Commissioner Jose
T. Almonte, petitioner v Honorable Conrado
Vasquez, respondent
Facts:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera
of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all
documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the
whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that
circulate around the EIIB office. They
moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of
the Government.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget
and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been
illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee
of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance,
with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the
petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating
tWhether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena
duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary
vouchers of EIIB employers.o personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB
employers.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, there is no claim that
military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information.
"illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient
to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other
considerations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it
is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made personally in
camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
ASIAN SURETY and
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner
v
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent
Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant
issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to
command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and
records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge
Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by
the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in
connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification,
insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with
principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and
other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the
premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant
upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li
Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm.
After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents,
papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was
issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2)
falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the
explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby
granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside,
and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents,
papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
Malacat v Court of Appeals
Facts:
On
August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to bomb
threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District,
Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No.
3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of
them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug
store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of
the corner of “stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information”; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion
Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal
indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of
the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its
decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid,
pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk”.
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that the warrantless
search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a “stop and frisk,” where a
“warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.” Probable cause was
not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however,
the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause
would have been “premature.” The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were
“confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence” and the officers “had to act in
haste,” as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering
the time, place and “reported cases of bombing.” Further, petitioner’s group suddenly ran away
in different directions as they saw the arresting officers’ approach, thus “it
is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which
is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” The trial court then ruled
that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and since petitioner “later voluntarily admitted such fact to the
police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store,”
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the
Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET
ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of
reasonable doubt, the decision of 10
February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and
petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately
released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any
other lawful cause.
PEOPLE
V
RUBEN MONTILLA
Facts:
Ruben Montilla, was charged for violating
Section 4, Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, R. A. No. 6425, as
amended by R. A. No. 7659 in an information which alleges that on or about June
20, 1994, at Brgy. Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, the above named accused, not
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, administer, transport and deliver 28 kilos of dried marijuana
leaves which are considered prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted on
appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him?
Ruling:
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily
cloaks the arresting officer with authority to validly search and seize from
the offender (1) dangerous weapons and (2) those that may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense. On the defense argument that the warrantless
search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still
the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal
drugs as aresult thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest under Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant.
Facts:
The
crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search
warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy
Juco. In the process, the authorities seized, among others, an art metal filing
cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo to be his and contained some letters, documents
and papers belonging to his clients. Also, books belonging to Salakam Lumber
Co., Inc., were seized.
Issue:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or
not, taking into consideration the provisions of the law and of the
Constitution relative thereto?
2.
Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue belong to Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
Ruling:
The
search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in the affidavit that the
books, documents or records referred to therein are being used or are intended
to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government and,
notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant avers that they are
actually being used for such purpose.
Also,
it assumes that the entire building is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, when the
only ground upon which such assumption is based is the BIR agent's statement
which is mere hearsay (coming from an informant) and when in fact part thereof
was occupied by Atty. Remo. It was not asked that the things belonging to Atty.
Remo and to others also be searched and seized.
For
all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the
appellant are very well founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is
ordered that the art metal filing cabinet, together with the key thereof seized
by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the judicial warrant in question,
which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately returned unopened to the
appellant; and that a copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General
for him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful investigation of
the facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and
executed the warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of article
129 of the Revised Penal Code, without special pronouncement as to costs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Cebu City Branch, petitioner,
vs.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
FACTS:
Sangguniang Bayan
member Nicolas Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72- year old widower
when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old. On 4 January 1985, Nicolas
filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective 18
February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977 (“PD 1146”). In
his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole
beneficiary.Milagros
filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim
because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to
survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed
Milagros on 10 July 1983, less
than one year from his date of retirement on “17 February 1984.”
On 2
October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for
declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and was granted of the
survivorship pension.
GSIS appealed to the COA, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the
Court that she already accepted the decision of the GSIS and is not interested
anymore of the survivorship pension. GSIS wants the court to decide on the case
basing on the merit of the letter given by Milagros(respondent).
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the decision of Section 18 of PD 1146 is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
SEC. 18. Death
of a Pensioner. Upon
the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the applicable
pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That,
the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with
the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified
for the pension. When
the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship
pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the
pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship
benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being received at the time of
death.
The
main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD
1146, which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship
pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension (“the proviso”).
We hold that the proviso, which was the
sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros’ claim, is unconstitutional
because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory
and denies equal protection of the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of
merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of
Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that “the dependent spouse
shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.” The
Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O.
Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid provison.
No pronouncement as to costs.
BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH
ALINDOGAN, petitioners,
v HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B.
Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge
against Banjamin V. Kho, now
petitioner, in his
residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay,
another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search
warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy.
Moonwalk, Paranaque. The
search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a
personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of
confidential information they received that
the said places were being used as
storage centers for unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles. On the same
day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants
and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12,
90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, NBI
conducted the simultaneous searches on the said residences of the petitioner
(Kho) and they were able to confiscate the above mention objects stated in the
warrant and the simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of
various radio and telecommunication equipment. The confiscated items were
verified in Camp Crame and were proven that all of them are unlicensed.
Petitioner (Kho) question the validity
of the warrant and filed a Motion to Quash the previous decision.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the issuance of the search warrant by the
respondent Judge valid?
2.
Whether or not the Motion to Quash filed by the
petitioner (Kho) alleging that there was an abuse enforcement of the challenge
search warrant valid?
3.
Whether or not the Petitioners sought to restrain the
respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case
or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the said
items valid.
RULING:
The Court believes, and so holds, that
the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory requirements. The law does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is very
crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the
details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of the search
nugatory.
The question of whether there was abuse
in the enforcement of the challanged search warrants is not within the scope of
a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity
of the issuance of the warrant. The
manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue to
be resolved here. As aptly
opined and ruled by the respondent Judge, petitioners have remedies under
pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem at hand, which
cannot be solved by their present motion to quash.
Considering that cases for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation of Section 3 in relation to
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972, have been instituted against the petitioners, the petition for
mandamus with preliminary and mandatory injunction to return all objects seized
and to restrain respondent NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has
become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become
moot and academic, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.
G.R. No.
82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V.
SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V.ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON.
RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice,
LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO,
respondents.
G.R. No.
82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D.
BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON.
RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at
Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS
SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No.
83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D.
BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS
F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the
Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V.
Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R.
Nos. 82827 and 83979.
FACTS:
. On March
30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners.
A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by
the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through
the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention
that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law
has lost factual support.
Petitioner Beltran also said that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is not valid because the judge did not personally examined
the complainant and witnesses.
.On the other hand, Petitioner Beltran argues that
"the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit,
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court
or perjury.
So, the petitioners’ raised 3 questions to
contend if there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, respectively:
(1) whether
or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under
the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the public respondent.
RULING:
The first question was rendered moot and academic.
The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation
is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he
filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law
does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed.
All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second question, court interpreted the
provision under Article III, sec 2, which states that, no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The court
said that, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
The third
question, court said that, the rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
The
petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate
acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in
G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo
contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and
reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
G.R.No.
74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL
AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T.
Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Idel
Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana
leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
In his
defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his
bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. The trial court was not
convinced of the statement of the Aminnudin (accused-appellant) because of lack
of proof to show that he was really manhandled to force him to admit the crime
and trial court said that it was valid through Rule 113, sec 6(b) the Rules of
Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to
a lawful arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not the application of Rule 113, sec 6(b) the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests is valid.
Whether or
not the decision of the Trial court in convicting the accused-appellant valid.
RULING:
In the case
at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention
of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was
held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures
for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
Without the
evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have
been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana
was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest
because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
We find that
with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he
must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY,
the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant,
known only as Benjie, that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be arriving from Baguio
City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of
marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt.
Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the
bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
“Cash Katutak.” Upon examination of the
seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical
Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a
prohibited drug. She was charged with violating the Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act and sentenced her to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On
her defence, accused-appellant reputed the above accusations against her and
said that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice
Theater where she watched the movie “Balweg.”
While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a
shoulder bag. In the middle of the road,
Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the
NARCOM Office. During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any
knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred that the old woman was
nowhere to be found after she was arrested.
Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the
arresting officers.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the search and seizure
conducted by P/Lt. Abello and his team valid.
RULING:
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be
committing a crime. Neither was she
about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground
for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a
crime. It was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled
out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended
accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because,
as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing
finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as
it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure. Neither was there
any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause
and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause
and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being
incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was
similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be
used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned
tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of
the Constitution.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ORMOC
SUGAR COMPANY, INC.
VS.
THE
TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-23794
Facts:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964 imposing any of all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States and other foreign
countries.
Ormoc Sugar Company paid a total of P12,
087.50 under protest and subsequently filed a case before the Court of 1st
Instance of Leyte for being unconstitutional as it violates the equal
protection clause (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) and the rule of uniformity of taxation
(Sec. 22 [1], Art. VI).
On
August 6, 1964, the Court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality
of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city
broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes,
licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
Ruling:
Yes. The ordinance is discriminatory for its taxes only
the Ormoc Sugar Company and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently sugar central from the
coverage of the tax. Even later when a similar company will be set up, it
cannot be subject to tax because the ordinance expressly points only the Ormoc
Sugar Company.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the
defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12, 087.50
plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ET AL.
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 126859
Facts:
On March 31, 1995, Presiding Judge Mangay of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City issued search warrants for the search and seizure
of certain of certain items in Apartment No.
2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City and found the 2
M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live
M-16 ammunitions, among others. Likewise, the police searched also the
Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. The
firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the
apartments were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court
of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
C-48666-67, accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners
were arrested and detained.
At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied
petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and
3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3
of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the
place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely
abused its discretion when itruled that the
search and seizure orders in question were valid and the objects seized
admissiblein evidence.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search
conducted at Apartment No. 8 is hereby declared illegal and the item (.45
caliber pistol) seized therein is inadmissible in evidence. However, the search
at Apartment No. 2 pursuant to Search Warrant 55-95 is hereby declared valid
and legal, and the articles seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in
evidence. Let this can be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City, Branch 123, for trial on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67 with
dispatch.
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.
PRISCILLA
DEL NORTE
G.R. No. 149462
Facts:
On
August 1, 1997, a search warrant was served on Ising Gutierrez Diwa, residing
at No. 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, by SPO1 Angel Lumabas and their
group for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425. They were ordered to
forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quality of shabu and
marijuana leaves. They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in manila paper
under the bed and inside the room. Appellant was brought to the police
headquarters for further investigation.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant
against her. She asserted that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Brgy. Balsa,
Caloocan City and that she was just visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275
North Service Road corner Cruzada Street., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No. The search warrant has irregularity because the
authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the search. They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant and
their knowledge was based on pure hearsay only. The prosecution witness failed
to establish appellant’s ownership of the
house where the prohibited drugs were discovered.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.
ALVANO SAYCON Y BUQUIRAN
G.R. No. 110995
Facts:
The trial court
rendered, on June 15, 1993, a judgment of conviction. The court found Alvano
Saycon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having transported four (4) grams of
Metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sentenced him to life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P20,000.00
On July 8, 1992, 6:00 A.M. the Coastguard personnel
received information from Narcotics Command agent Ruben Laddaran that a
suspected “shabu” courier by the name of
Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was arriving at that
moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief
officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. NarCom agents,
Philippine Coastguard personnel and Senior Police Officers posted themselves at
the gate of Pier 1.
The MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same
morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat
carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine
Coastguard where he was identified by police officer. He was invited to the
Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area and willingly went with them. The
coastguard asked him to open his bag and willingly obliged. In it were personal
belongings and a maong wallet. Inside the maong wallet was a Marlboro pack
containing the suspected “shabu”. The police officer, Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the
suspected “shabu” was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag
and the suspected “shabu” were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When
he was arrested, the NARCOM agents did
not have a warrant of arrest.
Alvaro Saycon appeal before this court seeking reversal
of the decision of the trial court and contends that the search of his bag was
illegal because it had been made without a search warrant and that therefore,
the “shabu” discovered during the illegal search was inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Issue:
Is the warrantless
search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Rulings:
Yes. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles- automobiles, trucks, etc.
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial
warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Also, a
peace officer may without a warrant, arrest a person when he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision of
the trial court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATIONS, however, appellant shall suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as
maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No pronouncement as
to cost.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES
ASSOCIATION ET AL
VS.
HON. PETE PRADO ET AL
G.R. No. 110995
Facts:
The petition assails the constitutionality of Sec. 35 of
Republic Act No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No. 92-98. These measures withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government
offices.
