the final exam

Final Examination in Political Law Review

Saturday, October 19, 2012; 5:30 p.m

Instruction: Read the facts. Rule on the issue/s posed by the case.

^1.                               Subject of the present petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated June 3, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, hereafter simply the Office, which dismissed the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents Sixto O. Daleon, Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba, Norma Tecson and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP), Davao City, for violation of Section 3 [a], [e] and [j] of Republic Act 3019 also known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.”^[1] Also sought to be nullified is the Order of the Office dated September 10, 1997, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts as culled from the records are as follows:
Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since January 1994 to the present. He has served the university as faculty member and as administrator for almost 13 years.
Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317, which is a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-1995. At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing grades of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5, respectively.^[3] They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers.
Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were “ghost students” in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to them, these “ghost students”, namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grades despite their failure to attend classes. Issue:  Is the act of Dr. Daleon in givng grade to the alleged “ghost students” proper? If you were his lawyer what principle of  constitutional law will you invoke? Explain your answer.

2. On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner Jose M. Pacoy Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word “Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment the information from homicide to murder?

3. Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. 

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Issues: 

(1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and 

(2) Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.

4. On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurrence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, 1 alleging.

"That on or about 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on the roadside in the ricefields at the abovementioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo."

After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".

The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith with his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the present appeal place the accused in double jeopardy.

5. Facts:  Lilia Cheng argues that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Issue:  Does the proscription against ex post facto law apply to the interpretation of Section 11, a provision which does not provide for a penal sanction but which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and deposits?

6. In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70.  August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.

The court ruled that :

1.      It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, “Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines”

2.      As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the “rank” requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court.  The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.

The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

7.    The petition before us arose from a November 10, 1989 incident when the jeep ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with dust.Later, while Mabuyo was investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr. Ramon Paulin and his wife. Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a companion of the spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to call the police in Talisay and the rest to block the exit of the spouses and their lone companion.

Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon the arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the police station. On the same date, Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204. On November 20, 1989, the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave threats and oral defamation," against private respondent Mabuyo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5213.The cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu (Branch IX), acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204. On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3, 1990.Not satisfied with the resolution of respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores, petitioners filed on July 31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, which was thereafter docketed as Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207 and later re-raffled to Branch 5 stationed in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso M. Gimenez, who dismissed the petition in a decision dated December 19, 1991. The decretal portion of the decision states:

"All the foregoing considered, for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure, as revised, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Public respondent is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of Crim. Case Nos. 5204 and 5213 and to decide both cases on their merits within the period provided under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued dated May 9, 1991, is hereby lifted and set aside.” (p. 118, Rollo.)

Still not contented, petitioners have now resorted to the instant petition, arguing that (a) the decision of the municipal trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case against them was a judgment of acquittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating petitioners' right against double jeopardy; and (b) the regional trial court, in dismissing the petition in CEB-9207 abused its discretion as it ignored petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:           Whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal as the same would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy.

8. Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.  As government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others. 

On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.  Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations. 

Issues:

              I.Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?

             II.Does Andutan's resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?

            III.Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman 's findings supported by substantial evidence?

9. Respondent spouses Jose Dayrit and Reynata Dayrit, Jesus Carmona and Virgilio Clasio were charged with theft.Although they were finally arraigned on October 12, 1976, two postponements of the arraignment and trial had already been secured by them. In fact, the trial simultaneously set for October 12, 1976 was postponed upon their motion. Subsequently, on November 16, 1976, January 28. 1977 and May 12, 1977, the trial had to be set for other days because of the non-appearance of one or the other of them. In August 1977, a resetting had to be done due to their absence. While at the trial on November 4, 1977, counsel for accused Clasio again failed to appear. This absence was repeated on December 6, 1977 and trial had again to be postponed.On January 25, 1978, accused Carmona; thru counsel, Atty. Elpidio Borja, filed a motion for postponement alleging that he would be needed in Manila on January 25, 1978, the afternoon of which was set for the continuation of the trial, and simultaneously respondents Jose and Reynata Dayrit also asked for postponement representing that they were being sent to Manila on a mission by the Governor of Camarines Sur. Atty. Prila, the counsel of the Dayrits, personally served copy of said motion on the private prosecutor, Atty. Juanito B. Ilao in the morning of January 25, 1978 requesting the latter to give his conformity and to refrain from attending the hearing that afternoon. Inasmuch as Atty. Fandiño had also asked for postponement and assured Atty. Ilao he would not also be present, Atty. Ilao acceded to the request for conformity and even gave the same in writing.

A new common counsel, Atty. Ernesto Atienza appeared and moved for withdrawal of the two motions for postponement, insisted on the trial and, because of the absence of the prosecutor, asked for dismissal on the ground of denial of speedy trial. The regular judge, who was then acting, the Honorable Rolando Carandang, unaware of the actual circumstances, found himself with no alternative than to grant the dismissal prayed for, albeit provisionally. Fortunately, however, and to his credit. upon being apprised of what had actually happened thru a motion of Atty. Ilao, filed on February 6, 1978, Judge Carandang set aside said dismissal on April 20, 1978, and reinstated the case.

Private prosecutor seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 18, 1979, alleging that the reinstatement of said criminal case did not place the accused in double jeopardy considering the peculiar circumstances attending said case.

Issue:

Whether, by virtue of the provisional dismissal, double jeopardy attached and, consequently, bar another prosecution for the same offense.

10. In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the OpulenciaCarpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

End of the Examination