174 !d. at 461. "3. Bu dg et Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers
the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government
fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and
other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle."
1 ~ Biraogo v. Phi I ippine Trut h Commission of2010, supra note 118, at 158.
176 Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, at 460-461 .
Decision 38 G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 &
209251
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction
only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,"
Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made
clear that Congress' role must be confined to mere oversight. Any postenactment-
measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is
bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in
A bakada: 178
[A]ny post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited
to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must
be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation
and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power
to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non
quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means "follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural
law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually
similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court
examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings
in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states
that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and
second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action. 151 This required identity is not, however, attendant
hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas
the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based
on a procedural technicality - and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits - in
that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or
"pertinent evidentiary support [to demonstrate the] illegal misuse of PDAF
in the form of kickbacks [and] has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court upheld, in view of
the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF
Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements
in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata
principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot
apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine
created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code,
evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached
in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same
• 153
ISSUe.
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a
Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court.
To properly understand its context, petitioners' posturing was that "the
power given to the [M]embers of Congress to propose and identify projects
and activities to be funded by the [CDF] is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in
implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the
projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment
thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In
deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following
main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation,
or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of
appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made
by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is
apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring
post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the
contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the
inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other,
formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the
intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular
CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted
may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually
riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the
main conclusions of the case, Philconsa's fundamental premise in allowing
Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the
said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation
which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an
aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is
Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual
Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed
153 C h inese Young Men's Christian Association oft he Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,
G.R. No. 159422, March 28,2008,550 SCRA 180, 197-198.
154 Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.
Decision 34 G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 &
209251
procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA
has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA,
has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice
Vitug's Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa
quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by
law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to
give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in
whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As
the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the
matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its
previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment
identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the
same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious
constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground
that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must
be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa's allowance of
post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers
principle.

. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a
legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a
task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering
precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise
judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, 142 the
expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its
effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows: 143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of .iurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater
prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did
not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases
supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that "when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court
is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of
government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully
perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court's avowed intention that a
resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the
endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars
of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the
best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its
own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine
solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot
heed respondents' plea for judicial restraint.