The Philippine Judges Association
averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege
of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such
as the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC and former
Presidents of the Philippines among others.
Issue:
Whether or not
there is a violation of equal protection before the law.
Ruling:
Yes. The equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all
others in these same particulars
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
partially GRANTED and Sections 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds to all of which
offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order
dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998]
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of
radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens,
taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing
to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it
was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.
Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to
bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television
broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of
B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free
air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other
political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground
(1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given
to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication
or information during the period of election. Petitioner claims that it
suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these
stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing
free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to
lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least
30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
(2)
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property
without due process of law and without just compensation.
RULING:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All
broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio
and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own
the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the
state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out
radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and
magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they
may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry
requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print
media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC
is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do
not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they
provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a social function
and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast
media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever
altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections
is for that common good.
For
the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO LUMANG, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that
"he has been informed" and was of the belief that Maria Castro and Co
Ling, whose place of residence was not indicated, although subsequently mention
was made of their being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in
possession narcotics and other contraband." There is a claim that he had
verified the report and that he had "reasons to believe that a Search
Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned to take possession" of
such narcotics and other contraband. The application was accompanied by the
joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G.
Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. Again, mention was merely made of their
information about narcotics and other contraband being kept by Castro and Co
Ling. They allege that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could
come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for almost ten
years conducting such traffic and that after verification, he was not
registered in the Immigration Office. Then, on the very same day, the search
warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. Again,
there was reference to the possession by Castro and Co Ling of such forbidden
goods.
As to the complete and detailed description
of the properties to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal
traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and premises of
petitioners. In the resolution upholding the validity of the search warrant,
respondent Judge did state the following: "On July 10, 1967, Ernesto
Lumang, Sgt. of the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in chamber before
the Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With him were Sgt. Molina and
Cpl. Apilado both of the PC Command of La Union. The three submitted to the
Presiding Judge in chamber an application for search warrant which is Exhibit I
in this case and a joint affidavit supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt.
Lumang said, testifying regarding this incident, those appearing were asked,
although not in writing and not recorded, some questions by the Presiding Judge
regarding their request of the search warrant on the knowledge of Molina and
Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The
inquiry was brief. The barrio to be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria
Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this correction was not
done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining
barrios. After the routine taking of their oath and examination questions and
answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search
warrant, the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not a search warrant issued without complying with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court should have been nullified
RULING:
Respondent
Judge conducted the required "examination under oath" be justified
merely because respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the PC, with a long
service behind him.
He did not even bother to take the
depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. There
was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the constitutional standard as to
the quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause. The Constitution
requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." As admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was
a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the
search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria
Cristina. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural
requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense."
Reference was made to "an illegal
traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term
covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to
applicable statutes. More than one offense could arise from the activity
designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact,
in the challenged order, reference was made to at least three charges having
been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue Code, its
Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession of opium. It is the
established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the illegality of the search
warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of
which is prohibited by law. The issuance of the search warrant in question the
judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No.
58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its
paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are
they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge. The SC
held that the search warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being
violative both of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Likewise
notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the challenged order of
respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of
the articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of
distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search
warrant.
BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE
JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, 10th
Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent
G.R No. 153087, August 7, 2003
FACTS:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L.
Alcoser together with his witness Ruel Nalagon applied for the issuance of a
warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who
was referred to in the application as “Rumolo Nala alias Long” of “Purok 4,
Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.” The application was filed in connection with
petitioner’s alleged illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm.
pistol in violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the same day, respondent Presiding Judge
of RTC of Malaybalay City, issued Search and Seizure Warrant .On July 4, 2001,
at around 6:30 in the morning, Alcoser and other police officer search the
petitioner’s house and allegedly seized the following: (1) one piece caliber
.38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number 1125609; (2) one pc. Fragmentation
grenade (cacao type); (3) one pc. .22 long barrel; (4) 5- pcs live ammunition
for caliber .38 revolver; and (5) 4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and
unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu. Petitioner
questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed an Omnibus Motion to
Quash but was denied by the judge.
Lower court found that probable cause was
duly established from the deposition and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon
and the testimony of PO3 Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to
confirm the information given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were
not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same
because the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal
possession of firearms. Respondent judge also found that petitioner was
sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously
stated therein as “Romulo” and not “Bernard”, considering that the warrant was
couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and
residence of petitioner and no other.
ISSUES:
(1)
Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?
(2)
Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant
against petitioner?
(3)
Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioner’s
residence are admissible in evidence against him even though said firearms were
not listed in the search and seizure warrant. Immaterial due to a void search
warrant.
RULING:
(1)
YES.
the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name
of petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not
invalidate the warrant because the additional description “alias Lolong Nala
who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon”
sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner.
. What is prohibited is a warrant
against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a
descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused
without difficulty.
(2)
NO.
Nowhere in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3
Macrino L. Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search warrant was it
mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. PO3 Alcoser and
his witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal knowledge but only personal belief
of petitioner’s lack of license to possess firearms, ammunitions and
explosives; and did not adduce the evidence required to prove the existence of
probable cause. Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of
the evidence presented is void.
(3)
The
settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by
virtue of a void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the course of
the search are inadmissible against the accused. Prohibited articles may be
seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant,
the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the
military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no right to be
there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.”
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. Search and Seizure Warrant is declared VOID
and the articles seized by virtue thereof are declared inadmissible in
evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant.
[G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003]
FACTS:
Prior to Nov. 20, 1996,
Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the RTC of Zambales issued a warrant for the
conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal,
Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales. On same day, Senior Police Officer
(SPO1) Antonio Buloron, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together
with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special
Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales, coordinated with the
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the
assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the
enforcement of the search warrant. On
their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella sitting on a rocking chair
located about 2 meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of
appellant, and being rented by Estrella's live-in partner, named Eva. They
approached Estrella and showed him the search warrant. Estrella surrendered to
the team 2 cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained 20
bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of Estrella
and his live-in partner. They found a plastic container which contained 4 big
bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live
ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions.
SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested Estrella and brought him to San
Marcelino, Zambales.
The
defense, however has different version, denied having surrendered to policeman
Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and likewise having any firearm.
Appellant also claims that the hut, which was searched by the police and where
the subject marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him. He points to
another house as his real residence. Estella was investigated at San Marcelino,
Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact that the house they
searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan. Still, Estrella
was charged for possession of prohibited drugs and unlicensed firearms. On the
other hand, Estrella was acquitted from the charge of violation of PD 1866 The
.38 caliber revolver without serial number and 4 live ammunitions, subject of
the offense, were however ordered delivered to any authorized representative of
the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame,
Quezon City. Estrella appealed said decision.
ISSUE:
Whether
the search undertaken inside the hut during which the incriminating evidence
was allegedly recovered was legal.
RULING:
There is no convincing proof
that Estrella indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or
otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds
rather than clarifies the prosecution's story. Given this backdrop, the police
authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such
a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through
Section 5 (Arrest without warrant; when lawful), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
All
told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty. Not only did its evidence
fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it has also failed
to present any evidence at all. Under
our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the accused is to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To overcome such presumption,
the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates that if
the prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the accused to
be set free, but also the constitutional duty of the court to set them free.
This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C.
Estella for insufficiency of evidence.
WHEREFORE,
the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE.
Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from
custody.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES and ROGER AMAR y
MATEO, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 132165. March 26, 2003]
FACTS:
Armed with a search warrant, SPO4 Gelacio R.
Guarino, Chief of Police of Banga, Aklan together with PO2 Jhanny Navida,
raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal St., Poblacion, Banga, Aklan on
March 2, 1996, relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants,
Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran and Pepe Casabuena. The three were apprehended for
illegal possession of marijuana and were detained at the Banga Police Station.
In the course of their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly
from Capiz and Roger Amar were the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be
back on March 4, 1996.
On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz, caretaker of
the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed Guarino that there were two strangers
looking for the Duran sisters. Then they proceeded to the house and saw a
woman, who turned out to be accused-appellant Melly Sarap. Melly saw Guarino
and Navida in police uniform and immediately threw away her black canvass bag,
which Roger Amar picked up. Guarino Blocked Sarap’s path and grabbed from her
the green plastic bag she was holding. The plastic bag was found to contain two
blocks of marijuana fruiting tops. Navida pursued Amar and arrested him. The
accused-apellant denied the accusations against her. The Court fines accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article II, Sec 4 of Republic
Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused appealed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether
the warrantless search and arrest conducted is legal.
(2)
Whether
the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to find the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
A search may be conducted by law enforcers
only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product
of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to
Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless searches and
seizures may be made without a warrant in the following instances: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving motor vehicle,
(3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in
plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not
dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug,
the appellant’s conviction cannot stand. There is simply no
sufficient evidence to convict her. That the search disclosed
marijuana fruiting tops in appellant’s possession, and thus confirmed the
police officers’ initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent
illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an
arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search for being
a fruit of a poisonous tree.
All
told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty of conviction. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence as constitutionally ordained
Wherefore
the Accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Ramon B. Ceniza, Federico C. Cabilao Jr.,
Nelson J. Rosal and Alejandro R. Alinsug, petitioners
vs.
Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit
and National Treasurer, respondents
G.R. No. L-52304
January 28, 1980
Facts:
On December 22, 1978, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51, providing rules regarding the upcoming local
election on January 30, 1980. To implement this act, the Commission on
Elections(COMELEC) adopted Resolution No. 1421, which barred qualified voters
from highly urbanized and chartered component cities(unless if its’ charter
provides the contrary) to vote for positions in the provincial level. The
resolution listed the City of Mandaue and Cebu among the cities not entitled to
participate in the pro-provincial elections.
Cebu was included because it was classified as a highly urbanized
city(having income not less than 40,000,000 pesos) while Mandaue though only a
component city, however its charter expressly provides that its registered
voters cannot vote, except to be a candidate thereof. Ramon Ceniza, in behalf of a group called
DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed), filed a petition
assailing that Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 and Republic Act No. 5519(Charter of
Mandaue City) are unconstitutional. The petitioners contend that, Section 96,
Art. XVIII of the Charter of Mandaue is unconstitutional for it went into
effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents in a plebiscite or
referendum. They also claimed that political and gerrymandering motives were
behind the passage of BP Blg. 51 pointing out the province of Cebu is politically
and historically known as an opposition bailiwick. Most importantly, Sec. 3 of
Batas Blg. 51, that classifies Cebu City as a highly urbanized city as the only
basis for not allowing its electorate for provincial officials is inherently
and palpably unconstitutional and such classification is not based upon
substantial distinctions making it unreasonable which amounts to denial of
equal protection.
Issue:
Are the voters of Mandaue and Cebu City denied
with the equal protection of the law?
Ruling:
The
Court found no merit in the petition. The classification of cities into highly
urbanized cities and components cities on the basis of their regular income is
based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or
not is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social,
economic and political unit. Cities with smaller income need the continued
support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some
instances.
The equal protection of the law
contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar right and privileges granted
by law. The law would have been discriminatory and a denial of equal protection
of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the
city from voting for provincial
officials while granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the
same city. Moreover, the practice of allowing voters in one component city to
vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in
another city is a matter of legislative discretion which neither violates the
Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage. It cannot be considered also an
infringement upon such right since the Constitution confers no right to a voter
in a city to vote for provincial officials of the province where the city is
located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city
officials in local elections in which the questioned statute neither withdraw
nor restrict.
On the constitutionality of the Charter of
the City of Mandaue; the constitutional requirement that the creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of the boundary of a province, city,
municipality, or in a barrio should be subjected to the approval by the
majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the government unit or units affected
is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution,
which is prospective therefore cannot affect the creation of Mandaue City on
June 21, 1969.
Finally, on the claims of political and
gerrymandering motives is of no factual or legal basis. Gerrymandering is a
term employed to describe an appointment of representative districts as to give
an unfair advantage to the party in power. The questioned statutes do not
apportion representative districts nor has it been shown that there has been an
unfair advantage in favor of the candidates in power.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is dismissed. Costs against the petitioners
Gil V. Manlavi, complainant,
vs.
Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., Regional
Trial Court, Branch 47, City of Puerto Princesa, respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293
May 9, 1995
Facts:
On
January 18, 1991 at Brgy. Mandaragat, Pureto Princesa City, the accused dis
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess illegally caught assorted
fish with the use of explosives weighing more or less eight thousand (8,000)
kilos. The complainant filed thereafter
Criminal Cases No. 9210(Illegal Possession of Explosives Intended for Fishing)
and 9211 (Illegal Possession of Illegally Caught Fish) against the accused. The
cases were consolidated for trial at the sala of the Honorable respondent. The
accused then moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the ground that the
evidence of the prosecution was a product of a warrantless and illegal search
and seizure and also moved to quash Criminal Case Criminal case 9211 on the
ground that the information failed to charge the offense of illegal possession
of fish caught by explosives for its failure to allege the element of profit.
The
respondent granted both the motion to quash the criminal cases filed. The
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order but was denied. The
complainant then charged the respondent with partiality, miscarriage of justice
and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of
the Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 and 9211.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge erred in dismissing
the case due to warrantless arrest and search and seizure.
Ruling:
The
complaint is dismissed. As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9210,
complainant himself admitted that the search and seizure was conducted in the
absence of a warrant and that the search warrant was only produced by the
complainant after the search and seizure took place. The complainant invoked Circular No.
130(s.1967) of the Office of the President to justify the warrantless search.
The said circular pertains to the procedure in the confiscation of fish caught
by the use of explosives. Such confiscation may be exercised only by the
Commissioner of Fisheries or his representatives who can only take a sample of
the fish caught (not to exceed one kilo) for testing if the fish were indeed
caught through the use of explosives. It is only upon the determination that
the fish were caught through the use of explosives when the seizure of the
entire catch may be authorized. Thereafter, an appraisal of the value of the
fish caught shall be made, which shall be paid to the accused should he be
subsequently acquitted in the criminal case filed against him. The arresting
officer failed to show compliance with the procedure prescribed by the very
circular they invoked.
As to the dismissal of the Criminal Case
9211, though the respondent erred in holding that the information was defective
that the information was defective in not alleging that the offense was
committed “knowingly” because the element of knowledge was encompassed within
the word “willfully”; however, the information failed to allege the element of
profit. Though it is true that the prohibits Presidential Decree No. 704
prohibits the separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of
illegally caught fish and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done
“knowingly” but also “for profit”, as essential element of the offense.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
Rolando Codilla, German Lucanas and Marcelo
Putulin, accused-appellants
Facts:
On May
24, 1990 at about 3:00 o’clock in the early morning at Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc
City, Helen and her sister Leticia Pepito were awakened from their sleep. When
they opened their eyes they were surprised to see two men carrying bolos and
flashlights. One of the men asked if they had money; when Helen replied that
they have none, she was ordered to go down the kitchen while her sister was
brought to the sala by and there Helen was allegedly raped by Rolando Codilla
and while her siste was raped by Marcelo
Putulin.
Also on November 27, 1990 at 3:00 o’
clock in the morning, Margarita Alpos was sexually abused by two men who she
identified as Rolando Codilla and German Lucanas. At around 2:30 of the same date, Sgt. Romeo
Penarada together PFC Mamento Sarcol Jr, PFC Diosdado Tagalog, Pat. Eduardo
Bituin and CVO Manuel Pepito proceeded to the place where the alleged rape
suspects were hiding and thus the police were able to apprehend the suspects
and brought them to the Ormoc City Police Station. The RTC convicted the
appellants for the crime of rape and as well as to indemnify the victims for
damages.
The accused-appellants then filed a
petition to review and reverse the decision. However, during the pendency of
the appeal, Roland Codilla escaped from jail on July 27, 1991 while German
Lucanas whereabouts remains unknown after a flashflood hit their cells. As such
only the appeal of Putulin was the only petition the court has resolved.
Issue:
Whether
or not the nature and circumstances surrounding their arrest is violative of
their constitutional right against illegal warrantless arrest.
Ruling:
The
appellant started his defense by challenging his warrantless arrest and
detention for two days without any charges being filed against him. However,
this argument must be rejected by the court for the simple reason that he is
estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being
raised for the first time by the appellant before this court. He did not move
for the quashal of the information before the trial court. Hence, any irregularity
for his arrest, if any was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in the trial.
Wherefore,
the assailed judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners.
The People
of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
Fidel
Abrenica Cubcubin Jr., accused-appellant
Facts:
At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26,
1997, the Cavite City Police Station has receiveda telephone call that a person
had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio,
Cavite City. For this reason, a police team composed of SPO1 Malinao Jr. , PO3
Rosal, PO3 Estoy Jr., PO3 Manicio and SPO3 Manalo responded to the call and
found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle. A tricycle driver, who
refused to divulge his name, then told PO3 Rosal that the accused-appellant and
the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Café, located about
a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Danet Garcellana, a food
server/ waitress at the said café told the police investigators that she had
seen the accused arrive together with the victim however she did not know if
they left together. Garcellano described the accused-appellant in which then
another tricycle driver told the investigators that he knows a person that fits
the description given by the waitress and told them where his house is.
As
they went to the house and upon entering, SPO1 Malinao noticed a “bloodied”
white Hanes t-shirt. As he picked up the shirt, two(2) spent .38 caliber shells
fell. As they proceeded the search, PO3 Estoy found on top of a plastic water
container outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver
and five live ammunitions. The police station then took custody of Cubcubin and
the evidences found. After an evaluation of the evidence, a formal criminal
complaint was then filed against the accused-appellant.
The trial court convicted the accused-appellant
guilty as charged for murder.
Issues:
Whether or not the arrest of the accused-
appellee was valid.
Whether
or not the search and seizure of the alleged incriminating evidences was valid
and legal.
Ruling:
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended
points out the three instances when warrantless arrest is lawful. The case at
bar, falls under par. B Sec. 5 which provides that for a warrantless arrest to
be valid, two conditions must concur: first, the offender has just committed an
offense and second, the arresting peace officer has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been
held that “personal knowledge of facts” in an arrest without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable ground
for suspicion. In this case, the arrest of the accused-appellant was shortly
after the victim was killed. The question therefore, is whether there was
“probable cause” for the arresting officer to believe that the accused
committed the crime. The court found none. The arresting officers did not have
‘personal knowledge of the facts as their knowledge of the circumstance from
which they allegedly inferred that the accused was probably guilty was based
entirely on what they had been told by others. They merely relied on
information given to them by others.
As to
the validity of the search and seizure, even assuming that the warrantless
arrest to be valid as the prosecution contends, the search cannot be considered
incidental thereto. A valid warrantless search incidental to a valid arrest
allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person
of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. It is clear
that the warrantless arrest cannot be justified on this ground for neither the
t-shirt nor the gun were within the area of accused-appellants control. Nor the
warrantless search is justified under the “plain-view doctrine”. The alleged evidences
against the accused did not merely stumble upon the police officers as such
they are purposely sought it. Hence the things obtained as a result of the
search are illegal and are inadmissible evidence against the Cubcubin.
Wherefore, the decision of the RTC charging
the accused guilty of murder is reversed and he is acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas
alias “Stephen Po y Uy” or “Tommy Sy” and Paul Lee y Wong alias “Paul Leung”,
accused-appellants
Facts:
On
February 21, 1992 accused Cuizon and his wife from Hongkong at the NAIA. After
which they proceeded to the arrival area of the airport where they handed down
four (4) travelling bags to the accused Steve Pua and Paul Lee. On the other
hand, a group of NBI agents have posted themselves before the arrival of the
couple at the airport for the purpose of apprehending them because they
allegedly brought with them a huge quantity of shabu as tipped by an informant
from Hongkong. The accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they
boarded in leaving the airport while the accused Cuizon and his wife took
another vehicle. At this juncture, the other team positioned at the parking
area was radioed to intercept the vehicle accused Pua and Lee boarded, however
the communication was not completely received as they radio ran out of battery
power.
Realizing the failure, the group
followed the vehicle taken by Pua and Lee which proceeded to Manila Peninsula
Hotel in Makati. With the help of the Chief Security Officer of the hotel, they
apprehended Lee and Pua in their hotel room and confiscated four (4) travelling
bags; three (3) of which yielded a plastic containing a white substance
suspected to be shabu. Thereafter, the team proceeded to the house of accused
Cuizon, taking with them Pua and Lee. Retrieved from the accused Cuizon’s
residence was another bag containing a substance likewise suspected to be
shabu; in addition a .38 caliber firearm.
All of them were then taken into
custody by the NBI and was the charged (with the exception of Cuizon’s wife) in
violation of Section 15 of R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
RTC found the accused-appellants guilty as charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrests and warrantless search and
seizures conducted by the NBI against the accused are legal and constitutional.
Ruling:
The
court cannot agree at the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants
were caught in flagrante delicto which would have justified the warrantless
search. Paragraph (a) of Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrest without warrant requires that the
person be arrested after he has committed or while he is actually committing or
is at least attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. These requirements are not present, for at the time of the arrest,
appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in their hotel room and appellant
Cuizon was in his bed resting with his wife and children. No offense had just
been committed, or was being committed by the accused n the presence of the
lawmen.
Paragraph (b) of the same rule is also
inapplicable as such its requirements have not been met. The prosecution failed
to establish that at the time of the arrest an offense has in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the accused-appellants have committed it. Appellant Cuizon
could not, by the mere act of handing over four(4) pieces of luggage to the
other two appellants be considered to have committed the offense of “carrying
and transporting” prohibited drugs. The only reason why such it became a
“felonious deed” was because of an alleged tip received by the NBI that
morning. The NBI merely relied on hearsay information and such under the
circumstance it failed to establish that they have “personal knowledge”
sufficient and reasonable enough to believe that the appellants had committed a
crime at the point when the search and seizure were made. Therefore,
accused-appellant Cuizon is acquitted on constitutional ground.
G.R.
NO. 128845,
JUNE
1, 2000
INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,
vs.
HON.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary
of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc.
(School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and
management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine
or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable
laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or
will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. Classification varies from four (4) queries,
viz;
a. What is one's
domicile?
b. Where is one's
home economy?
c. To which
country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the
individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible
for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on
June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well
as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the
failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which
favored the School.
ISSUE:
Should the foreign-hires should be included
in bargaining unit of local- hires?
RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section
3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.”
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory,
the office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers
treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of
wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to
“protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article
II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State
has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must
yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the
same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of
a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate
collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that
foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining
history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes
and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to
their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the
latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would
not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining
rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE.
The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
G.R. No. 133254-55,
April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant
FACTS:
On December 26, 1995, around 10:30 p.m., a group of about
ten (10) policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of
the accused-appellant, Roberto Salanguit y Ko, a search warrant was shown, and
the police operatives started searching the house. They found heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip
box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried
leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto
Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of
shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively)
were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases
Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.
The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against
him was inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
ISSUES:
1.
Was
the warrant find invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the
seizure of “drug paraphernalia?
2.
Whether
the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view
doctrine.”
RULING:
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined
quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing
probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in
fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as
to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to
the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was
properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed
to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous
with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
Salanguit’s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery,
therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been
recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was
invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357,
accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs
S16 of R.A.No. 6425.
GR No.
94054-67
February
19, 1991
VICENTE
LIM SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioner
Vs.
HON.
NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents
FACTS:
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in
the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate
,Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial
Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and
killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then
followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of
preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg,
of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City
filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing,
among others, Vicente Lim, Sr.,Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez,
Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and
Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 9211.
After conducting the preliminary
investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein
that “. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses
for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questions
and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint,
namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez,
Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio
Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tuallaalias Tidoy.”
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim
filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in
substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the
initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the
Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the
existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of
the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate
shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated
that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima
facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of
some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. It should also be noted that
the Lims also presented to the respondent Judge documents of recantation of
witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against
them.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued
an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The
judge wrote, “In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted
by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of
probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all
the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the
Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four
separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent
officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of
probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there
is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely
on the prosecutor's certification in each information…”
Petitioners question the judgment of Judge
Felix.
ISSUE:
WON
a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists?
RULING:
The
questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional
Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET
ASIDE. As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same
functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there
should be necessary documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All of these should be before the Judge. We cannot determine
beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be.
Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to
exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is vested in
the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond
the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. As
mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented documents of
recantations of the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that recantations
are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of
a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest
should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary
examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the
concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing
in the cases. In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible
officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that
discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix)committed a grave error when he relied
solely on the Prosecutor’s certification and issued the questioned Order dated
July 5,1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause.
G.R. Nos. 130568-69
March 21, 2000.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee
vs.
CHE CHUN TING alias “DICK,”
accuses-appellant
FACTS:
Accused-appellant, Che Chun Ting alias
“DICK,” a Hong Kong national, was charged and convicted for dispatching in
transit and dispatching 999.43 grams of shabu and possessioning and control 5,
578.68 grams of the same drug. He contends that the methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is inadmissible in evidence as it was seized without a
valid search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether the white crystalline seized under his Unit without valid
search warrant an inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
The lawful arrest being the sole
justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception,
the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of
the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with
respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him
are limited to “dangerous weapons” or “anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense.” With respect to the time and place of the
warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated
otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time
of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect
was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
It must be stressed that the purposes of the
exception are only to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from
the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and also
to prevent the person arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach.
The exception therefore should not be strained beyond what is needed in order
to serve its purposes.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the
things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a polluted
source, the “fruit of a poisonous tree.” However, objects and properties the
possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners
notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the
NARCOM operatives, which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the
law, can and must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance
with law.
GR No. 96177,
January
27, 1993
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Vs.
MARI
MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant
FACTS:
On December 14,
1989, in the City of Zamboanga City, accused-appellant, Mari Musa was
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sells to one Sgt. Amado Ani, two (2)
wrappers of plastic bags containing dried marijuana leaves during the buy-bust
operation.
Accused-appellant
contends that seizure of the plastic bag is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible
evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable and the found evidence is
inadmissible.
RULING:
Yes.
It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as
evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s
lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain
view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the
object.
In the case at
bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested
the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other
evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside
the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said
object.
Therefore, the
‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 81958 June
30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION
OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
FACTS:
The
petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for
short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS”. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" and
that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.
On
May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of
Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar,
Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the
challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police
power of the Philippine State. The petitioner has proffered no argument that
the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 Series of 1988 of the
Department of labor and Employment
violates the constitution?
RULING: .
The discrimination of male workers from the female workers was justified
because there is no evidence that the male workers were abused. But the Order
was not in contrary to the constitution because it is the duty of the state to
provide full protection to labor and that Department Order No. 1 did not
prescribe a total ban on overseas deployment and the alleged violation of right
to travel was not violated because such right must submit to the demands and
necessities of the States’s power of regulation for public safety.
[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1576. June 28, 2001]
SIMPLICIO ALIB, for himself and in behalf of the members
of the MANDALAGAN SMALL FARMERS COOPERATIVE, complainants, vs. JUDGE EMMA C. LABAYEN of the Regional
Trial Court, Bacolod City, Branch 46,respondent.
FACTS:
Complainants charge the respondent Judge Emma
Labayen of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 with grave abuse
of authority and grave misconduct. They allege that an Information
for Perjury docketed to Criminal Case No. 98-19271 was filed against several
members of the Mandalangan Small Farmers Cooperative with Regional Trial Court
of Bacolod City. Judge Labayen issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused therein. The accused filed a "Motion for Re-
investigation and Recall of Warrant of Arrest" and a Supplemental thereto
alleging that the court has no jurisdiction as the crime of perjury is within
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities.
Respondent
Judge Labayen filed a Supplemental Pleading reiterating that as pairing judge
of Branch 45, it was ministerial on her part to sign warrants of arrest coming
from Branch 45 and that when she realized that the case was within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC, she had the case remanded as shown in her Order dated
October 2, 1998. Respondent Judge claims she acted without malice
and in good faith.
ISSUES:
Whether or not acting without malice and in
good faith not knowing the exact probable cause of the warrant of arrest issued
constitutes gross ignorance of the law?
RULING:
Yes, before issuing a warrant of arrest,
a judge must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the prosecutor, he
must evaluate the report and the supporting documents which will assist him to
make his determination of probable cause. A finding of the existence of a
probable cause is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
strict compliance therewith is required of judges.
Republic
of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN
BANC
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
On
October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in
a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar. On November 3, 1987,
public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned,
sent to the petitioner a telegram to summon him. On the same day, having
ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE
AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205.
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on
Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto
Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No.
1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito
Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to
the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a
certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was
accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced
upon twelve talent performers practicing
a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated
assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and
witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
On
January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA stating to return the confiscated
items on the ground that the said seizure was contrary to law and against the
will of the owner and among the others reasons are they have not been given any
prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated
November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec.
1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. Their action also violates Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine
Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose." And lastly the premises invaded by Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including
2 policemen) are the private
residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the
seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with
grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of
domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:
Whether
the promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
Yes, the promulgated Presidential Decree was
unconstitutional because under Article III, Section 2, of the l987
Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest
and search where the only exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, for the purpose of deportation.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R.
No. 138881. December 18, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at
the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side,
California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was
naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had since been working as a
registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer’s
disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the
Philippines to visit her son’s family in Calamba, Laguna. She was
due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she
checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the
next day, June 26, 1998.
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia
Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA
departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers,
employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband
goods, and explosives.
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental
Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal
area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two
panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez
reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying “Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po
iyon.” (“Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.”) She was
directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest women’s room for
inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room,
accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Ramirez then asked her “to bring out
the thing under her girdle.” Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs,
which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women’s room. The
confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of
580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu.”
ISSUES:
Whether the arrest without warrant is lawful?
RULING:
Yes, because according to Section 5, Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) when in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) when an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
[G.R. Nos.
132875-76. February 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs
. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
FACTS:The accused-appellant, Romeo G.
Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUES: Does being an elective official result
in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment?
RULING: The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded.
People
vs.
Lacerna
G.R. No. 109250
September 25, 1997
Facts:
On September 12, 1992, Marlon
Lacerna and Noriel Lacerna were aboard in a taxi cab when the mobile patrol car
of PO3 Angelito Camer
and PO3 Carlito P. Valenzuela, members of the Mobile Patrol Division of Western
Police District stop them for being so suspicious. The police officer asked
permission if they can search the vehicle, and the occupants answered yes. When
the police officer went searching they found in the occupants’ luggage a
knapsack and a dark blue plastic bag. When the police officer asked what is the
content of the plastic bag, Noriel Lacerna immediately answered that it
contains his vomit. Sceptical to Noriel
Lacernas’ answer, PO3 Valenzuela made a small hole and peeped inside and saw
several bricks wrapped in a newspaper. Officer Valenzuela took a brick and when
he opened it, it turned out to be Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Issue:
Whether
or not the bricks of Marijuana be admissible in the court and use as evidence
against the accused
Held:
Yes,
the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable searches and
seizure are not violated and the evidences are obtained legally and the
evidence does not constitute as “fruit of a poisonous tree”. The accused
allowed to be searched when he gave the consent to be search to the police
officers. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a
generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search. The
marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and
seizure. They were admissible in
evidence.
Jose Burgos
vs.
Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were
issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail
and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized items and
articles, and thus those seized articles will not be used by the respondents
against the petitioners in the court.
The petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and
that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not, the
two warrants are valid to justify the seizure of the items.
Held:
The warrants are
null and void. The Court found out that the affidavit for the application of
the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause because the
statements of the witnesses are mere generalizations. Furthermore,
jurisprudence prohibits the issuance of general warrants. In this case, the
warrant issued doesn’t describe and enumerate the items to be searched and
seized and did not indicate and specify the subversive nature of the said
items.
People
vs.
Mendoza
G.R. No. 109279
January 18, 1999
Facts:
On November 11,
1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife Cecilia and their 10 yr. Old daughter Charmaine
went to the birthday party of a relative in McDonalds’, Harrison Plaza. During
the party, Octavio left without telling his wife and kid, and went to Kentucky Fried
Chicken and Restaurant where he had some beer. Since Cecilia and Charamaine
couldn’t find him in the party, they went home at #2 TRAMO ST. CAMELLA HOMES,
PHASE III, PAMPLONA, LAS PINAS. They arrived home at 7pm, and still Octavio was
not at home and Cecilia left again to go to her parents in Bacoor to bring
perfume. They got home around 9pm and saw Octavio’s car parked in the garage of
their neighbour. All the lights were opened but the front door was locked.
After a while, Octavio opened the back door and let them in. He was drunk and
told her daughter to get cold water and douse him. She followed and was
instructed to go to her room. She went and got ready for bed. She heard her
parents arguing about them leaving the party without Octavio. Afterwards, she
heard THREE GUNSHOTS, ran to their room and saw her mom on the floor bleeding.
She also saw her dad hide a gun under the bed. Octavio called his
brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac arrived, they all brought him to
Perpetual Help Hospital where Cecila was declared dead on arrival. The
policemen investigated Gabac and found a gun in his waist. A .38 calibre
revolver. He told them that Octavio handed it over to him as soon as he arrived
at the crime scene. Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio learned of his daughter’s
death and that valuable were being taken away from her house. He and his sons
decided to go there and remove the rest of the property, including a memorandum
receipt signed by Octavio and a mission order authorizing him to carry such weapon.
At court, Charmaine testified that she saw her father hide the gun under the
bed. On her second testimony, she said she saw no such act. Octavio also denied
that he killed his wife and that he owned that gun. He said that the memorandum
receipt and mission order were illegally procured by Eusebio in violation of
his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue:
Does the Constitutional right of Octavio Mendoza
against unreasonable searches and seizures have been violated when Eusebio took
the memorandum receipt to the court?
Held:
No, because the people’s
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure can only be
invoke if there is interference from the Government and it these rights cannot
be extended if the acts are committed by private individuals. In this case, the
memorandum receipt and other articles were discovered by Alipio, Cecilias’
father, a private individual and handed it over to Eusibio.
Peralta
vs.
COMELEC
G.R.No. L-47771
March 11, 1978
Facts:
Peralta
was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa
Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or
the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978
Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual
candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of
candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a
political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided
for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation or
office-block ballot. Peralta was determined in contending that the optional
block voting scheme is violative of this provision of the Constitution:
“Bonafide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination. “He sought the shelter of its protection for
himself and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus
made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in
terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection
question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party
voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated
against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party,
a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage
which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that
the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of
the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article
XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether
or not 1978 Election Code violates the equal protection clause
Held:
The SC ruled
that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the
voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will
receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate
of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual
candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one
can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on
whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group
or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing
his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the
law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail
himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is
free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other
words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the
candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and
disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule
depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his
discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.
Waterous Drug Corporation
vs.
NLRC
G.R. No. 113271
October 16, 1997
Facts:
On August 15, 1988, Antonia
Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation.
Catolico purchased 10 bottles of Voren tablets from Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals a
price of 364php per bottle with its original price of 320php per bottle,
overpriced amounting 64php per bottle. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals sent a check
to WDRC for refund of jack-up price amounting 640php addressed to Catolico. Ms.
Saldana, the WDRC clerk opened the envelope and found out that there was a
check amounting 640php issued by YSP. On March 5, 1990, Waterous Drug
Corporation issued a memorandum for Catolicos’ termination by reason of
dishonesty.
Issue:
Whether or not the check
admissible in the court as evidence against Catolico
Held:
Yes. The rationale is the
doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Marti which states that the Bill
of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. Since the envelope was opened by Saldana, a
private individual, the check is admissible to court as evidence.
G.R.
No. 113811, October 7, 1994
ISHMAEL
HIMAGAN, petitioner,
vs.
People
of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Mapayo ,RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents
Facts:
Ishmael
Himagan, a policeman was assigned in the medical company of the Philippine
National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, was implicated in the
killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar.
After the informations were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued and Order suspending petitioner
until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975,
otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
which provides the accused suspension from the office until the case is
terminated and such case shall be terminated within 90 days from arraignment of
the accused. The petitioner filed to lift the order of suspension relying on
Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree and cases of Layno &
Deloso but his motion was denied.
Issue:
1.Whether
or not the preventive suspension of the petitioner may be lifted if the case is
not terminated within 90 days.
Ruling:
There
is nothing in the R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the
accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within the period.
Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without
justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions. If the trial is
unreasonably delayed without the fault of the accused such that he is deprived
of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy, he may ask for the
dismissal of the case.
The petitioner had also
misapplies Sec, 42 of PD 807 which clearly shows the lifting of preventive
suspension in pending ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION and not in CRIMINAL CASES.
The petitioner’s reliance on the
cases Layno and Deloso is misplaced for the 2 cases only involved in graft and
corruption and not in the present case which Himagan is accused in the crime of
murder under the Revise Penal Code. It is undisputed that he falls under Sec.
47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until
the case is terminated.
Furthermore, the reason why
members of the PNP are treated differently from other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule
on preventive suspension is concerned is that the policemen carry weapons and
the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. The
petition is hereby denied.
G.R.
No. 82544, June 28, 1988
Andrew
Harvey, John Sherman and Adriaan Van Del Elshout, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago, Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, respondent.
Facts:
Andrew
Harvey( 52 years old) and John Sherman (72 years old) are both American
nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna while Adriaan Van Elshout (58 years
old) is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. The petitioners
were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after the three months of close surveillance by CID (Commission on Immigration
and Deportation) agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Seized
during petitioner’s arrest were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the
suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls
engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes. During the operation Harvey was found
together with two young boys and Sherman was found with two naked young boys
inside his room and in the case of Van Den Elshout there were two children ages
14-16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for
quite some time. Petitioners availed for
this petition a writ of Habeas Corpus questioning the validity of their
detention.
Issue:
1. Whether
or not the respondent has the authority to arrest and detain the petitioners
pending determination of the existence of probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.
2. Whether
or not the CID agents were clothed with valid warrants, search and seizure as
required by the Constitution.
Ruling:
The
right against unreasonable searches and seizure which is guaranteed by the
constitution is available to all persons including ALIENS whether accused of a
crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant
or warrant of arrest is that it must have a probable cause. In this case, the
arrest of petitioners was based on a probable cause determined after a close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities was
monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure
of the photo negatives, photographs and posters and the said articles were
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and are therefore, admissible in
evidence.
The
petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal.
The Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones
with Sherman were naked. The CID agents had a reasonable ground to believe that
the petitioners had committed “pedophilia” and it is a behavior which is
offensive to public morals and against State policies. . Also it is a fundamental rule that a writ of
habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal,
although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The petition was
dismissed and the Habeas Corpus was denied.
G.R.
No. 11920, September 20, 1996
People
of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Nilo
Solayao, accused-appelant
Facts:
On
July 9, 1992 about 9 o’clock in the evening SPO3 Jose Nino with CAFGU members
conducted intelligence patrol in the Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to
verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of
Caibiran. From Caulangohan they proceeded to another barangay and met the group
of the accused Nilo Solayao. The group of Spo3 Jose Nino had become suspicious
when they observed that that the latter were drunk and the accused himself was
wearing a camouflage uniform. Upon seeing the government agents the group fled
and Nilo was left behind. The Police officer Nino had seized the dried coconut
leaves which Nilo was carrying and found wrapped a 49-inch long homemade
firearm locally known as “latong”. SPO3 confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policeman of Cabiran and was charged before the RTC
of Naval, Biliran with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not there is an unlawful search warrant.
2.
Whether or not the prosecutor was able to prove that
there is an absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm.
Ruling:
The
argument of the accused-appelant in which there is an unlawful search warrant
is hardly tenable. He and his companion’s drunken actuations aroused the
suspicious of SPO3 Nino’s group as well as the fact that he himself was attired
in a camouflage uniform or single suit and upon seeing the government agents,
his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely
on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming
around the barangay of Caibiran. There was a justifiable cause to “stop and
frisk” the accused when his companion fled upon seeing the group of SPO3 Nino.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The prosecutor was only able to prove by
testimonial evidence that the accused-appelant admitted before the Police
Officer at the time he was accosted that he did not have any authority or
license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one, the
prosecutor had relied in the accused appellant’s admission and didn’t do its
duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear
and convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency
concerned. Thus, Nilo Solayao was acquitted for insuffiency of evidence.
G.R.
No. 11318, August 28, 1996
Columbia
pictures Inc., petitioners
vs.
Court
of Appeals, respondents
Facts:
The
Petitioners with the National Bureau of Investigation filed a complaint for
violation of P.D. 49 and sought assistance with the NBI’S anti-film privacy
against Sunshine Home Video Inc. which is owned and operated by Danilo A.
Pelindario. On November 14, 1987 NBI Senior Agent Reyes applied for a search
warrant with a court a quo against Sunshine Home Video Inc. seeking the
seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films and
television sets, video cassettes, laser recording equipments and other machines
and paraphernalia used for the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction,
sale, lease or disposition of videogram tapes in the premises. The search
warrant was served about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 and seized various
video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively
distributed by private complainants, machines and equipments. On December 16,
1987 a RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT was filed with the court and MOTION TO LIFT THE
ORDER OF SEARCH WARRANT for lack of merit in which the master tapes from which
the pirated films were allegedly copies were never presented in the proceedings
in the issuance of search warrant.
Issue:
Whether
or not there is a probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant.
Ruling:
Probable
cause for a search warrant has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be search. Hence, the applicant must present
to the court the copyrighted films to compare with the purchase evidence of the
video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an authorized
reproduction of the owner. The judge bases for the issuance of the search
warrant is only the personal knowledge of the subject matter of NBI Agent
Reyes, Atty. Rico Domingo and Rene Baltazar and also their respective
testimonies without stating the fact by which these were pirated and it is a
conclusion of facts without basis. A search warrant not based on a probable
cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal
contemplation and arbitrary.
G.R. No. 95122-23, May 31, 1991
Board of Commissioner, petitioner
vs.
Judge De la Rosa
Facts:
Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather
of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native
born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Machana
Gatchalian, on July 12, 1960. Santiago had 5 children and one of those children
had a son named William Gatchalian who arrived in Manila from Hongkong together
with Gloria, Francisco and Johnson carried with them the Certificates of
Registration and identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong which
was signed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On January 24, 1962 the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum No. 9 directed the Board of
Commissioner to review all the cases where entry was allowed on the ground that
the entrant was a Philippine Citizen among these cases was William Gatchalian
and others. The citizenship of William
was questioned and he was alleged as an alien. A warrant of arrest was issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation of William.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration is null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Immigration Act of 1940
reads that “the following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien.”
From a perusal of the above
provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act
insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration
may issue warrants of arrests only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation charged against
the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing final order
of deportation.
It is not necessary that an
alien be arrested for the purpose of investigation. If the purpose of the
issuance of warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause,
surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only JUDGES can issue
the same.
Hence, a warrant issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void
for being unconstitutional.
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
The People of the Philippines
Vs
Cayat
Facts:
Cayat is a native of Baguio prosecuted for violation of
Act No. 1639 and was sentenced by the justice of the peace of Baguio to pay a
fine or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On January 25, 1937, the City of Baguio accused Cayat of
illegally possessing a gin, which the members of his tribe have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Cayat
interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, Cayat admitted the
alleged facts but pleaded not guilty. But trial court found him guilty and
sentenced him of the fine or imprisonment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the
following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws;
(2)
That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3)
That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Issue:
1.Whether or not Cayat accused of illegally
possessing a gin?
2.
Whether or not that is improper exercise of the police power of the state?
Held:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that
the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And
the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members
of the same class.
(1)
Substantial Distinction: . It is not based upon "accident of birth or
parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to
religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly,
to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the
peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
(2)
Germane to the purpose of law: it is unquestionably designed to insure peace
and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience
of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use
of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted
in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to
raise their standard of life and civilization.
(3) it
must not be limited to conditions: The law is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for
all times as long as those conditions exist.
(4)
apply to all members of the class: that the Act applies equally to all members
of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its
operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Act
No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the
non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and
intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and
unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can
be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines.
People
vs
Encinaba,
G.R. No. April 3, 1998
Facts:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped
off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain "Aling
Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14,
1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello
assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt.
Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West
Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988
and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along
Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two
groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant
posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the
Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a
Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front
and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the
evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at
this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa"
who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Having ascertained that
accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling
Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash
Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus
ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property
Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the
seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical
Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
After the presentation of
the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report,
the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its
evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating
accused-appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said "Demurrer to
Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the
alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in
evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial,
accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the
incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately
prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched
the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked
her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and
Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said
office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and
averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested.
Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting
officers.
After the prosecution made a
formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment and/or Objection to
Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of
the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and
seizure.
Not convinced with her
version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams
of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4,
Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. 2uin
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin charge
for with a large volume of Marijuana?
Ruling:
While conceding that the officer making the
unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, theStonehill case observed that most jurisdictions
have realized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is
based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case
the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed." 35
Unreasonable searches and
seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to
the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. 36
Those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.
As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply
not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if
the law violated is the Constitution itself. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for
some other legal grounds. No costs.
PEOPLE
VS.
GERENTE
G.R.
No. 95847-48, March 10 1993
FACTS:
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente,
together with FredoEchigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor
and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant. She overheard
the three mentalking about their intention to kill Clarito
Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill
Clarito Blace . Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing as
follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito
Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him
twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter,
the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received
a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to
the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed
by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death
was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.
Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas
where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece
of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.
They were informed by Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to
Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who
was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced
themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other
suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
Two separate informations were filed by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8,
Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for Murder. The trial court convicted
him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in
evidence by the prosecution; and
2.
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crimes charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The appealed decision was affirmed.
ARREST
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours
after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the
hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block
which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna
Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully
arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they
could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
SEARCH
and SEIZURE
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise
lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.
The
frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves,
for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first
CONSPIRACY
When there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of
one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and
his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked
their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his
death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for
the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was
not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit".
G.R. No. 121234, August 23,
1995
Hubert Webb, petitioner
vs
Hon. Raul de leon
Ponente:Puno
Facts:
June 1994, NBI filed with DOJ a
letter-complaint charging petitioner Hubert Webb, and other persons with the
crime of rape with homicide. Forthwith, DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by assistant chief state prosecutor to conduct the PI of the charged
with the rape and killing of the Visconti in their home in Paranaque.
During the PI, NBI presented: (1) sworn
statement of their principal witness Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of
the crime. (2) sworn statements of two former housemaids of the Webb (3) sworn
statement of Cristobal who allegedly that he was a passenger of United Airlines
bound for New York and expressed doubt on whether Webb was his co-passenger in
the trip (4) sworn statement of Barrier, former live-in partner of Belong, who narrated
the manner of how Belong investigated and tried to cover up the crime (5) sworn
statements of two Visconti maids, security guard and engineer. (6) Autopsy
reports of the victims showing the number of stab wounds and genital
examination of the victims.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Webb
filed with DOJ panel a motion for production and examination of evidence and
documents for the NBI to produce some documents like (1) certification of US
FBI on the admission to and stay of Hubert Webb in the US from March 9, 1991 to
October 22, 1992 (2) Laboratory report of the medico legal officer (3) sworn
statement of Belong (4) photographs of the fingerprints lifted from the
Visconti residence taken during investigation (5) investigation of NBI.
The motion was granted by DOJ and the NBI
submitted the photocopies of the requested documents. Then Webb filed a civil
case in RTC of Makati for the purpose of obtaining the original of said sworn
statement and has succeeded to obtain the original copy. This was submitted to
the DOJ together with his other evidence. But Webb failed to obtain the
document from US FBI.
During PI, Webb denied the crime as he went
to the US and was not in the Philippines when the crime happened. This alibi
was supported by the other persons accused and the documentary evidence of
Webb's purchase of bicycle in the US, the driver's license State of California
issued for him and the letter of the legal attaché of the US embassy confirming
his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991.
The other respondents submitted their sworn
statement as well.
On August 1995, DOJ Panel issued a resolution
finding probable cause to hold the respondents for trial and recommending that
an information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their
co-respondents, which was complied on the same date with the RTC of Paranaque.
The case was raffled to branch 258 with Judge Cano, however it was Judge de
Leon, pairing judge of Judge Cano who issued the warrant of arrest against the
accused. But later, Judge Cano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to
avoid any suspicion considering that he was with NBI before his appointment to
the bench. The case was re-raffled again to branch 274 with Judge Tolentino who
issued new warrants of arrest against the accused, then Webb with other accused
voluntarily surrendered to the police.
In their petitions, the petitioners contend:
(1) Judge de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to conduct PI before issuing warrants of arrest (2) DOJ panel gravely
abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them
with the crime of rape and homicide (3) DOJ denied them their constitutional
right to due process during the PI (40) DOJ panel unlawfully intruded into
judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information
as an accused.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the DOJ Panel
likewisegravely abused its discretion in holdingthat there is probablecause to charge them with the crime of
rape and homicide.
2.
Whether or not respondent Judges deLeon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest
against them.
3.
Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation.
4.
Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when
it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.
Ruling:
Petition without merit. (1) 24 The terms are legally
synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such
as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street. 25 It ought to
be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules
of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance. Misdescription of
Alfaro did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. (2) The voluminous number of
exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense of denial and
alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the
records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the
complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a
prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of
positive identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported
mainly by friends and relatives. The receipts of the bicycle purchase and the
driver's license were considered weak also compared to the affirmative
testimonies of the witnesses affirming that Webb is in the country. (3) In
arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without
any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's
control. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply
provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. That before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty
of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it
is supported by substantial evidence. (4) We reject these contentions. The
records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove
lack of probable cause against them. Petitioners cannot also assail as
premature the filing of the Information in court against them for rape with
homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said
Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of
1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
Sec.
4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution
of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant
had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency
of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of
Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution
finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information
in court.
Sec. 2. When to appeal. — The appeal must be filed within
a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the questioned resolution by the
party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution
and shall continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion shall
have been received by the moving or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
Without
doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in
court after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the
accused can still exercise the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's
recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including
Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged conspiratorial participation
in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on
Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness
Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For Other Purposes" enacted
on April 24, 1991. . In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is
to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this
power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right
to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus
hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A.
No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can
qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from
prosecution. (5) petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to
discovery proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the
April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI
Report.41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to
move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material
evidence in possession of the prosecution. 42 But these provisions apply after
the filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded
to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to
prepare for trial. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself
subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or
diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot
be understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a
non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.
Raro
vs
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 108431, July 14,
2000
Facts:
Petitioner
Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer, was the Corporate Secretary of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). As
such, petitioner was the Acting Manager of the Special Projects Department that
was in charge of the experimental Small Town Lottery (STL), which under PCSO
Resolution No. 118, dated April 1987, was to be operated in certain areas of
the country. On July 30,
1987, the PCSO, through Atty. Reynaldo E. Ilagan of the Special Projects
Department, authorized Elmec Trading and Management Corporation (ELMEC) to
operate the STL in the province of Camarines Norte. ELMEC in turn employed Luis (“Bing”)
F. Abaño, a resident of Daet, Camarines Norte, as Provincial Manager of the
experimental STL in said province.[1] Abaño allegedly invested P100,000.00
in the STL operation in that province.
In a complaint that he filed with the
Tanodbayan in Manila on May 20, 1988, Abaño alleged that petitioner, in his
capacity as PCSO Corporate Secretary, “personally and directly intervened in
the operation of said lottery to his financial
benefit and advantage” .
The
complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was referred by the Deputy Ombudsman to the NBI for
investigation. The NBI recommended the prosecution of the
petitioners. However, the petitioners argue that the four-year delay
in the completion of the preliminary investigation violated right to speedy
disposition of cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying a motion to quash an information on the ground
that the preliminary investigation allegedly violated the right of the accused
to due process of law.
HELD:
It took the NBI 2 years to complete its
report. The resolution recommending the filing of the case against
petitioner has to be reviewed. The length of time it took before the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation may only be attributed to the
adherence of the Ombudsman and NBI to the rudiments of fair play.
Ruling:
Finally, there is no ground to
give credence to petitioner’s claim that the complainant should be charged as a
briber on account of his admission that he gave petitioner some sum of money;
or that evidence presented during the preliminary investigation, specifically
the affidavits of witnesses, were hearsay and inadmissible. As we stated
earlier, this Court cannot supplant the Ombudsman’s discretion in the
determination of what crime to charge an accused.
All told, this Court finds no reason to reverse the assailed Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner’s
insinuation that he was subjected to the proceedings before the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan for politically motivated reasons, has not been established
with sufficient evidence. In the absence of any imputation that
public respondents were impelled by ill-motive in filing the case against him,
it is presumed that there is no such motive and that public respondents merely
filed the case to correct a public wrong.[69]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are hereby
AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayan
is DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal
Case No. 17800.
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
Rolito Go y Tambunting, petitioner
vs.
The
Court of Appeals, The Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, Presiding Judge Branch 168
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and People of the Philippines,
respondents.
Facts:
On 8 July 1991, petitioner
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2)
lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and
reported the same to the police. Another eyewitness who was at the
police station at that time identified petitioner as the gunman who shoot Eldon
Maguan on July 2, 1991. According to the police reports and of the
eyewitnesses, petitioner, while traveling in the
wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another
vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other
vehicle, and drove off.
First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio informed petitioner, in the presence
of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
Issues:
The principal
issues at stake are whether or not the arrest by the San Juan Police with
respect of the petitioner was unlawful and whether or not petitioner
effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held:
Both the
petitioner and the prosecutor erred on relying on Umil v.
Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to
14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted
“continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization,
etc. In the instant case, the offense for which
petitioner was arrested was obviously commenced and completed at one definite
location in time and space and not a “continuing crime”.
Furthermore, the
warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case
does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days
after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present
at the time of the commission and none of the arresting officers had any
personal knowledge of facts thereof. Moreover, petitioner was not arrested at
all as he walked into San Juan Police Station, he neither expressed surrender
nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of a crime. There was
substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation
and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was entitled to
be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
G.R. No.
119246. January 30, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO CORREA y CAYTON @ “BOYET,” RITO GUNIDA
y SESANTE @ “DODONG,” and LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS @ “BOY KUBA” accused-appellants
Facts:
On or about June 18, 1994, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the accused Antonio Correa, Rito Gunida and Leonardo Dulay
conspired together, not being authorized by law to possess, sell, deliver, and
transport eight (8) bundles of dried flowering tops of MARIJUANA, a prohibited
drug, wrapped in pieces of papers and plastic tapes weighing 16.1789 kilograms.
On
12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 35), docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-137528, indicting appellants
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ “Boyet,” Rito Gunida y Sesante @ “Dodong,” and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ “Boy Kuba” for having violated Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The defense,
however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin
D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulay’s house to get the things of his child
allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge
of trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N.
Avenue, where they were detained. After trial, on
March 3, 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and was sentenced to death to be executed by the means
provided by law, and to pay a fine of P 10,000,000.00, plus
the costs.
Whether the accused are precluded from
assailing the warrantless search and seizure, due to waiver on their
part.
Held:
Antonio Correa y Cayton @
"Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo
Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the
warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown
by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never protested when the
police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened
one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their
vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent
prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it
made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof
The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Further, they
effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure by
their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the
trial. While the conviction of the appellants of the
crime charged is proper, we find, however, that the penalty of death imposed by
the trial court is not in accordance with the law. There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance which attended the commission of the offense in this
case, and considering that the quantity of the subject prohibited drug exceeded
750 grams, the proper penalty that should be imposed on each of the appellants
is reclusion perpetua and a fine of Ten Million Pesos.
G.R. No.
143944July 11, 2002
The People of the
Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon,
accused-appellant.
Facts:
On December 27, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City rendered judgment finding the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section VI, Article III of
Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended by RA 7659.
The antecedent facts of his conviction showed that on
March 11, 1999, the accused boarded M/V Super Ferry 5, sailing from Manila to
Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock
at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a
complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about a missing jewelry. Diesmo and four
(4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for
the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was
informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his
consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted
by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage and
took a Samsonite suitcase. When requested by the security, the accused opened
the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the
security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took
pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents.
The accused testified that the suitcase was
not his but was owned by Alex Macapudi who requested him to give it to
Macapudi’s brother in the Iligan port. On appeal, the accused contends that the
Samsonite suitcase was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and
hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he
claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
Issue:
A question was
raised whether the contention of the accused-appelant on unlawful search and
seizure valid.
Held:
The Supreme Court
held the contention devoid and without merit. The right against unreasonable
search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Whenever
this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right to the search and seizure. It
should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed
by the government or its agent. The search and seizure performed by the vessel
security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police
authorities tasked to maintain peace and order.
In a prosecution
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, : (1) that the accused is in possession of the
object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. The first two elements were sufficiently proven in
this case, and were in fact undisputed. In the case at bar, the third fact was
missing. It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.
The decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No.
06-7542, is affirmed.
People
vs.
Albofera,
FACTS:
Sometime
in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a
forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not
participate in the killing.
The matter was
later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and
accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.
Albofera
executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He
stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his
life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and
that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.”
Esma testified
against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a
letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by
prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead.
Later the accused
were convicted of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the
Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged
unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy?
HELD:
No. The
production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful
search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into
Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its
recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the
course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really
self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor.
Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him
in arriving at a determination of his culpability.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ANDRE MARTI
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes
went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich,
Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package
making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes,
husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection
of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the
substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to
his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes
opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case
was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by
the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired
from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private
individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that
the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was
the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of
business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed
by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight
is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
Tan
vs
Del Rosario
G.R. No. 109289,
October 3, 1994
FACTS:
These
two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No.
109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as
the Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (“SNIT”), amending certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by
public respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioner
intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement
that taxation “shall be uniform and equitable” in that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the
manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Petitioners claim
to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the
amendatory legislation.
ISSUES:
1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely
entitled, “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession” (Petition in G.R.
No. 109289)
2. Does Republic
Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not uniform
and equitable.
3. Did the
Secretary of Finance and the BIR Commissioner exceed their rule-making
authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships?
HELD:
The
Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of
equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation,
similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities
(Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not
forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well
to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24
SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771).
What may instead
be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent
to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in
the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the
present global treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this
classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
Having
arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared
unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due
process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the
tax power.
Tiu
vs
Ca G.R. No.
127410. January 20, 1999
J. Panganiban
Facts:
Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law
RA 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of
MilitaryReservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special
Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges. President Ramos
issued Executive Order No. 97, clarifying the application of the tax
and duty incentives. The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A,
specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative.
The petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A
for allegedly being violative of their right to equal
protection ofthe laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.Proclamation No.
532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and bounds of
the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA
7227. Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference
between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the
'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the
Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined
by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America, as amended . . .'"
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Held:
No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances
obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a
valid and reasonable classification. The fundamental right of equal
protection of the lawsis not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differentlyfrom another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose
of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be
germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Supreme Court
believed it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application
of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is
this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from
its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining
industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local
investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries.
G.R. No. 56515 April 3, 1981
United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), petitioner,
vs.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), respondent.
Facts:
At a time when
the country was already under martial law, amendments to the 1973 Constitution
were proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. The amendments to the constitution were
to be placed in a plebiscite for the people’s approval. The Commission on
elections, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the 1978
Election Code and pertinent enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, issued three
(3) Resolutions 1467-1469 providing for “equal opportunity” on public
discussions and debates, “equal time” on the use of broadcast media, and “equal
space” on the use of print media.
On March 12,
1981, President Marcos advanced his campaign for the “YES” votes on the
constitutional amendments in his nationwide “Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo”
radio-television program carried live from 9:30 to 11:30 PM via radio and
television. Pursuant to the resolutions promulgated by the COMELEC, petitioner
UNIDO demand exactly the same opportunity, the same prime tune, the same number
of TV and radio stations all over the country at the earliest possible date to
campaign for ‘NO’ votes in the forthcoming plebiscite.
After due and
careful deliberation, the Commission held and ruled that the demand of the
UNIDO cannot be granted and thereby denied. UNIDO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Commission appealing that such denial is a basic ground
for contradiction to the Constitution and the Law, and moreover, violate the
basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play.
Issue:
The question
was raised whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of the
COMELEC’s denial of their request.
Held:
The Supreme
Court held that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded
equal protection.
It is
considered view of the Commission that when President Marcos conducted his
pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in
his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head
of any political party. The President/Prime Minister is ‘responsible
for the program of government and the guidelines of policy’. It cannot be
denied that seeking constitutional changes constitutes a program of government
imbued with the nature of highest importance to enlighten the people on its
sense and significance.
The UNIDO or any
of its leaders does not have the same constitutional prerogatives vested in the
President/Prime Minister as above discussed. As such, it has no right to
'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos. The UNIDO, however,
is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations
concerned.
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
Ricardo C.
Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Rights (ULAP),
petitioners,
vs.
Gen. Renato De Villa and National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC), respondents.
Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering
that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when,
at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality
of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members
of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint
and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up
without a court order or search warrant. Instances have occurred where a
citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority
to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in
violation of the Constitution. Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and
police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the
checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the
Metropolitan Police Director.
Issue:
The
question was raised as to whether or not checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures.
Held:
The
Supreme Court held to dismiss the petition. True, the manning
of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfareand and individual’s right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
G.R. No. L-30026,
January 30, 1971
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and
PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
FACTS:
Gumabon, after pleading guilty,
was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was
rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner
Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the
petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.
They now invoke
the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime,
a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become
final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the
accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not
warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. This
ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become final.
Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could have been
served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued
detention is illegal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives
a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case.
RULING:
Yes. Judicial decisions
favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on
Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil
Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their
constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been
convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were
lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the
retroactive character of a favorable decision.
G.R. No. 79543.
October 16, 1996
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose
D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in
Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of
various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as
a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be
sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind
of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Filoteo admitted involvement
in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely ,Eddie Saguindel,
Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be adischarged
soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30,
1982,petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C.
Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner however sought later that his
confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the law should favour him as
an accused.
Issue:
Whether or not
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive
effect and petitioner’s extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible
evidence.
RULING:
No, since what
he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of felony
who is not a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.
[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
FACTS:
On February 12, 1998, at about
1:30 p. m., Susan Canton was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a
departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When the metal detector alarmed
while Susan was passing through, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the
National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, made a pat down search on the former. Upon Frisking, Susan,
Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area and when the latter
inserted her hand under the skirt of Susan, She noticed that the packages
contained what felt like rice granules. Mylene then reported the matter tom
SPO4 Victorio de los Santos, her supervisor on duty. The supervisor then
instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring Susan to a
comfort room for a thorough physical investigation. Upon further frisking,
Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in
grey colored packing tape which Susan voluntarily handed to them. Mylene turned
over the packages to SPO4 De los Santos and after laboratory examination, it
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
SPO2 Jerome Cause, an
investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that no
investigation was ever conducted on Susan. However, Susan signed a receipt of
the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one
American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia
plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles. He said that he informed Susan of her constitutional rights but
admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt. Yet
he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the search conducted on Susan
was incidental to a lawful arrest.
2.
Whether or not the scope of a search pursuant
to airport security is confined only to search weapons under “Terry Search” doctrine.
3.
Whether or not Susan was lawfully arrested
without a warrant.
4.
Whether or not the constitutional right to
counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was violated.
5.
Whether or not Susan’s conviction and penalty
on her are correct.
RULING:
The Supreme Court did not agree
with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this
case were incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made; the process cannot be reversed. Susan’s arrest did not precede the search.
. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the
police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which
they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested.
Under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6235, the provision is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search,
is not limited to weapons. The Terry search or the “stop and
frisk” situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person
who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. In
this case, after the metal detector alarmed Susan, R.A. No. 6235 authorizes
search for prohibited materials or substances. Thus, the strip search in the
ladies’ room was justified under the circumstance.
Warrantless search and seizure
were legal. Armed with the knowledge that Susan was committing a
crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to
arrest her, under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
As testified to by the lone
witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was
conducted after Susan’s arrest. She affixed her signature to the
receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told
that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her
signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its
case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention
and used in evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of
her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
As regards the fine, courts may
fix any amount within the limits established by law. For possession
of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000
to P10 million. In view of the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride
found in the possession of Susan, the trial court’s imposition of fine in the
amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
Susan Canton was found guilty
beyong reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Act of 1972 ( Republic Act No. 6425) as amended and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). The appellant’s passport,
plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
About
March 15, 1945, (1)
Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias
Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G.
Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias
Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B.,
(5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias
Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias
Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10)
Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian
Lumanog alias Manue, were accused of being members of PKP
Community Party of the Philippines which was actively
engaged in an armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With
the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they
committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder,
etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on
government forces or civilians by HUKS.
The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is
charged with rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which
the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense contends, among other
things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The
lower court sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment. A petition for
bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on December 28, 1953, which was denied by a
resolution of the Supreme Court dated February 2 , 1954. A similar petition for
bail was filed by Hernandez on June 26, 1954 and renewed on December 22, 1955.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Amado V. Hernandez is entitle
to bail.
RULING:
The
court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of
rebellion as means “necessary” for the perpetration of the offense. Such common
offense is absorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. In as much as the
acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, one single crime it
follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code which requires therefore the commission of at least two
crimes.
The crime charged in the amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that,
in conformity with the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.
[G.R. No. 130644. October 27,
1997]
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his
mother MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 1, 1997, petitioner
Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranagga
alias Paco, filed in the RTC of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest
issued as a consequence thereof. On October 6, 1997, petitioner
filed a Supplemental Petition asking for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus to relieve her son from his alleged illegal confinement or to
grant him bail.
On September 15, 1997, the
police tried to arrest the Larranaga without a warrant for the alleged crime of
kidnapping and raping Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong in Cebu City on July 16,
1997 but his counsel persuaded the arresting officer that he would be presented
in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17,
1997. On September 17, 1997, Larranaga’s
counsel attended the preliminary investigation and made a request to the
prosecutor that his client be given a preliminary investigation and that he be
granted a period of twenty days to file the defence affidavit. As well pointed
of his motion, Larranaga travelled from Cebu City to Quezon City on June 8,
1997 to pursue a Diploma at the Centre for culinary arts in Quezon City. On
July 16, 1997, he was taking examinations during the entire day and then went
to a restaurant in the evening. He stayed with friends until the next morning.
On July 17, 1997, he took another examination before taking a plane back to
Cebu City at 5pm. The prosecutor denied this request, arguing that
Larranaga was entitled only to an inquest investigation. On September 19, 1997,
Larranaga’s counsel appealed to the Court of Appeals to prevent the filing of
criminal information against Larranaga. However, criminal charges had already
been filed on September 17, 1997 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. On
September 22, 1997, counsel filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
requesting that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City prevent Larranaga’s arrest.
Nevertheless, he was arrested on that day with a warrant issued by the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscilla Agana. Another
petition was filed in the Court of Appeals against his arrest and dismissed on
September 25, 1997. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court. Despite
this pending appeal, Larranaga was brought before a judge on October 14, 1997.
He did not enter a plea and the judge thus entered a plea of not guilty to two
counts of kidnapping with serious illegal detention. On October 16, 1997, the
Supreme Court temporarily restrained this judge from proceeding with the case
to prevent the issues before the court from becoming moot.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a
regular preliminary investigation.
2. Whether or not petitioner should be
released from detention pending the investigation.
3. Whether or not the arresting officer had
legal authority to make warrantless arrest of the petitioner
RULING:
The Court resolves:
(1) to set aside the inquest investigation of petitioner and to order the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary
investigation of the petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to
annul the order for Detention During The Pendency of the Case issued by
Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No.
CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to order the immediate release of petitioner pending
his preliminary investigation and (4) to order the Presiding Judge of Br. VII,
RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and
trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending the result
of petitioner’s preliminary investigation.
It is within petitioner’s
constitutional and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary
investigation rather than a mere inquest be conducted before resolving the
issue of whether or not to file informations against him. The
petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary
investigation and during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from
detention.
The arresting officer had no
legal authority to make warrantless arrest. Under Sec 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs
(a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. The ‘arresting’ officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly committed the crime. Moreover, none of the ‘arresting’ officers had
any personal knowledge’ of facts.
MELVIN L. ESPINO and ESTRELLITA L. IGPIT, complainants,
vs.
HON. ISMAEL L. SALUBRE, Municipal Trial Court, Tagum, Davao del
Norte, respondent.
FACTS:
On July 17, 1997, Wilfreda
Clamucha filed a complaint for frustrated murder before the Municipal Trial
Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, presided by respondent Judge Ismael Salubre,
against Joemar Telleron and two (2) unknown assailants, only known as alias
“Dodong” and John Doe, for stabbing and mortally wounding her son, Ruel
Clamucha who later died from his wounds.
On November 20, 1997, Wilfreda
Clamucha executed a “Supplemental Sworn Statement” before the Tagum
Police Station to the effect that she was informed by the accused
Joemar Telleron that the true name of alias “Dodong” is Peter Erer and that of
their other companion designated as “John Doe” is Melvin Espino alias “Bentot.”
Despite the fact that respondent
Judge had no more jurisdiction over the case, he conducted a further
preliminary examination and after allegedly finding the existence of probable
cause, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of Peter Erer and
Melvin Espino on November 27, 1997.
On February 23, 1998, Melvin
Espino, represented by his aunt, Estrellita Igpit, filed a “Petition
for Habeas Corpus” before Judge Bernardo V. Saludares
of the Regional Trial Court , Branch 2, Tagum City
naming Judge Ismael Salubre, Police Chief Pytagoras Cervantes and
the Warden of Tagum District Jail as respondents. In said
petition, it was averred that Melvin Espino was restrained of his liberty
without a valid warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Salubre is guilty of
gross ignorance of law.
RULING:
Yes. The Court finds respondent
Judge Ismael L. Salubre GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby FINED in the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with a warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
To constitute gross ignorance of
the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and
corruption. These circumstances were not at all attendant in the case at
bar.
Ignorance of the law, which everyone
is bound to know, excuses no one - not even judges. They are
expected to keep abreast of our laws and the changes therein as well as with
latest decisions of the Supreme Court. A judge should be acquainted with
legal norms and principles as well as with the statutes and procedural
rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence, which goes against Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
respondent judge owes the public and the court she sits in to be proficient in
the law. She must have the basic rules at the palm of her hand as
she is expected to maintain professional competence at all times.
G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE
LEDESMA, respondents.
FACTS:
On August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through
counsel, in a letter-complaint, sought the National Bureau of Investigation's
(NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the
latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged
that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which
constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known
as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).
The NBI, in response to the letter-complaint, conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently
filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets
owned by the private respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4,
1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants on the basis of the
statements of applicant NBI’s witnesses which were taken through searching
questions and answers. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's
agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three
warrants.
The lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the
private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the
issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations
of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy
of a particular film have been committed.
On October 8,
1985, the lower court issued an order in lifting the three search warrants
issued earlier against the private respondents by the court.
The petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the lower court in its order dated
January 2, 1986.
The petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the October
8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court.
The petition
was dismissed. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued
earlier.
2. Whether or not respondent
court did commit a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned
order.
RULING:
YES, the judge
properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
In the absence of probable cause
that the private respondents violated P.D. 49, the copyright infringement law,
the court lifted the three questioned search warrants.
NBI agents who acted as witnesses
did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter. Of the three witnesses
in the application of search warrant, only one of them, who is the petitioner’s
counsel, had the personal knowledge of the subject matter. The lower court
declared that the testimony of the petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence
because
the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court
during the application.
A careful review of the record
of the case shows that the respondent Court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the questioned orders. Grave abuse of discretion'
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. But far from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were motivated
by a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so when the erroneous findings
collided with the constitutional rights of the private respondents. In fact,
the petitioner did not even contest the righteousness and legality of the
questioned orders but instead concentrated on the alleged denial of due process
of law.
G.R.
No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
Patricio
Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot, and Alfredo Sapantan, Jr., petioners
Vs.
Commission
on Elections, respondent
Facts:
Petitioner
Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed
his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the
forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. He specifically questions the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees
of the Constitution. Section 4 - Any retired elective
provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired. He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed
insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based
on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
His colleague Igot,
assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidacy of a person who was
convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima
facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes. He
also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC,
as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to
section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a
"bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, he also
attacked the term of office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51,
Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
Issues:
1. Did petitioners
have standing?
2. Are the
statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Ruling:
1. No.
2. Dumlao's
petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumlao sued as
a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine
judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and
controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a
constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not
yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his
disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did
they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has
yet been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are
actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving
the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would
require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they
relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the
imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP
Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee
ofequal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If
the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can
be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. The
requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable
classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics. But, in
the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided
for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government work,
but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is
for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of
the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection, neither does it permit such denial. In fine, it bears reiteration
that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence
of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at
times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies.
Regarding
Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional
provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as
a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the
ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed
for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have
been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it
the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence. And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima
facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and
present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. A
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.
G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992
The People of the Philippines,
plaintiff-appellee,
Vs.
Basilio Damaso @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ Ka
Dado, accused-appellant
Facts:
Accused-appellant charged in an information of
violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of subversion assailed the
legality of a search and seizure conducted at his house at night when he was
not around, on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue:
Whether or not a search on a house of a person
without the owner’s presence is valid.
Ruling:
No. The search in the dwelling of the
accused-appellant without his knowledge is a violation of the constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.
G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002
Rudy Caballes, petitioner
Vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,
respondents
Facts:
While
on a routine patrol in Brgy. Sampalucan,
Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt. Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex de Castro
spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with
smuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the
driver of the jeep, Caballes was asked by the officers as to what was loaded in the
jeep, to which he did not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officers checked the
cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station, where he was imprisoned for
7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of Theft
of property. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether
or not the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against
Caballes.
Ruling:
No;
the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
The
constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is
not absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the
case at bar does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions.
1. Search of a moving vehicle
The
rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized
for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving
vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific description of
the place, things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still, however,
there must be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search. One form
of search of moving vehicles is the ´stop-and-searchµ without warrant
at checkpoints, which has been declared as not illegal per se, for as long as
it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A
checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s
right against unreasonable search. The circumstances in this case, however,
do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach inside
the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were
able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected
to an extensive search, such a search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers have probable cause
to believe that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle
to be searched. In this case, the officers flagged down the jeep
because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to
them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the
vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered in kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause to justify
a search without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip or
confidential information that could have backed up their search,
as jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information
has become sufficient to constitute probable cause.
2. Plain view doctrine
It is clear from the records that the cable wires were
not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks andcovered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was
underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure without further search.
3. Consented search
At
most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity,
which is no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches.
G.R.
No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
In
the matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against Atty. Wenceslao
Laureta, and of contempt proceedings against Eva Maravilla-Illustre in G.R. No.
68635, entitled “Eva Maravilla-Illustre
vs.
Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.
Facts:
Maravilla Illustre
wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of her case (a
land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre
claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated
by the 1st division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond
the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her
letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far
from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call
for a press conference. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the
participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was
established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty.
Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were
referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the
minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap
but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap
was not aware that Atty. Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also
made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.
Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera,
Cruz), again with more threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance
readily constituting travesty of justice.” True to her threats, Illustre later
filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices
with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen
Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First
Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty. LAURETA was the counsel of
Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any
copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear
that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan
dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt. They
claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend
to dishonor the court.
Issue:
WON privacy of
communication was violated.
Held:
The letters formed
part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved
here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises is
unmistakable. It must act to preserve its
honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of
the legal profession.
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
Francisco I. Chavez, petitioner
Vs.
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) and Magtanggol Gunigundo, (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG),
respondents
Facts:
Petitioner
Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former
government official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and
enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties
and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos goldhoard";
and (2) to compel respondent[s] to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents
related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and
the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the same person initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated
plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's
economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These
news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the
reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and
the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER
DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He
claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a
"debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people
in general have aright to know the transactions or deals being contrived and
effected by the government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that
petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he
has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.
And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since
the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective
and binding.-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people
to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions
refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being
considered.
Issue:
Whether or not the
Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details
of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December
28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL
AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its
officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the
public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the
discussion sembodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost”.
G.R. NO. L-22196June 30, 1967
Esteban Morano, Chan Sau Wan & Fu Yan
Fun, petitioner-appellants
v.
Hon. Martiniano Vivo, Actibg Commissioner of
Immigration, respondant-appellant
FACTS:
Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukein, China on Jan.6,1932, arrived in
the Philippines on Nov.23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She
left in China two of her children bt the first marriage. With her was Fu Yan
Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage on Sept, 11, 1957.She and her son
were permitted only into the Phils. Under a temporary visitor’s visa for 2
months and after they posted a cash bond of Php4,000.
On Jan. 24 1962,Chan Sau Wan married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino
citizen, born to his union on Sept. 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.
To prolong their stay in
the Phils., Chan Sau Wan & Fu Yan Fun obtained several extentions. The last
extention was Sept. 10,1962.
On Aug. 10 1962, the Commissioner
ordered her and son to leave the countryon or before Sept. 10, 1962 w/ a
warning that upon failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest
and will cause the confiscation of the bond. But instead of leaving the
country, on Sept. 10 1962, Chan Sau Wan w/ her husband Esteban Morano & Fu
Yan Fun petitioned the court of First Instance of Mla. for Mandamus to compel
the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioner’s alien certificate of
registration, prohibition to stop him from issuing a warrant for their arrest
& preliminary injunction of confiscating their cash bond & from issuing
warrants of arrest pending resolution of the case. The trial court on Nov. 3,
1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a Php.
2,000 bond.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chan Sau Wan and her son
Fu Yan Fun violated sec. 37(a) of the Phil. Immigration Act and the
Naturalization Law requisite.
COURT RULING:
The petition for
mandamus and prohibition w/ respect to petitioner Chan Sau Wah was denied and the
judgement declaring her a citizen of the Phils. directed respondent to
cancel her alien certificate of registration & other
immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction w/ respect to her
permanency were all set aside. With respect to her citizenship, Chan Sau Wah
didn’t possessed all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law.
G.R. NO.78596
July 13, 1989
Lucien Tan Van Nghia, petitioner
v.
Hon. Ramon J. Liwag, Acting Commisioner of
the Commision on Immigration and Deportation(CID), and John Doer, agents of the
CID, respondents
FACTS:
Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national
w/ temporary address in Sta. Ana, Mla.He was in the Phils. on Nov. 1, 1981 as a
temporary visitor but his status was changed to an immigrant on Nov.16, 1984
based on his representation that he is financially capable & will invest in
the Phils. but has not made any investment & has engaged only in French tutoring
& practice acupressure.
On May 28, 1987, CID
Commissioner Liwag recieved a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G.
Cabrera. Jr. , as the landlord of Lucien Tran allegedly accused the latter of
being an undesirable alien for being hostile to public safety progress.
On June 1, 1987, Commisioner Liwag issued a mission order to a team of seven
CID agents to locate & bring Lucien to Intelligence Division for proper
disposition & submission of report. But on the following day, as the CID
went to the residence of Lucien in Sta. Ana inviting him to the former’s
headquarter for verification of his status but failed to obey instead lacked
themselves w/ his lady companion in their bedroom, refused indeed to talk to
the agents. In such manner compelled them to sought assistance of members of
the Western Police District. But then again, Lucien adamantly refused to be
taken in resulted to the injury of both parties due to ensuing struggle until
Lucien subdued & immediately taken to the CID intelligence office.The
warrant of arrest was issued on this day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest
and detention of petitioner by the authority, the Immigration Commision is
legal.
COURT RULING:
The petition was dismissed.
Petitioner Lucien Tran Van is not similarly restrained with the condition in
his bailbond is to obey by appearing and answering the complaint with will hold
himself, amenable to the court’s orders and processes & after conviction
will surrender in execution of such judgement. The records therein show that
formal deportation proceeding have been initiated against Lucien before the
Board of Special Inquiry of the CID.
The restrain has therefore
become legal as well as the writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.
G.R. NO. 115455
Aug. 25, 1994
Arturo M. Tolentino, et al
v.
Executive Sec., Sec. of Finance, Commission
of Internal Revenue, et al
FACTS:
Petitioners Tolentino et al
are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino declare that the revenue bill
did not originate exclusively as required Art. VI s. 24 of the
Constitution from the House of Representatives. The result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, House No. 1197 & Senate No. 1630 must retain the
essence of H.No. 1197. Albeit RA 7716 originated as House Bill 11197 and that
it passed the 3 readings in the House of Representatives, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading,
the 2nd reading as well as the approval were on the same day by
votes of 13 of its members w/ 1 abstain. Deprived in fact the succinct
scrutiny as a vital piece of legislation. That upon referral to the
Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Petitioner declare that what Senate could have done
is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of
Senate Bill 1630 in such way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the “text of the House Bill”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Expanded Value Added Tax Law
is constitutionally valid.
Whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion by passing its own version of the Bill.
COURT RULING:
The Supreme court rejected
the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the
House of Representatives. According to the 9 justices, the constitution
meant that the initiative must come from the House of
Representatives. There were instances indeed before where Senate
passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and
other such bills are concerned. This has always been accepted in terms of
amendments by substitution. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference. What Tolentino’s concerned was basically a matter of
form but failed to established a substantial difference on both Bills.
Therefore, R.A. No. 7716 is
not unconstitutional. It is not the only instance in which the senate proposed
an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version. This has
happened before twice during the eight Congress.
In
like manner on the question if there’s grave abuse of discretion though
Art. VI sec. 24, the Supreme Court ruled as there’s none.
Feb. 3, 2003
People of the Phils., plaintiff-appelle
v.
Binad Sy Chua, accused-apellant
FACTS:
On Sept. 21, 1996 in the
city of Angeles, Binad Sy Chua was accused of a criminal case, illegal
possession of plastic bags containing methamphetamine Hydrocloride known as
SHABU weighing 1,955.815 grams w/c is a regulated drug w/o any authority.
Another criminal act was charged on him on the same date and place of willfully
& unlawfully in his possession and under his controla 20 pcs.of live .22
cal. Ammunitions w/o the license or permit to carry them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Binad Sy Chua is guilty of criminal cases nos.96-507
& 96-513.
COURT RULING:
The decision of the RTC of
Angeles City in criminal cases nos. 96-507 & 96-513 convicting the
accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was reversed and set aside in violation
of sec. 16 Art.III, R.A. No. 6425, sentencing the latter to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua & to pay a fine of Php 1000000. He was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lack of merit of his arrest
then was reviewed. Consequently, he is ordered to be released from the
custody unless he’s lawfully held for another crime.
ICHONG
VS.
HERNANDEZ
Facts:
The Congress of the
Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes theretail trade business,
Republic Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate theRetail Business,”
prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in
ourcountry.Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents,corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act
isunconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, theUN Declaration of Human
Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.
Held:
The UN
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rightsand freedom
of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights containsnothing more
than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to
the Chinese nationals “upon the sameterms as the nationals of any other
country. But the nationals of China are notdiscriminated against because
nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who
are granted special rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging
in the retail trade.But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty isalways subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law, and the samemay never curtail or restrict the scope of the
police power of the State
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KAGUI MALASUGUI,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No.
L-44335 July 30, 1936DIAZ,
:Facts:
On March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a
Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, a victim of robbery was found lying
on the ground,with several wounds in the head, on a path
leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato. Shortly before the victim’s
death he was ableto mention the appellant’s first name, “Kagui”, when he
was asked about assailant.Appellant was later searched by the investigating
police, without opposition or protest on his part, and it was discovered that
healso had the victim’s pocketbook, containing P92 in bills, the victim’s
identification card and a memorandum of amounts with someChinese characters. In
one of the pockets of his pants was found some change, making the total amount
of money found in hispossession P92.68. The said search was conducted
after the appellant had voluntarily produced the bracelets Exhibit A and
placedthem on Lieutenant Jacaria's table,
because, upon being asked if he had anything, he tremblingly answered in the
negative. The appellant testified at the trial that
Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through
intimidation taken fromhim the
bracelets the pocketbook and all the money which he and that, but for the
printing thereon, the identification card found inthe pocketbook then
was blank and there was no memorandum of the kind, in Tan Why's handwriting,
inside the pocketbook,'
Issue:
WON
the search and seizure conducted on the accused legal?Article III, section 1(3), of the 1935 Constitution
:The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effectsagainst unreasonable search and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported byoath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized," contains
noprohibition of arrest, search, or seizure
without a warrant, but only against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures.
SC ruling:
Yes. The SC held that When the
search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects
found in hispossession are incidental
to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be considered
unreasonable, much lessunlawful. To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be
arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without
awarrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances. The record
shows that before proceeding with the trial in the
lower court, the appellant asked for the
return of saideffects to him on the ground that they were unlawfully
taken away from him. Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, histestimony
cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract that of the
government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria andSergeant Urangut, who testified
that when Lieutenant Jacaria asked him what other things he carried, after
having voluntarilyplaced the two pairs of
bracelets, Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt his body, he did
not show the leastopposition. It follows, therefore, that the lower
court committed no error in accepting as evidence the items taken from
theaccused, not only because the appellant did not object to the taking thereof
from him when searched, but also because theeffects found in his possession of
a person detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him,
if theyconstitute the
corpus delicti
or are
pertinent or relevant
thereto. It is certainly repugnant to maintain
the opposite viewbecause it would
amount to authorizing the return to the accused of the means
of conviction seized from him, notwithstandingtheir being eloquent proofs of crime, for him to conceal, destroy or
otherwise dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.
Facts:
Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of
the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a
search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or
store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as
usurer.” The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda.
On the same date,
the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary,
went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the
search warrant to the petitioner’s bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the
presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with
the execution thereof
The papers and
documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury
Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who
subsequently filed six separate criminal cases against the herein petitioner
for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
The legality of
the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six
criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent
Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for the reason that though the search
warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.
HELD:
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular
right and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination
of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
In
the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the
judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as
true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the
applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the
properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt
issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties
seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by
law.
Instead, they were
turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up
cases against petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued,
there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant
was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.
Facts:
A
civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City
RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in
the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile
and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”
In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As
a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
“An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200.
The
CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR,
hence the instant petition.
Issue:
W/N the
Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the
conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to
Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall
be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The
aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under
this provision of R.A. 4200.
A
perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent
court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated
to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can
be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s
contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from
the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or
to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting, as in a conversation, or
signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions
are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the
legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and
“communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory
Note to the Bill.
VILLEGAS VS HIU CHIONG
Facts:
Pao
Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then
Manila mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance
prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without
first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them
P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the
said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction
between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment
permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it
fails to prescribe’ any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor,
thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative
powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the
Ordinance as being null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is
undue delegation to the Mayor of Manila.
HELD:
The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an
ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard
to guide or limit the mayor’s action, expresses no purpose to be attained by
requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and
entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because
it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in
the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The
ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule
of the Constitution.
